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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION  
 
 
THINGS FALL APART: THE 
DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY 
MUTINIES  
 
Military mutinies are occurring more frequently in the last two decades than ever 
before. Mutinies impact every region of the world. Given that they are occurring more 
frequently, impact every region, and often have disastrous implications, scholars must 
answer the foundational question: why do mutinies occur? What are the proximate 
domestic conditions that give rise to military mutinies? This project makes three 
contributions. First, I set out to formally define mutinies and collect a new dataset that 
will allow scholars to examine mutinies empirically. Second, I present a theoretical 
framework that explains when and why mutinies will occur. Finally, I present three novel 
empirical tests of the theory.  
The first portion of this dissertation defines mutinies and describes the data 
collection process. I present the Military Mutinies and Defections Databases (MMDD). 
Using news articles from various sources, I code 460 mutiny events from 1945 – present 
day. I code a number of other variables that give users details about the event, such as: 
whether or not violence was used, whether or not civilians were killed, and whether or 
not soldiers defected from the military apparatus.  
Next, I utilize a nested principal agent model to describe when mutinies are likely to 
occur. Agent models describe hierarchical relationships of delegation. A nested structure 
allows for multiple agents and multiple principals in a given model. I apply this nested 
structure to the military to generate three various nests. The first examines foot soldiers 
as an agent of the military leadership. In this nest, policy failures (e.g., bad strategy) 
secured by the military leadership will drive foot soldier mutinies. The second nest 
explores foot soldiers as agents of the executive, a civilian principal. In this nest, I expect 
that situations that place soldiers in conflict with the executive will generate shirking. The 
final nest considers foot soldiers and military leadership as collective agents of the 
executive. I theorize that risk aversion and divergent preferences will drive shirking, or 
mutinies, in this nested structure. The final nest presents an interesting trade-off for a 
coup-worried leader. I argue that while executives can utilize regime securing strategies, 
such strategies might actually agitate the military and drive low level military rebellions. 
Coup proofing, a common practice among executives that are worried they will be ousted 
 
 
by the military, effectively wards of coups but can generate unintended consequences. 
Specifically, I expect that counterbalancing measures and other coup proofing tactics 
should spur mutinies because the intended purpose of these measures is to create 
coordination challenges which likely spur military splintering.  
 The first empirical chapter sets out to explore the relationship between civil 
conflict and the likelihood of mutinies. I expect that when civil wars are extremely 
bloody or long lasting, mutinies will be more likely as war-weary soldiers no longer want 
to invest in the war effort. I find evidence that indeed civil war intensity and duration 
contribute to the probability of a state experiencing a mutiny. The second empirical 
chapter explores scenarios that pit foot soldiers preferences against the executive’s. I 
expect that scenarios that impose steep costs on foot soldiers, yet provide some benefit to 
the executive are likely to spur mutinies. I find evidence that protest events and 
divisionary conflict spur mutinies. The final empirical chapter explores the military 
apparatus as a whole. I find that coup proofing measures increase the likelihood of 
mutinies. Additionally, I find that scenarios that are likely to spur widespread dissent 
among military actors will increase the likelihood of a mutiny in the context of steep 
coordination challenges that stifle coup activity.  
 The final chapter concludes by providing policy recommendations. I offer 
recommendations for leader states (e.g., major powers and democratic leaders in the 
international system) and for states experiencing mutinies. I conclude by discussing the 
many possible extensions for this project. This section seeks to emphasis the fact that this 
is a young, novel research program with many promising avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 1 
An Introduction: Why Do Mutinies Matter?  
Introduction and Background  
Military mutinies do not occur in isolation. Often they are the first stage in a cascade of 
events that impact the lives’ of civilians. Mutinies are frequently followed by gross 
violations of human rights, the onset of civil war, and military coups that result in 
repression. There are a myriad of examples that one could use to highlight the grave 
impacts that mutinies have on the lives’ of individuals. Below I will outline a recent case 
that occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mutinies that have impacted 
this state have had severe consequences, but this anecdote does not stand out when 
reading through the case descriptions of mutinies (see Appendix). Indeed, there are many 
anecdotes that could have been selected to portray the impact of mutinies.   
 In late March of 2012, Bosco Ntaganda, a former rebel leader, and his troops 
mutinied against the DRC national army (FARDC). Ntaganda and his soldiers had 
previously signed a peace agreement with the central government in 2009 that 
incorporated rebels back into the state’s military apparatus. However, after feeling that 
the central government had not held up the terms of the agreement, Ntaganda and his 
troops defected from the FARDC in an effort to protest the central government’s actions 
and to display discontent over unpaid salaries. The renegade troops carved out an area of 
control in Masisi with several hundred renegade soldiers serving under him (Human 
Rights Watch 2013). Within several weeks, he declared that the mutiny had given way to 
a full scale rebellion. This rebellion gave birth to one of the most infamous, notorious 
rebel groups in recent history, the M23 rebels. A simple mutiny had created a scenario 
that was quickly spiraling towards disaster and protracted civil war. 
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 The impact that M23 has had on the lives of individuals cannot be understated. 
Approximately 80% of the total recruitment of child soldiers in 2013 occurred in the 
North and South Kivu provinces where M23 consolidated power after the mutiny (The 
International Peace Support Training Centre Report 2013). Within the first three months 
of M23’s formation, Human Rights Watch estimated that M23 raped at least 61 civilians 
and summarily executed at least 44, although these are likely underestimates (Human 
Rights Watch 2013). The formation of M23, as a direct result of a military mutiny, 
produced horrific conditions for civilians and spurred years of ongoing conflict in the 
DRC. 
Mutinies occur in every region of the world and are dramatically increasing in 
frequency. While I outlined recent events in DRC, there are many other states that have 
repeatedly experienced mutinies. For example, Nigeria has experienced several 
protracted mutinies in recent years that have resulted in soldier defections to Boko 
Haram. Afghanistan’s military has seen soldiers regularly defect to the Taliban. Mutinies 
in Yemen have contributed to the rise of the Houthi rebellion. In many of these instances, 
mutinies involve state trained and equipped soldiers defecting to violent non-state actors. 
This type of defection does not bode well for the security of the state. Mutinies have the 
ability to embolden violent non-state actors by creating parity between these traditionally 
weak and ill-resourced groups and the traditionally stronger state. Given the potentially 
disastrous effects that mutinies can have on the state and its civilians, further exploration 
is needed.  
 This dissertation starts from the basic premise that while mutinies can have 
disastrous effects, scholars and policy makers have virtually no systematic information 
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about mutinies. There is no empirical, quantitative work that explores why mutinies 
occur. The recent civil military relations literature has focused almost exclusively on 
military coups d’état. Our aggregate state of knowledge regarding coups has expanded 
greatly in the last decade. While this knowledge on coups has expanded, a systematic 
understanding of mutinies is practically nonexistent. To illustrate this point, I surveyed 
two top International Relations, sub-field journals. Examining The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution and The Journal of Peace Research, there have been 463 articles that contain 
the word “coup”.1 In contrast, there are 49 articles in these two journals that mention the 
word “mutiny”.  This incongruity in knowledge is surprising given that mutinies are 
occurring more often than coups at present. This dissertation sets out to enhance our 
scholarly understanding of why mutinies happen and explore policy-relevant implications 
of systematic research findings.  
 One of the main contributions of this dissertation is the empirical task of building 
a new dataset that codes global instances of military mutinies from 1945-presentday.  
Beyond facilitating the empirical tests of this dissertation that were previously impossible 
to carry out due to a lack of data, these data will provide scholars the ability to answer a 
number of policy-relevant questions about the determinants and effects of military 
mutinies. These data will also allow scholars to ask questions about variation in the 
nature of mutinies, such as, why are some mutinies violent and others are not? It is my 
hope that these data will make lasting and meaningful contribution to scholars’ and 
policymakers’ understanding of civil-military relations.  
                                                            
1 This count covers the life of these journals. JCR was created in 1957. JPR was created 
in 1964.  
4 
 
Outline of Dissertation  
Given that there are no cross-sectional datasets that code mutinies across regions, data 
collection was the first step in this project. The following chapter presents a new dataset: 
the Military Mutinies and Defections Database (MMDD). This chapter presents basic 
descriptive statistics of MMDD as well as exploratory analyses. Here, I unearth a number 
of patterns in this new catalog of military mutinies. The descriptive statistics presented in 
this chapter are novel in that scholars and policy makers alike have virtually no 
systematic knowledge about the nature of mutinies.  
Chapter 3 seeks to answer the primary research question of this dissertation, 
“what are the proximate causes of military mutinies?”  I utilize a nested principal agent 
framework to outline scenarios that are likely to spur military mutinies. There are three 
primary actors in this nested framework: the foot soldiers, the military leadership, and the 
executive. These three actors form various hierarchical nests, making a nested principal 
agent model a suitable theoretical framework. I describe how agents may shirk, or 
mutiny, due to risk aversion or divergent preferences that do not align with the principal. 
After outlining the main theoretical mechanisms, I present a number of testable 
implications regarding scenarios that are expected to create divergent preferences or test 
risk averse agents and thus are likely to result in shirking.  
The subsequent chapters present empirical tests of these theoretical expectations. 
The first empirical chapter explores the relationship between foot soldiers as agents and 
military leadership as principals. Here, I argue that foot soldiers are largely risk averse 
due to their position of individual vulnerability. The risk of conflict for soldiers is grave, 
imposing steep costs and even death on individuals. Military leaders are tasked with 
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securing good strategy, or strategies that mitigate individual risk for foot soldiers. When 
military leaders fail to secure good strategy, the risk posed to foot soldiers is steep. Due 
to risk aversion, foot soldiers are likely to shirk when bad strategy is selected by military 
leadership. As an indicator of bad strategy, I examine the impact of long lasting and 
intense civil war on the likelihood of shirking. I find evidence that risk aversion does 
drive shirking in this nest where foot soldiers are serving as agents of military leadership. 
Bloody and enduring civil wars raise the risk of mutiny.  
 The second empirical chapter examines the relationship between foot soldiers 
and the executive. In this nest, foot soldiers serve as agents of the civilian principal, the 
executive. I argue again that risk aversion and divergent preferences will drive shirking in 
this nest. I expect that military regimes, or regimes where the executive branch and 
military leaders are essentially one cohesive unit, will be more mutiny prone. I do not 
find strong empirical support for this expectation. I then examine the impact that protests 
have on mutinies. Protests can impose steep costs on foot soldiers. I find that indeed, 
protests spur mutinies. Diversionary war creates scenarios of great danger for foot 
soldiers and also great benefit for executives. Thus, I expect this relative risk and reward 
should incentivize shirking by way of mutiny. I find support for this expectation that 
diversionary conflict increases the chances of a mutiny.  
 The final empirical chapter examines all the actors in the interaction. In this nest, 
the foot soldiers and military leadership are serving as agents of the executive.  Adding 
all of the actors back into the model generates complex dynamics and tradeoffs for the 
executive to consider. Executives are fearful of coup activity as such extraconstitutional 
shifts in power threaten their tenure. As such, they are likely to impose coup proofing 
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measures, or strategies that are effective at minimizing the risk of coup activity. 
However, such tactics increase coordination challenges and exaggerate existing cleavages 
in a military, such as those along ethnicity, or generate artificial rifts in order to minimize 
conspiratorial tendencies. In doing so, executives can unintentionally increase the 
propensity for mutinies by imposing coup proofing measures on their military. 
Additionally, I examine scenarios that are likely to generate wide spread grievances 
among the military and would traditionally be associated with coup activity. However, in 
the context of high coup proofing, where coup activity may not be able to be fully 
realized, I argue that mutinies will be used as a substitution for coups. I examine the 
impact of democratization and human rights violations on the likelihood of mutinies 
given a highly counterbalanced military. I find evidence that of all the various types of 
human rights violations, political imprisonment in the context of high coup proofing 
spurs mutinies.   
The final chapter explores a number of policy implications that arise from the 
research findings presented in this dissertation. I demonstrate that policy makers in the 
West have often encouraged and incentivized mutinies in the developing world as a 
solution to civil conflict. However, I offer a strong caution here. There is actually no 
evidence that mutinies shorten wars or produce favorable outcomes. Next, I discuss 
whether or not mutinies may serve as a harbinger for other domestic processes. I show 
preliminary evidence that mutinies can serve as an early indication of possible coup 
activity. This evidence is useful to both policy and scholarly communities seeking to 
predict when and where the next coup may occur. Finally, I offer recommendations to 
leaders trying to secure their tenure. While coup proofing can ward off coups, there are 
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potential risks with maximizing counter balancing measures. Specifically, in placing the 
steepest coup proofing measures on a military, mutinies are more likely. While mutinies 
do not directly oust the executive, they can give way to escalating processes that pose 
serious threats to a leader’s security, such as: rebellion or full scale revolution.  In the last 
portion of Chapter 7, I put forward many avenues for future research. One of the 
strengths of this research program is the potential for expansion. I offer several ideas 
research projects that will serve both scholarly objectives and produce meaningful policy 
implications.   
 
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018 
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Chapter 2  
Military Mutinies and Defections (MMDD) 1945-2017: A New Dataset 
Special Data Feature  
While research on civil-military relations has burgeoned recently, the focus has remained 
largely on coups d’état, or events that specifically seek to oust the executive. There is no 
doubt that coups are critically important; however, they likely only represent the apex of 
military dissatisfaction. Evidence suggests that militaries have many modalities they 
utilize to express grievances before launching a fully-realized coup. Specifically, 
militaries can signal grievances with smaller-scale military rebellion, or mutinies. 
Focusing solely on coups limits scholars’ understanding of the micro-processes of 
military rebellion. To this point, scholarship has lacked a complete catalog of smaller-
scale indiscipline, which prevented the systematic study of such events. The Military 
Mutinies and Defections Database (MMDD) introduced here provides scholars with the 
necessary tools to explore indiscipline beyond coups. MMDD provides scholars with the 
opportunity to examine lower level rebellion that operates through distinct theoretical 
channels from coups.   
 Mutinies are central to the understanding of civil military relations. To illustrate 
the importance of lower-level military rebellion, consider Nigeria’s military. Nigeria has 
not experienced a coup in the last two decades. The last fully realized-coup occurred in 
1993 after the military annulled the outcome of a presidential election and stepped into 
power. As such, observers might conclude that civil-military relations in Nigeria have 
been relatively placid over the course of the last two decades, especially if they relied on 
extant data to capture civil military relations (e.g., Powell and Thyne 2011). This 
conclusion is far from the truth.  
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Nigeria’s military is frequently entangled in civilian politics. Soldiers displeased 
with the state’s policies often use unauthorized tactics or refuse to participate in combat. 
As recently as July 2008, nearly 30 Nigerian soldiers serving in a United Nations mission 
in Liberia protested low pay during deployment (BBC Monitoring Africa 2009). 
Similarly, Nigerian soldiers mutinied on several occasions in 2014, refusing to fight Boko 
Haram because they felt under-resourced (Daily Nation 2014). While such acts are 
clearly not coup activities, they are still a threat to the state. As Parsons (2003: 3) writes, 
“Mutiny is usually a capital offense because it represents a direct challenge to lawful civil 
authority over the armed forces. Without civil control, soldiers can easily devolve into a 
predatory threat to the very societies they are charged to protect.” The predatory threat 
posed by military mutinies is critically important to enhancing scholars’ understanding of 
civil military relations.  
Contributions  
The contributions of this project are threefold. First, there are no longitudinal datasets 
that systematically code military mutinies across all regions. This dataset represents the 
first attempt to capture events that do not directly seek to oust the executive but still 
represent serious forms of military indiscipline. The existing work on military mutinies 
typically explores case studies that select cases non-randomly upon the dependent 
variable, making it increasingly difficult to draw inferences about the causes and effects 
of military mutinies (e.g., Osboune 2014). This dataset will move scholarship forward by 
introducing a systematic, cross-sectional catalog of military mutinies, which will allow 
scholars to test expectations about why militaries rebel and how such rebellions influence 
other conflict processes. 
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 A second contribution MMDD makes is allowing scholars to consider the impact 
of military disloyalty through domestic perspectives. The military is a critically important 
actor in transitioning societies, such as those that are democratizing, concluding a civil 
war, or experiencing domestic dissent.   Successful democratization processes must 
incorporate the military, as we know that the military is an important veto player in 
fledgling democracies (Mansfield and Snyder 2002). Military cohesion is also essential 
for quick and decisive civil war termination (Cunningham 2006). If the military is 
fractured, civil conflict may drag on as a result of disunity that creates parity between 
rebel groups and state forces. Likewise, scholars have demonstrated that military loyalty 
also impacts the success of protest movements. As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show, 
military defections enhance the success of protest movements. While their study only 
considers the impact of very large-scale defections, MMDD gives scholars the 
opportunity to examine military rebellion on a smaller scale. Clearly there are many 
domestic phenomena that are likely impacted by dimensions of military loyalty. MMDD 
will allow scholars to examine these links across space and time for the first time.  
Third, dimensions of military loyalty also impact international phenomena. 
Military mutinies undoubtedly have an impact on battlefield effectiveness. However, it 
remains unclear if mutinies should enhance fighting capabilities or weaken them. On the 
one hand, mutinies might result in a policy change or strategy shift. This divergence from 
previous policies might enhance a state’s fighting capabilities. On the other hand, 
mutinies represent a splintering within the military and may result in a slapdash, 
disjointed war effort. MMDD will enable scholars to pursue such questions and test 
theoretical mechanisms that enhance or diminish fighting effectiveness. Alliance 
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formation might also be impacted by mutinies. States may hesitate to form alliances with 
mutiny-prone states, recognizing that their military is prone to fracture. This fracture 
could make the ally a weak or unreliable partner, thus impacting decisions made at the 
formation stage. While these are primary suggestions for future work that would consider 
dimensions of military loyalty, there are many other areas of the intra- and interstate 
conflict literatures in which MMDD will prove useful.  
What are Mutinies? A Conceptual Definition  
I define military mutinies as observable acts committed by military actors with intent to 
display indiscipline towards leadership in an effort to revise the status quo.2 I require that 
mutiny events surpass a minimum threshold of 12 soldiers for an event to be considered a 
mutiny.3 This threshold is in line with the existing understanding that mutinies are 
defined in large part by their collective nature (Dwyer 2015). In other words, a single 
rouge soldier or a few renegade combatants does not represent the conceptual equivalent 
of a mutiny.   
                                                            
2 The definition put forward here departs existing narrow definition of mutinies. The most 
commonly used definitions is “an act of collective insubordination, in which troops revolt 
against lawfully constituted authority” (Dwyer 2015).  One exceedingly important caveat 
is that this thin conceptualization of mutinies excludes events such as desertion, evading 
orders purposefully, or military defection. Theoretically, there are a number of ways for 
soldiers to display grievances, and one particularly effective way might be to remove 
themselves from the military apparatus altogether or join the other side in a conflict. 
Therefore, I include desertions and defections in MMDD, but code them accordingly so 
that users may drop such cases if they do not find them theoretically useful for their 
project.  
3 While this threshold might seem arbitrary, 12-15 individuals the average size of a squad 
in the U.S. context. Clearly, the size of squads may vary between countries, but this is at 
least a full unit of soldiers in most contexts and provides a theoretical justification for this 
threshold.  
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The key components of the MMDD definition of mutiny require elaboration. 
First, mutiny events must be purposeful, not accidental. Simply misunderstanding orders 
does not constitute a military mutiny. Mutineers must clearly share a grievance, and as a 
result, attempt to change the status quo by defying the chain of command in some 
observable, collective way. Mutinies may occur domestically or abroad when troops are 
deployed.4 Below I will outline who perpetrates mutinies, who mutineers target, and the 
goals of mutinies.  
Military actors must perpetrate military mutinies. MMDD does not code events of 
rebellion carried out by those in civilian positions, rebel groups, or military reserves.5 
Early work on civil military relations largely argued “soldiers mutiny, while officers 
stage coups” (Nordlinger 1977). While this statement contains an attractive element of 
simplicity, the rough dichotomy does not hold up in reality. There are many cases of 
mutiny that are initiated and orchestrated by junior officers, officers, or generals. For 
example, junior officers perpetrated the 2011 Libyan mutiny by rebelling inside the home 
of Al-Qadhafi (BBC Monitoring Middle East 2011). These junior officers were quickly 
opposed by Al-Qadhafi’s paramilitary. They were clearly not seeking to harm or oust Al-
Qadhafi himself, but instead were using intimidation tactics to promote their interests. 
This case highlights that while mutinies are generally carried out by the rank-and-file, 
higher ranking military officials can also perpetrate them. For this reason, MMDD 
                                                            
4 When troops are deployed, mutinies are coded in respect to which state’s forces 
mutinied. For example, the German mutiny in February 1945 occurred in Copenhagen. 
Because German troops mutinied, this is coded as a German mutiny, rather than a Danish 
mutiny.  
5 Espionage events are not coded in MMDD, although they are often labeled 
“defections.”  
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includes a variable that codes whether or not mutinies are perpetrated by foot-soldiers or 
are spearheaded by military leaders. I define military leaders as commissioned ranks as 
opposed to non-commissioned ranks. However, MMDD does not set out to distinguish 
mutinies from coups based upon the perpetrators. I allow for military leadership to 
mutiny, just like foot soldiers. Instead, what separates coups and mutinies is the goal. 
Events that have the explicit goal to oust the executive are coups, while event that have a 
goal short of regime change are mutinies.   
Mutinies can have two potential targets: military leadership (e.g., various 
commissioned officers, such as Lieutenant Colonels) or the executive. Similar to 
perpetrators, I do not categorize mutinies based upon the target. In my extensive reading 
of cases, I learned that mutinies often target the executive, just like coups. As the unusual 
2011 Libyan mutiny illustrates, sometimes mutinies can, in fact, target the executive. 
Because mutinies may target the executive, they can be difficult to distinguish from 
coups. Fortunately, coup scholars have spent a great deal of time considering the ultimate 
goal of coup-plotters. As Powell and Thyne (2011: 249) state, coups are “illegal and overt 
attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting 
executive.” Thus MMDD only codes events that begin with no clear intent to oust the 
executive. However, there are times that this intent to oust the executive develops as 
events progress. Below I will describe the process for handling such escalating events. 
Mutinies may be one early step in a larger, escalating process of contentious in 
politics. As Rose (1982: 572) suggests, mutinies can be “the first step in a much larger 
upheaval and the catalyst through which discontents in other sectors of society are 
activated.” In reality, a series of mutinies will often proceed coup activity. Therefore, it is 
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critical to establish when the dissent moves from mutiny territory and into coup activity. 
In an order to capture this escalation effect, I have coded two variables that capture 
escalation. These variables are coded 1 if a coup occurs within two temporal thresholds 
of a mutiny (1 month and 6 months). These variables will allow users to carefully 
consider the relationship between these distinct forms of military rebellion. In addition, 
Powell and Thyne’s (2011) coup dataset was cross-referenced to ensure that no coup 
attempts were coded as mutinies unless the event clearly began as a mutiny that escalated 
to a coup. Each mutiny’s source document was assessed to confirm that the perpetrators 
were seeking to change military policy or to signal grievances to observers, rather than 
explicitly seeking to oust the executive.  
Failed coups present a unique challenge. Because failed coups do not result in the 
ousting of the executive, they can be hard to distinguish from mutinies. Singh (2014: 37) 
calls coup attempts lead by foot soldiers “coups from the bottom.” He writes that a “coup 
from the bottom” is “…a mutiny intent to overthrow the government.” While I recognize 
that there are a handful of coup attempts that are led by the foot soldiers, they are vastly 
outnumbered by coup attempts organized by military leaders. Coups from the bottom and 
mutinies should not be conceptually conflated, as these are two distinct processes that can 
be differentiated from one another. As outlined previously, a coup, even those led by foot 
soldiers, will be observable because they are overt attempts to unseat the executive. 
Mutineers have a goal short of unseating the executive. Thus, MMDD is not coding 
“coups from the bottom,” as they are conceptually distinct from mutinies.  
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Data Collection  
MMDD was coded using Lexis-Nexis Uni (formerly known as Lexis-Nexis Academic) 
and the Historical New York Times. Lexis-Nexis Uni searches beyond major English news 
wire sources, making it extremely useful for this project. The New York Times was also 
used due to its widespread accessibility and enhanced temporal coverage. The search was 
performed with the following terms: “mutiny,” “military mutiny,” “military sedition,” 
“military defection,” “military desertion,” “military rebellion,” “soldier mutiny,” “soldier 
defection,” “soldier desertion,” “soldier rebellion,” “troop mutiny,” “troop rebellion,” 
“troop desertion,” “troop defection.” In some instances, news sources did not report 
specifics about the mutiny event, such as the number of soldiers involved or the duration. 
In these instances, consulting books and region-specific academic journals clarified these 
specifics.6 If reliable information could not be located, those variables were marked as 
missing in the dataset for that case.  
Other datasets were consulted to identify candidate cases. Powell and Thyne’s 
(2011) full coup candidate dataset includes events that were initially considered for 
inclusion in their coup dataset but were excluded because there was no overt attempt 
made to oust the executive. I reviewed each of these cases, and many of them were 
mutinies rather than coups.7,8 The Social Political and Economic Events Dataset 
(SPEED), Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD), and the Armed Conflict Location, 
and Event Data Project (ACLED) code events of mutiny (Nardulli et al. 2014; Salehyan 
                                                            
6 Outside sources are reported in the dataset files.  
7 22 cases were identified from Powell and Thyne (2011) using the “no_exec” variable in 
their full candidate case dataset.  
8 Counter coups are not included in MMDD.  
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et al. 2012; Raleigh et al. 2010). I also used these datasets to help identify candidate 
cases; however, it is important to note that the primary objective of these projects is not 
to produce a comprehensive catalog of mutinies. As such, I find that many mutinies are 
not coded in these datasets and some of the events that are coded do not fit the formal 
definition of mutinies. Indeed, many of the events coded as mutinies in these datasets do 
not even roughly resemble mutinies.9 Similarly, I consult Dwyer (2015) to explore her 
sample of mutinies in Western Africa. Likewise, I find that many of the events coded 
here do not meet MMDD’s formal definition of mutinies. Some events in this research 
could not be verified by primary or secondary sources, and thus are not included in 
MMDD. It is likely that these existing data sources have been miscoding mutinies, thus 
inhibiting scholars’ ability to draw accurate inferences about the effects and determinants 
of mutinies. MMDD addresses this issue by coding only events that meet a formal 
conceptual and empirical definition of mutiny.  
Beyond coding the occurrence of mutiny, MMDD also codes several pieces of 
specific information about each event. Each mutiny event is geocoded. For the majority 
of events, the specific sub-national latitude and longitude of the location of the mutiny is 
reported.10 This geocoding will provide users with the unique ability to examine 
                                                            
9 For example, there are events in SPEED that are coded as mutinies (or they take on the 
value of 18 on the “stat-act” variable). However, many of these events are clearly not 
mutinies. There are several events from the integration era in America that are coded as 
mutinies. News articles for some of these events are titled, “New Flare up in Nashville” 
(1968), “Columbus, Ga., Mayor Asks People to Keep off Streets” (1971), and “Louisville 
Bussing Resumes as More Students Enroll” (1975). Given the high level of certainty in 
the American context that these are not mutinies, users should also seriously question the 
accuracy of this coding scheme in lower information environments.   
10 For most events, these coordinates are coded for the specific location of the mutiny 
within a city. However, some news reports are less specific than others. For less specific 
articles, the coordinates of the city in which the mutiny occurred are reported.  
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dynamics of spatial contagion and subnational considerations of military rebellion. 
Characteristics of each mutiny event are also coded, such as: estimated number of 
mutineers, estimated duration of mutiny in days, the occurrence of civilian deaths, and 
the occurrence of violence. I have also coded particular characteristics on which users can 
eliminate particular types of events. For example, I have coded whether or not junior 
officers led the mutiny. If users are only concerned about foot soldier mutinies, this 
variable will allow them to drop all events that military leadership influenced. Likewise, I 
have coded two escalation variables that code if a mutiny escalated to a coup within 1 
month or 6 months. Thus, if users want to only examine cases of escalation or exclude 
cases of escalation, this variable facilitates such adjustments.  
A dichotomous variable is coded to capture whether or not an event involved 
defection. Defection can be conceptually tricky. In order for an event to involve 
defection, the state must be actively countering either an internal threat (e.g., rebel group, 
terrorist organization, secessionist movement, etc.) or an external threat. Defection only 
occurs if there is evidence or suggestion in the source document that the soldiers not only 
left the military apparatus, but then joined forces with this internal or external threat. 
Defections are theoretically important because they are events that shift the balance of 
power between state militaries and their opponents.  
 MMDD users might be concerned with the reliability of the data. As with any 
measure in social science, there are likely errors associated with the measurement of 
indicators (Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). However, it is unlikely that these errors are 
systematic, thus introducing noise into the data but not systematically biasing them in one 
direction. While most errors are likely random, there may be some systematic biases in 
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MMDD. There are fewer events occurring in Asia and in closed regimes, likely due to a 
gap in reporting and media restraints. Non-democracies are able to suppress the media in 
ways that constrain the reporting of any form of state weakness. For example, the 
managing editor of L’Observateur, a weekly newspaper in Chad, was detained and held 
in police custody after reporting on a 2013 mutiny in the Bardai region of Chad (BBC 
Monitoring Africa 2013). Events like this might result in a systematic underreporting in 
non-democracies.  
In order to partially address this issue, users should always include a control 
variable for regime type and consider using regional fixed effects. Additionally, MMDD 
users might consider estimating models on a limited sample to see if findings hold (e.g., 
limiting the sample to only Western democracies where there is little reporting gap). As a 
final robustness check, users might consider including a control variable in the estimation 
that holds constant the total number of news articles from each country in a specific year. 
While it would be nice to be able to overcome such systematic biases in more satisfying 
ways, many events datasets suffer from similar biases (e.g., human rights data). However, 
these potential biases should not deter scholars from attempting to examine critically 
important topics that can have dire consequences for civilians. As we know, similar 
reporting biases exist across many commonly used data sources. Regime type and media 
openness is likely the only systematic bias in these data. All other bias will be random, 
thus not threatening our ability to draw inferences with these new data.  
 Validity of the measure is another concern. While a measure might be reliable, it 
could still lack conceptual validity, meaning that it does not adequately capture the 
concept being operationalized. As mentioned previously, the literature has conceived of 
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mutinies in various ways. Some conceive of mutinies only occurring within the military 
apparatus while others equate mutinies with defection events. In order to address this 
conceptual confusion, there is a variable that indicates defections, allowing users to 
decide whether or not they want to include these events in their study of mutinies. 
MMDD has reassuring face validity. I find 460 mutiny events over this time series, which 
is about what we should expect to see given that there are roughly the same number of 
coups attempts in this time period (Powell and Thyne 2011).11 Perhaps face validity 
would be challenged if MMDD found a drastically different number, but indeed, MMDD 
yields roughly the same number of events. In compiling MMDD, I have made every 
attempt to make a user-friendly dataset that can be manipulated depending on the user’s 
research question and goals.  
Exploring MMDD  
Presented below are a number of descriptive and exploratory figures that seek to 
find general patterns and identify possible determinants of mutinies. Figure 2.1 presents 
military mutinies across space. Unsurprisingly, the Global South experiences more 
mutinies than the North. This pattern is likely driven by regime type, given that the 
majority of anocracies and autocracies are located in the Global South. Another important 
observation to make from this figure is that mutinies are occurring in every region. There 
are no regions that are “mutiny-proofed”. 
                                                            
11 They code 475 events.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Military Mutinies across Space, 1945-2018 
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Table 2.1 summarizes the frequencies of mutinies across regions. Africa stands 
out as not only the most mutiny prone region. Given that mutinies occur, they are more 
like to be violent if they occur in Asia. Not surprisingly, the fewest violent mutinies occur 
in Europe where democracies tend to be more consolidated and other levels of political 
violence are lower.   
Table 2.1: Frequency of Mutinies across Regions, 1945-2017  
Region  Name  Count of Mutinies  Count of Violent 
Mutinies (% of mutinies 
associated with violence)  
1 Europe 51 12 (23.5%)  
2 Middle East 61 19 (31.1%) 
3 Asia 102 50 (49%) 
4 Africa 199 82 (41.2%) 
5 Americas 47 15 (31.9%) 
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Figure 2.2: Mutinies by Region
 
 Figure 2.2 displays the number of mutinies across region graphically. This figure 
also displays the portion of mutinies that involved defection. Remember, defections are 
coded when the source document indicates that soldiers left the state’s military apparatus 
and joined cohorts with an internal or external threat. We see that defections follow the 
same general pattern as the total count of mutinies. Defections occur most often in Africa, 
likely due to the strong presence of both internal and external threats and the weakness of 
state institutions. This state weakness creates opportunity structures that incentivize 
defection. Furthermore, threats (most specifically internal threats) are often designed to 
be competitors of the state and offer an alternative to disgruntled soldiers. In contrast, 
defections occur least often in Europe. Figure 2.3 displays defections across space. In this 
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figure, X’s are events that involved defection. Black circles are mutinies that were not 
associated with defection. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Mutinies with Defections 1945-2018
No Defection 
Defection 
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Next, Figure 2.4 presents military mutinies and coups d’état across time. An 
interesting pattern emerges from this exercise. This figure demonstrates that in the post-
Cold War era, militaries have shown an increased propensity for mutinous activity. At the 
same time, the number of military coups is dwindling. This pattern firmly justifies the 
continued exploration of mutinies. Mutinies often disastrous implications for human 
security, and they are happening more often than military coups at present. These two 
observations motivate the remainder of this dissertation. Given that mutinies happen 
more now than in previous decades, they have outpaced coups, and they can impact 
civilians, we must understand why they happen.    
Figure 2.4: Mutinies and Coups d’état over Time  
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Next, I explore the relationship between regime type and mutinies. Figure 2.5 
shows military mutinies across different regime types using Polity IV measures of regime 
type (Marshall and Gurr 2009).12 Interestingly, the figure suggests that there is a non-
monotonic relationship between regime type and the mutiny proneness of a country. 
Semi-democracies appear to be the most susceptible polities to military disloyalty.13 This 
pattern in the data makes sense when considering that militaries in democracies are likely 
to have institutional avenues to secure their organizational preferences, making the option 
of mutiny less appealing and necessary in the first place. In contrast, militaries in 
completely autocratic states are unlikely to rebel because the heavy-handed, repressive 
nature of the regime is likely to enhance loyalty even if it is not sincere. Militaries in 
semi-open regimes are likely to face circumstances that make them unsatisfied with the 
status quo. Furthermore, militaries in semi-open regimes are more likely than their 
democratic and autocratic counterparts to carry out violent mutinies. This figure also 
demonstrates that semi-democracies are more likely to experience violent mutinies than 
other regime types. Figure 2.6 displays violent mutinies across space. In this figure, 
triangles represent mutinies that were associated with violence. Circles represent peaceful 
mutinies. About half of all mutinies are associated with violence.  
                                                            
12 Autocracies are indicated by regimes that score a -6 or lower, while democracies must 
score a 6 or higher. Semi-democracies are regimes that fall somewhere between these cut 
points. 
13 Returning to the idea of reporting bias, this pattern offers an interesting insight. If 
reporting bias was pervasive in these data we would expect to see that democracies have 
the most events, semi-democracies the second most, and dictatorships the least. Instead, 
we see that semi-democracies have the most events and dictatorships the least. While this 
pattern does not go a long way to assuage concerns about the autocracy category, this 
pattern should alleviate fears that MMDD is only picking up events in transparent 
democracies.  
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Figure 2.5: Mutinies by Regime Type 1945-2016 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Violent Mutinies 1945-2018 
 
Non-Violent 
Violent 
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Figure 2.7 explores the relationship between regime type and the duration of 
mutinies. Duration is captured by the estimated number of days a mutiny lasted. The 
round symbols in the figure are proportional representation symbols. Larger circles 
represent longer lasting mutinies whereas smaller circles represent shorter mutinies. This 
figure demonstrates that while autocracies and democracies experience mutinies less 
often than anocracies, the nature of the mutinies they do experience is qualitatively 
different. Autocracies experience protracted mutinies that endure longer. Democracies 
tend to have short-lived mutinies. There is no coherent pattern for semi-democracies. 
Some mutinies in these regimes are very long while others are short. Figure 2.8 displays 
the relative duration of mutinies spatially.  
Figure 2.7: Proportional Duration of Mutinies by Regime Time  
 
 
Figure 2.8: Proportional Duration of Mutinies 1945-2018
Quantiles of Duration 
(1-90 Days) 
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Mutinies vary dramatically by size. Figure 2.9 displays the relative size of 
mutinies spatially. The size variable is coded as the estimated number of individuals 
involved in a mutiny event. This variable is only coded if the source document 
provides an estimate. This variable ranges from 1-25,000 individuals.14 The largest 
mutiny in the dataset took place in Egypt in 1986 after conscripts of the CSF 
(paramilitary organization) staged a protest in Cairo in response to a rumor that 
conscription terms were going to be lengthened from 3 years to 4 years of service. 
The second largest event in MMDD occurred in Iraq in 2004. The Iraqi army was 
ordered to deploy to Fallujah in an effort to assist U.S. Marines who were actively 
fighting in this region. The troops refused these orders and an estimated 15,000 
soldiers and military police officers deserted their posts. This forced the U.S. to 
reevaluate military recruiting and retention strategies in Iraq. Despite these dramatic 
outliers, the average size of a mutiny event in MMDD is 88 soldiers.  
Six percent of mutinies are associated with civilian deaths. Figure 2.9 displays 
these events spatially. Squares represent mutinies that are associated with civilian deaths. 
Circles represent mutinies that did not kill civilians. It is possible that this variable is an 
underestimate of reality. This dichotomous variable was only coded if the source 
document explicitly mentioned the death of a civilian. Therefore, it is likely that there are 
events in which civilians were killed but the source document did not explicitly state this, 
resulting in a false negative. Even with this possible bias, we still see that 1 out of every 
                                                            
14 Size is only coded for 260 mutiny events (56.5% of MMDD). Many source documents 
do not mention size estimates. Thus, this information is only available for some events.  
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20 mutinies results in the death of a civilian, proving that these events have a direct and 
immediate impact on human security. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Mutinies Associated with Civilian Deaths 1945-2018 
No Civilian Deaths  
Civilian Deaths 
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Some mutinies are led by commissioned ranks while others are conducted entirely 
by foot soldiers. This reality may be of interest to scholars seeking to understand the 
impacts of mutinies. It is theoretically plausible that foot soldier mutinies have distinct 
outcomes when compared to those that involve military leaders. For example, foot soldier 
mutinies may likely be more violent in nature than mutinies in which commissioned 
ranks are involved. When foot soldiers lead mutinies, they are likely less concerned with 
legitimacy and more concerned with securing their preferences as quickly as possible by 
any means necessary. Generally, these foot soldier mutinies are staged over resources. 
One particularly effective way to secure resources is to exploit the civilian population 
through the use of violence to facilitate looting. In contrast, commissioned ranks 
understand that the use of violence may spoil their movement (similar to Stephan and 
Chenoweth’s argument mentioned earlier). Commissioned officers will be more hesitant 
to use violence, understanding that it may in fact detract from the effectiveness of their 
campaign.  
Using a simple contingency analysis, Table 2.2 demonstrates preliminary 
evidence that foot soldier mutinies may be more dangerous than mutinies led by low-
ranking military officers. 45.2% of all foot soldier mutinies are associated with violence 
while only 27.1% of mutinies led by commissioned ranks are associated with violence 
(chi-squared = 14.7, p<0.001). Figure 10 displays whether a mutiny was led by 
commissioned officers or foot soldiers. Stars represent events that were initiated by 
commissioned ranks while circles represent foot soldier mutinies.  
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Table 2.2: Mutinies and Civil Conflict, 1945-2008  
 Foot Soldier   Low Rank  Total 
Not Violent  161 (54.7%) 121 (72.9%) 282 
Violent  133 (45.2%) 45 (27.1%) 178 
Total  294 166 460 
Pearson chi2(2) = 14.7002, p< 0.001
 
 
Figure 2.10: Mutinies lead by Commissioned Officers 1945-2018
Foot Soldier Mutiny  
Commissioned Officer 
Mutiny  
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Avenues for Future Research  
Beyond the enticing empirical relationships explored above, there are several theoretical 
and policy-oriented areas for further research on mutinies. First, there is an emerging 
reality that the international community is beginning to punish coup activity more harshly 
and consistently than in previous decades. Specifically, in the post-Cold War era, coups 
are generally condemned by democratic leaders in the international system as well as in 
international organizations. Consider the recent July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. 
Despite Erdogan’s tenuous leadership, President Obama was swift in his condemning 
response. President Obama urged all parties to “support the democratically elected 
government of Turkey,” seeking to discourage such upheaval (Politico 2016). 
Furthermore, international organizations are also likely to respond negatively to coup 
activity. The 2009 Honduran coup resulted in immediate expulsion of the state from the 
Organization of American States (OAS), revoking all membership contingent benefits 
(OAS Press Release 2009). As the cost of coup plotting continues to rise, it is likely that 
the incidence of mutinies will continue to increase as military actors recognize that this is 
a less costly alternative to coup plotting.  
Beyond the rising cost of coups, there is strong evidence that the incidence of 
coups is waning (Lindberg and Clark 2008). Thyne and his colleagues (2016) 
demonstrate that negative international reactions to coups decrease the time that a coup 
plotter will remain in power after they stage a successful coup. These findings suggest 
that the post-coup state is often treacherous for the putschist. Given the rising costs 
associated with launching a coup, it seems likely that militaries will pivot to new 
modalities of rebellion that are less costly but are still likely to change the status quo. It 
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seems reasonable to expect coups to continue to decline and lower levels of indiscipline 
to become the new normal, especially given the large difference in costs.  
Third, not only do mutinies seem to be an increasingly popular form of dissent, 
but they also continue to shape the face of civil conflict in the 21st century. Consider the 
current Syrian civil war. As Arab Spring protests reached Syria in late March of 2011, 
tens of thousands of protesters joined the movement across several of the state’s largest 
cities. The Assad regime was clear in its intention to repress, ordering the military to 
squelch contention as effectively as possible, even ordering soldiers to fire and kill 
peaceful dissidents where necessary. However, portions of the military refused to comply 
with the regime’s orders. Sunni portions of the military mutinied at remarkable rates. 
Some of these disloyal combatants sought political asylum, some were executed, and 
many joined the rebel forces (Nepstad 2013). It is still unclear the degree to which some 
of these defecting soldiers supported, sympathized with, and ultimately joined non-state 
actors operating in Syria. While spurred by generations of sectarian divides, the defection 
of Sunni combatants has undoubtedly contributed to Syria’s bloody civil war by leveling 
the playing field between the state forces and rebel forces. The lack of state forces and 
fighting capacity in particular regions facilitated ISIS’s growth and its ability to 
consolidate grip on swaths of territory, including Raqqa and Deir al-Zour.  
Syria is not alone in demonstrating how military mutinies contribute to prolonged 
civil conflict. For nearly two decades, conflict has plagued the Central African Republic 
(CAR). It is clear that this conflict is at least partially rooted in the state’s inability to 
ward off protracted military mutinies. In 1996, portions of the Central African Armed 
Forces (FACA) mutinied over low wages and concerns of equity. President Patasse was 
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unable to appease the mutineers, which resulted in a lack of fighting capacity for the 
state. Local militias and rebel groups were able to successfully recruit, generate revenue, 
and engage in guerilla tactics because of this vacuum of state military power. In an act of 
improvisation, President Patasse formed a new security force that would later commit 
wide-scale human rights violation in the name of the state (U.S. Department of State 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, February 23, 2000). Much like the current 
Syrian case, mutinies provided the kindling needed to spark civil conflict and sustain the 
fire for nearly two decades in CAR. These two examples of the impact of military 
mutinies on the stability of states and on the severity of intrastate war call attention to the 
need for systematic understanding of this unique phenomenon.  
Fourth, military mutinies also have direct implications for the study of interstate 
conflict and traditional measures of power. Scholars who examine military power 
generally use measures such as Composite Index of National Capabilities, or CINC 
scores (Small and Singer 1982). However, such measures do not consider military 
loyalty, a dimension of power that has a direct and measurable impact on the state’s 
ability to wage war. There is an implicit assumption behind the use of CINC scores that 
every state will be able to leverage proportional resources in the CINC index in the event 
of a conflict. However, simply because a state has a large military does not mean that it 
will translate directly into fighting power. A large military may be plagued with 
ideological divides, ethnic cleavages, grievances due to under resourcing, etc. Any one of 
these factors may result in a large military being ineffective at fighting if rifts generate 
mutinies — meaning the total number of military personnel never make it to the 
battlefield because they decide to walk off their post. States are only as strong as their 
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military is cohesive. MMDD will allow scholars to critically examine how much 
dimensions of military disloyalty influence traditional conceptions of power.  
Conclusion  
This chapter introduces MMDD, a unique dataset that codes events of military rebellion. 
This new tool will allow scholars to test theoretical expectations about the determinants 
and effects of mutinies. The chapter also explored a handful of empirical relationships 
and discussed implications of MMDD for a variety of research areas. Regarding mutinies 
as a future research agenda, there are a number of directions for investigation. The next 
obvious step would be to predict mutinies. As seen in the exploratory portion of the 
paper, I have presented preliminary ideas about what other social processes are likely 
driving soldiers’ decisions to defect. A second goal would be to explore multinomial 
outcomes of military unrest. For example, why does the military decide to launch a coup 
in some cases, while in other scenarios they simply mutiny? Beyond exploring why 
mutinies occur, MMDD will now allow scholars to consider questions about the effects 
of mutinies. Scholars might explore how mutinies affect the outcome and duration of 
civil wars by introducing more spoilers or veto payers. Or perhaps there are theoretical 
reasons to suspect that mutinies weaken battlefield effectiveness. MMDD provides 
scholars with numerous avenues of inquiry that will likely provide timely policy 
recommendations.  
 In sum, military mutinies are a topic worthy of further investigation. Mutinies 
have the ability to affect a number of larger conflict processes both in the inter- and 
intrastate context. This dataset represents a strong contribution to the literature by 
allowing conflict scholars to consider elements of military loyalty longitudinally to 
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enhance our broader understanding of conflict processes. While this chapter offered a 
broad exploratory overview of MMDD, the next chapter will dive into the central 
research question of this dissertation, seeking to provide scholars an explanation for why 
mutinies occur. In the next chapter I outline the theoretical framework that will guide 
subsequent empirical chapters.  
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018  
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Chapter 3 
 Why Mutinies Occur: A Theoretical Framework 
Military mutinies have occurred more frequently in the last 30 years than ever 
before. Figure 1 presents a moving average of military mutinies from 1945-present day 
using the new MMDD dataset presented in the previous chapter.   
Figure 3.1: Temporal Trends of Military Mutinies  
 
Not only are mutinies occurring more often at the systemic level, but mutinies 
have also become a persistent and pervasive problems over the last two decades for 
particular states. For example, the Ivory Coast experienced its first mutiny in 1990. Since 
then, the state has experienced nearly a dozen mutinies, many of which have been violent 
and disrupting to state stability. Most of these mutinies occurred along the lines of former 
rebel groups that were integrated back into the state’s military after the conclusion of the 
Cote d’Ivoire’s civil war. Likewise, since 2011 Syria has experienced 12 mutinies during 
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a civil conflict that proved to have disastrous implications for the stability of the entire 
region. Beyond these two examples there are many states, especially in Africa, Asia, and 
the Middle East, that have seen a recent and dramatic upticks in the incidences of 
mutinies. 
Given this notable observation, the goal of this chapter is to provide a theoretical 
framework that explains when states are likely to experience mutinies. I argue that 
mutinies are likely to arise due to divergent preferences and risk aversion on behalf of 
military agents. Using a nested principal agent framework, I describe why agents might 
have strong incentives to shirk, resulting in military rebellion. I begin by reviewing extant 
explanations of mutinies. Next, I describe the actors involved in this complex interaction 
and what we know about their preferences. Finally, I describe how principal-agent 
problems are likely to arise in the civil-military context, allowing for various types of 
mutinies in a nested structure. 
Extant Explanations of Mutinies  
Much of the work considering why soldiers choose to rebel has been conducted through 
qualitative case studies. This work is rich in anecdotal evidence and theoretical nuance, 
focusing largely on the impact of having an ethnically-divided military. For example, 
Osborne (2014) examines how ethnicity in East Africa affected military loyalty during 
colonial periods. Colonizers recognized the Kamba ethnic group in Kenya as a “martial 
race,” or superior fighters, when compared to other ethnic groups. Colonizers believed 
that this particular group had a genetic makeup that made them more advanced military 
men with enhanced senses of loyalty and duty. However, this reputation was largely used 
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instrumentally by the Kamba to get favorable treatment from the colonial powers, while 
other ethnic groups tended to display disloyalty towards the colonizers.  
 This work emphasizes the reality that the decision to remain loyal or step away 
from the military apparatus is largely an instrumental choice. In events of mutiny, unlike 
most coup activity, soldiers step away from the state and very clearly articulate demands 
like higher pay or better resources. In contrast to coup activity, the demands often come 
prior to the putsch or rebellion, making mutinies distinct because observers know 
precisely what soldiers want and why they have chosen to rebel. While this work gets at 
the interesting idea that rebellion and the inverse, loyalty, are largely instrumental and 
can be driven by ethnic divisions, it offers few explanations for the proximate causes of 
military mutinies.  
Scholars have also considered the effect of grievances due to having a colonial 
power control the military apparatus, a condition that usually goes hand in hand with 
having an ethnically fragmented army. This camp of scholars largely agrees that 
militaries that are run by a colonial powers are prone to waning loyalty. Some of the most 
explored cases of this phenomenon include East Africa 1964, Kenya 1945, India 1857, 
and Singapore 1915. The Singaporean case is particularly interesting. As World War I 
was devastating mainland Europe, trouble was brewing away from home in Singapore. 
Indian troops, under the colonial rule of the British, were plotting a mutiny spurred by a 
number of grievances. First, the brigade deployed in Singapore (Malay at the time), the 
5th Light Infantry, was largely made up of Muslim Indians who were influenced by the 
Ghadar Party. The Ghadar Party actively encouraged Indian nationalism and resistance of 
Western forces. After predicting a small mutiny in Mumbai in January of 1915 and 
45 
 
reassigning soldiers to new outposts to prevent sedition, the British military overlooked 
the swelling discontent in the 5th Light Brigade. Second, there were rumors that this 
brigade would be commanded to fight in Turkey against a largely Muslim military.  
The rank-and-file soldiers of the 5th Light Brigade pointed out that they had only 
been ordered and contracted for service in the Federated Malay States originally, not in 
Turkey against religious kin. The officers of the brigade largely sided with the rank-and-
file soldiers on this issue, not wanting to deploy to the Middle East or Africa (Kuwajima 
2009). For these reasons (inter alia), several companies in the 5th Light Brigade staged a 
massive mutiny in February of 1915 with estimates suggesting that up to 800 men were 
involved in the violent sedition. This case demonstrates that rank-and-file soldiers are apt 
to rebel when they experience widespread grievances. However, one can look anecdotally 
and find many cases where militaries were under colonial rule, yet maintained loyalty. 
Also, colonization is a condition that persists and endures over decades. Therefore, while 
colonization can certainly spur grievances, colonization remains an unsatisfying answer 
to why we see military mutinies at particular moments and not at others. Furthermore, 
these explanations do not offer any power to help explain why the incidence of mutinies 
is increasing rather dramatically in recent periods. They also do not explain why 
particular states, like the Ivory Coast or Syria, have experienced many more mutinies 
lately than ever before.  
Actors and Interests  
Though previous research has suggested that ethnic fragmentation and colonial control 
might spur disloyalty, we continue to lack an explanation of the proximate causes of 
mutinies. Thus, in this section, I will lay out the actors and their specific interests to 
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explore strategic interactions that might spur mutinies. To begin, I will review the 
preferences and strategies beginning with the executive then moving to the military 
leadership.  
As depicted below in Figure 2, the executive serves as the principal of the military 
leadership. The chief concern of the executive is to remain in power (e.g., Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2004). Leaders will secure their tenure through many strategies that I label 
“regime-securing strategies.” Scholars have focused on many regime securing strategies 
including institutions (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), the generation of 
audience costs (Weeks 2008), and even the presence of particular resources, like oil 
(Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2015). For this analysis, I will focus squarely on repression, 
diversionary tactics, and coup proofing, as these particular regime securing strategies 
place a burden of responsibility on the military apparatus and apply to both democracies 
and non-democracies.  
Executives may utilize repressive tactics when they feel their tenure is being 
threatened. Repression has the explicit goal of limiting the dissidents’ ability to overturn 
institutions of the state or the current leadership (Davenport 1995). Repressive techniques 
can range in severity from limiting civil liberties to direct physical integrity violations. 
Repression can be costly because at times it is sanctioned by the international 
community, or it can backfire and spur increased mobility among existing dissidents 
(Davenport 1995). For this reason, executives may consider other tactics, such as 
divisionary conflict or coup proofing.  
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Figure 3.2: Military Leadership as an Agent of the Executive  
 
Diversionary tactics may also be used as regime-securing strategies. To maintain 
adequate levels of approval and legitimacy, the leader may initiate conflict abroad to 
enjoy a boost in public opinion and enhance loyalty within the military by enhancing a 
sense of nationalism (Levy 1989; Andreski 1968). While diversionary theory has been 
largely applied to democracies, Miller (1995), Mitchell and Prins (2004), and Powell 
(2012) demonstrate that autocrats may also engage in diversionary tactics to secure their 
tenure. In the face of elevated coup risk, there is strong evidence that the likelihood of 
militarized interstate dispute (MID) initiation increases dramatically (Miller and Elgun 
2010). Leaders who are fearful of losing their grip on power, even in autocratic contexts, 
may initiate conflict to secure tenure and divert the attention of the public and military.  
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Coup proofing is a regime-securing strategy used by executives to ward off 
putsches. Of all the strategies outlined15 (repression, divisionary tactics, and coup 
proofing), coup proofing at initial glance appears to be the least costly because coup 
proofing is a completely domestic process, and leaders do not risk angering the 
international community as they might by using heavy repression or divisionary tactics. 
Most non-democracies will experience irregular regime change through a coup (Decalo 
1990). In response to this threat, leaders may choose to counterbalance the military by 
disaggregating horizontally to make mutually suspicious factions, thus making 
coordination challenges steeper and decreasing the probability of a coup attempt. Beyond 
counterbalancing, leaders can utilize paramilitaries, militias, and secret police to protect 
their tenure (Feaver 1999). Purges may also be used when leaders suspect that the 
military has become too intertwined in political processes (Young and Turner 1985). 
Scholars have already demonstrated that coup proofing directly diminishes the ability of 
militaries to coordinate, weakening fighting capacity (Durell-Young 1997) and the 
quality of individual soldiers (e.g., Pilester and Bohmelt 2011; Roesseler 2011). As we 
will see, coup proofing likely has an additional unintended consequence that executives 
rarely consider. By introducing coordination challenges, coup proofing diminishes coup 
risk but may simultaneously enhance mutiny risk.  
 Moving from the executive, the next actor I analyze is the military leadership. As 
an agent of the executive, the military leadership has a number of divergent preferences 
                                                            
15 It is unlikely that leaders will use coup proofing and diversionary tactics 
simultaneously. As Powell (2012) demonstrates, coup proofing measures and 
diversionary incentives are inversely related. In other words, as a leader imposes steeper 
coup proofing measures, they are less likely to undertake divisionary tactics. However, 
repression may be used jointly with other regime-securing tactics.  
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and strategies to secure these preferences. Scholars possess a significant amount of 
information regarding the preferences of the military leadership because of the vast coup 
literature. A fruitful practice is to consider the disposition and ability of the military 
leadership to intervene in politics (Powell 2012). At this point in the theoretical 
framework, I will focus largely on aspects of disposition, leaving dimensions of ability to 
be explored later. According to dispositional arguments, military leadership will 
intervene, specifically by staging a coup when they are dissatisfied with the status quo. 
Scholars in this area emphasize the importance of legitimacy, arguing that military 
leadership will be dissatisfied when the government is experiencing a decline in public 
support due to a perception of poor performance (Finer 1962; Welch 1970; Belkin and 
Schofer 2003; Casper and Tyson 2014; Johnson and Thyne 2016). Moving forward in 
time, the corporate grievance model argues that military leaders’ dispositions respond to 
the amount of institutional “goodies” the military receives (Thompson 1973). When 
militaries are well armed and well paid, dispositional factors for intervention are likely to 
fade. However, when militaries are under-resourced, military leaders might recalibrate 
their disposition and coordinate efforts to launch a coup. I will return to this argument 
later by adding complexity to this notion of disposition. 
 Scholars have also spent time exploring the individual characteristics of military 
personnel. Huntington (1957) explores what he calls the “military mind.” He argues that 
the military mind sees war as a political instrument. As such, total war and absolute war 
are to be avoided at all costs as they “…produce the mutual devastation of combatants” 
(Huntington 1957: 65). By extension, I assume that military leadership would prefer to 
fight short and decisive conflicts as opposed to enduring wars of attrition. Huntington 
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also argues that because of the way the military mind views the world and the 
competition among sovereign states, they will continue to urge bureaucrats to enlarge and 
strengthen the military. This idea falls in line with the corporate grievance model of 
military preferences that argues that militaries essentially want institutional rewards. The 
military mind also sees that expertise is a prerequisite for competency. In other words, 
“professional training and experience is necessary for decision and action.” (Huntington 
71). Based on this notion that the military mind realizes that competency is based on 
professional training, I expect that military leadership would prefer a meritocracy, where 
promotions are based on ability rather than loyalty to the executive.  
 To this point, scholars know a lot about how executive tactics and the preferences 
of military leadership interact to influence many forms of unrest. Coup proofing has been 
shown to decrease the likelihood of a coup (Powell 2012). Likewise, well-funded 
militaries have been demonstrated to have lower coup risk (Powell 2012). We know that 
repression can cause backlash, specifically in the form of protest movements (Davenport 
1995, 2007; Moore 1998), but can also help secure the executive’s tenure. Scholars have 
also shown that protests, which may be a response to repression, are likely to spur coups 
(Casper and Tyson 2014; Johnson and Thyne 2016). However, the existing literature has 
not examined how mutinies might play a role, which is an important gap to fill for many 
reasons.  
First, mutinies are important outcomes in themselves. We have seen that mutinies 
can quickly change the dynamics of a conflict, as seen in the recent example of Syria. 
What is more, mutinies are happening at an increasing rate. Finally, it is hard to 
understand executive decisions about things like resource allocation, military purges, 
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diversionary war, and coup proofing without bringing the possibility of military mutinies 
into the picture. In order to develop a theory about mutinies, I will introduce a new actor 
into the principal agent structure to demonstrate how foot soldier preferences can add 
new avenues of disagreement between the executive and military leadership.  
A Nested Principal Agent Model of Military Mutinies   
Canonical Principal Agent theory (hereinafter referred to as P-A theory) has been used to 
explain various political processes, from IO behavior to domestic governance. In a 
traditional setting, principals give instructions and demands and can sanction agents if 
those orders are not followed. Agents are supposed to do the bidding of the principal, but 
as we will explore below, in some circumstances agents have stronger incentives to 
defect and not comply with the principals’ orders. These suboptimal outcomes are called 
shirking. Militaries can shirk in a number of ways, but here I will focus exclusively on 
shirking as a result of military mutinies. A nested principal agent problem is simply an 
expansion of canonical P-A theory, allowing for more than one principal and more than 
one agent in an interaction.16 Figure 3 presents the nested structure of the various 
principals and agents in a military organization.  
                                                            
16 See Mitnick (1992) and Waterman and Meier (1998) for discussion of the need to move 
beyond dyads when exploring principal agent theory. These works argue that very few 
interactions are simply dyadic in nature. It is more realistic to think of various principals 
and many agents.  
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Figure 3.3: Nested Principal Agent Structure of Military 
 
There is strong precedent in the civil-military relations literature to apply a 
principal-agent framework to interactions within the military. Feaver (2009) lays out 
what he calls the “civil-military problematique.” The inherent tension in civil-military 
relations is that “… the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient 
power to become a threat to the polity.” (2009 : 4). Thus, he presents a principal-agent 
framework in which civilian principals must contract military agents to protect society. 
However, these civilian principals must then worry about how the agents behave. Agents 
may behave inappropriately by either inadequately protecting society or becoming a 
predatory institution. Because this context provides a strategic interaction and a clear 
hierarchical order, Feaver argues that a principal-agent model is appropriate when 
considering the civil-military relations. As an extension of Feaver (2009), I argue that 
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there is not only one principal and one agent, but rather there are many principals and 
many agents. In his model, military agents shirk against civilian principals. While this 
type of shirking may occur in my model, I also allow for military agents to shirk against 
military principals.  
Next, I borrow simple assumptions from P-A theory about the behavior of each 
actor in this nested structure. I assume that principals can monitor the behavior of agents 
(Pollack 1997). This ex-post monitoring is an attempt to overcome the steep information 
advantages that favor agents (Waterman and Meier 1998). In this context, foot soldiers 
know more about the everyday realities of being a soldier than military leadership. 
Likewise, military leadership knows more about the reality of conflict and details about 
the fighting capacity of the opponent than the executive. In general P-A models, this 
information asymmetry is what drives shirking. Here, I will not focus exclusively on 
information asymmetries, but add a parameter of risk aversion, which will drive shirking 
by introducing goal conflict between the principal and the agent.  Relaxing a few 
assumptions of the canonical setting will introduce friction into the model, creating 
strong incentives for agents to shirk. Shirking in the context of this nested structure 
would mean staging a coup attempt or a mutiny, based on which actor shirks.  
 Inefficient outcomes in this nested principal agent situation can arise due to fear. 
Sappington (1991) demonstrates that by considering risk aversion displayed by agents, 
we can expect shirking to be more likely. That is, when agents are asked to carry out 
tasks that impose steep risks onto them, they are less likely to follow through with the 
demands of the principal. Risk aversion is particularly salient when applied to the 
military context. Mutinies and coups are likely to occur because agents will shirk when 
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they are asked to undertake risky activities like facing an opponent without appropriate 
resources or repressing peaceful protestors. Such risk aversion creates a conflict of goals 
between the principal and the agents. 
One might note that in this framework shirking is highly observable. Indeed, the 
purpose of a mutiny is to notify observers of grievances in an effort to change the status 
quo. This sets shirking in this framework apart from the canonical principal agent 
scenarios where shirking involves hidden action and is therefore not observable. This 
inability to observe shirking is what classifies these models as “moral hazard models.” 
However, there are many recent applications of P-A theory in which shirking is not out-
right observable. In other words, these recent iterations are not moral hazard models. For 
example, one seminal P-A application by Brehm and Gates (1999) examines strikes by 
police officers. Similar to my application, shirking in this context is highly observable. 
Thus, while it is a step away from tradition in the P-A literature, it is appropriate to apply 
principal agent theory in scenarios of observable shirking.  Below I will outline various 
scenarios that are likely to create risky situations for agents in the various nests presented 
above. This exercise will allow me to introduce and test many novel hypotheses.  
Foot Soldiers as Agents of Military Leadership (Type 1 Mutinies)  
The first nested structure in Figure 3.4 considers the foot soldiers serving as 
agents of the military leadership. For a moment, I will exclude the executive from the 
interaction. This nest represents one of the most conventional pathways to a military 
mutiny. In most cases, the executive determines broad military policy, such as total 
military expenditure and opponents, while the military leadership oversees specific 
military policy, such as how resources are distributed among battalions and specific 
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fighting strategies. Thus, there is a distinct possibility that soldiers may be pleased with 
the executive, but feel that the military leadership is not promoting the interests of the 
individual soldiers or is asking soldiers to carry out particularly risky activities.  
Figure 3.4 Foot Soldiers as Agents of Military Leadership 
 
In this nest, we are unlikely to see a coup because the grievance is spurred by 
military leadership rather than the executive, and by definition, coups must be pointed at 
the executive. Furthermore, the vast majority of coups are perpetrated by military 
leadership or at least require military leadership coordination (Thyne and Powell 2011). 
There are several situations that might create strong incentives for foot soldiers to shirk 
their duties as an agent of military leadership. 
First, high military spending and low soldier pay presents a situation that might 
lead to a disagreement between military leadership and foot soldiers. In this scenario, the 
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executive funnels significant resources to the military, but this does not improve the 
soldiers’ individual pay, which suggests that military leadership is squandering or 
stealing the money. High military spending with low individual pay presents a situation 
where soldiers are not adequately rewarded for undertaking the risks associated with 
serving in the forces. The 2012 Yemeni mutiny illustrates this type of grievance where 
nearly 600 rank-and-file soldiers rebelled against former President Saleh’s half-brother, 
General Mohamed Saleh al-Ahmar. Soldiers organized a sit-in at the al-Dalaimi air force 
base and reported that military leadership was largely dishonest and stealing portions of 
soldiers’ salaries. One soldier was quoted saying, “We are tired of being ruled by an 
unjust and corrupt man who steals portions of our salaries and confiscates our food and 
clothes allowances for his own benefit” (Bikya News 2012). Even though this is a clear 
scenario that would result in shirking in this nest, because of a lack of micro-level data 
regarding soldiers’ individual pay, it is nearly impossible to examine soldiers’ pay as a 
portion of total military expenditure. Thus, we turn to a second situation where soldiers 
are satisfied with the executive and simultaneously unhappy with the officers to derive 
the first testable hypothesis.    
Particularly bloody conflict is also likely to spur mutinies in this particular nest. 
The executive is responsible for picking opponents and the decision to enter war, but the 
military leadership is responsible for fighting strategies. As such, war specifics, such as 
strategy, that go wrong are likely to be blamed on the military leadership rather than the 
executive. Battle deaths are likely to be a result of poor strategy. As Biddle (2010) 
argues, gross numerical figures of military power are not adequate in explaining war 
outcomes. It is necessary to look at strategy and tactics, which are decisions made by 
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military leadership, not the executive.17 Therefore, bloody battle is likely to generate 
incentives for foot soldiers to shirk as they recognize that doing their job has become 
increasingly risky.  
Nigeria provides an illustrative example of soldiers blaming military leadership 
for battle losses. Nigerian troops have continued to face the insurgent threat in the North-
eastern province of their state against Boko Haram. Recently, the insurgent threat has 
swelled and soldiers have taken notice of how well-equipped and -resourced Boko Haram 
combatants are compared to state forces. This has created a sense among soldiers that 
they are sent into a completely hostile battlefield simply to be sacrificed in the name of 
the state. As such, there have been a series of mutinies where soldiers refuse to go into 
the field to face Boko Haram. An unnamed soldier told BBC that, “Soldiers are dying 
like fowl. The Nigerian army is not ready to fight Boko Haram. Boko Haram are inside 
the bush, everywhere. They [senior commanders] are sacrificing soldiers” (BBC News 
2014).  As illustrated by this quotation, soldiers in Nigeria blamed commanders for their 
losses against Boko Haram rather than the executive. This discussion generates my first 
hypothesis:  
H1: As battle deaths increase, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.  
Another factor that is likely to spur mutinies in this nest is the duration of conflict. 
Soldiers prefer to fight short and decisive wars over long and bloody wars. While the 
decisions to enter the war rests in the hands of the executive, the decisiveness of the war 
                                                            
17 This may not be the case for military regimes. I will control for military regimes, or 
regimes in which the executive is synonymous with military leadership, in the empirical 
model.  
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is directly related to strategy, which is determined by the military leadership. If the 
military leadership is adequately resourced, soldiers expect them to levy these resources 
from the executive in order to fight short wars leading to victory. If wars drag on, soldiers 
are likely to blame the military leadership for not using better strategy or allocating 
resources better. As such, long wars are likely to generate rifts between soldiers and 
military leadership.  
Syria provides an alarming example of this relationship between conflict duration 
and mutinies. Prior to the onset of Syria’s civil war in 2011, the state had only 
experienced a total of three mutinies. In 2011, at the onset of civil war, there were three 
mutinies. In 2012, the number of mutinies more than doubled, resulting in seven 
mutinies. While this rough count of mutinies might not entirely capture the relationship 
between conflict and mutinies, anecdotal evidence suggests mutinies often occur because 
soldiers are demanding demobilization. For example, during the Angolan civil war, two 
mutinies occurred in 1992, after decades of fighting. In both of these instances, soldiers 
were demanding immediate demobilization and a return to civilian life. The primary 
source documents indicate that soldiers were experiencing fatigue and simply wanted a 
conclusion to the conflict (BBC 1992). While conflict duration and intensity work 
through similar theoretical mechanisms, I intend to explore their independent and joint 
effects on the likelihood of mutinies. This discussion yields the second hypothesis 
regarding the relationship between long lasting conflict and mutinies:  
H2: As the duration of war increases, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.  
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Foot Soldiers as Agents of the Executive  (Type 2 Mutinies)  
A second nested structure in Figure 3.5 shows foot soldiers serving as agents of 
the executive. Shirking is likely to happen because soldiers are unhappy with the 
mandates of the executive. It is important to note that military leadership are not included 
in this nest, and therefore it is assumed that they are generally pleased with the policies of 
the executive and remain loyal. Because the military leadership is still aligned with the 
executive, a coup attempt is not an option because this would require defection of the 
military leadership, as nearly all coup attempts require high ranking military leadership 
involvement (Thyne and Powell 2014).  
Figure 3.5 Foot Soldiers as Agents of the Executive 
 
The most common route to a mutiny in this particular nest is the presence of a 
military regime. A military regime provides a context where the executive and military 
leadership are essentially the same actor. As such, anything the executive does that spurs 
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discontent among the soldiers can only be met with a munity because the military 
leadership is not likely to side with the soldiers, as their interests are directly represented 
in the regime. Early work on military regimes emphasized their inability to negotiate 
outcomes between societal actors that may have conflicting aims (Finer 1976: 12-14). 
Geddes (1999) points out that military regimes are surprisingly fragile and rarely survive 
longer than democracies or other types of autocracies. What is more, Frantz and Ezrow 
(2011) demonstrate that leaders of military regimes are the most likely to get ousted 
despite the extensive training and expected discipline within these regimes. I expect this 
logic to extend to dimensions of military loyalty. I anticipate military regimes to be more 
mutiny prone than other regime types due to their relative inflexibility and the 
superimposition of military leadership on the executive position.  
After a coup in December of 2000 in the Cote D’Ivoire, foot soldiers took the 
streets of Abidjan in protest. Soldiers were demanding compensation from the ruling 
junta for the critical part they played in the December coup that resulted in the junta’s 
new found power. The soldiers were displeased with both the military leadership and the 
executive, as these two actors are superimposed in a military regime. The Ivory Coast is 
not alone in experiencing mutinies during the reign of a military regime. Indeed, 
Argentina experienced many mutinies at the end of the military junta and immediately 
after the junta fell. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced mutinies in 
the context of a military regime, such as: Niger, Gambia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, 
among many others. This anecdotal evidence paired with theoretical expectations yields 
the following hypothesis about the effect of military regimes on military mutinies:  
H3: Military regimes are more likely to experience mutinies than other types of regimes.   
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Other pathways to mutinies in this nest occur when events place steeper costs on 
foot soldiers than the military leadership or the executive. In these situations, the soldiers 
are likely to blame the executive as he or she is at the helm of the ship and can mitigate 
the costs paid by the soldiers, but fail to do so. Military leadership is unlikely to side with 
the soldiers because they experience smaller costs than the soldiers. For military 
leadership, siding with foot soldiers may result in the loss of their elite status, a severely 
high cost.  
Protests facilitate mutinies in this particular nest. Protests create situations where 
foot soldiers pay steeper costs than the military leadership and executive. When dissent 
arises, the executive can choose to use repressive tactics or simply try to monitor and 
contain the situation without the use of repression. In either scenario, foot soldiers pay 
steep costs. These high costs paid by foot soldiers are a result of their closeness to the 
civilian population. In contrast, military leadership and the executive are more removed 
from civilian populations. In the absence of repression, soldiers are often used to monitor 
dissent. This means being in the street, exposing themselves to the potential dangers 
associated with unrest. When protests are met with repression, I expect that the difference 
in cost paid by these actors will be even more intense.  
While executives order repression, they are the most insulated and thus pay the 
lowest cost for repressing, and yet stand the most to gain by maintaining their elite status. 
Even if protests are particularly successful and spur coup activity (Casper and Tyson 
2014, Johnson and Thyne 2016), coups are rarely bloody and generally end in exile. 
Clearly this is not a preferred outcome for the executive, but it is not rarely a deadly 
outcome. The benefits associated with repression for the executive are ample. He or she 
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can secure their own tenure through the use of heavily repressive tactics that discourage 
dissent. A similar pattern emerges when examining costs and benefits of using repressive 
strategies for military leadership. There is a strong benefit associated with repression for 
military elite, as it will in most scenarios help secure their tenure. The costs are minimal 
because the military leadership supervises repression, but they will not carry it out with 
their own hands.  
When examining the costs and benefits associated with repression for foot 
soldiers, a different pattern emerges. Soldiers are generally not life-long military 
professionals. Most soldiers, particularly conscripts, want to return to the civilian 
population after their service. The IDF of Israel provides an illustrative example of 
conscripts wanting to return to civilian life after duty. After conscription in the IDF, foot 
soldiers are given the choice of remaining in the active reserves. In 2013, only 1/3 of past 
conscripts chose to maintain an “active” reservationist status. This number fell in 2015 to 
26% of all conscripts (The Times of Israel 2016). Recognizing that the clear majority of 
foot soldiers want to return to civilian life, they do not want to commit atrocities that 
would distance them from the civilian population. Repression is almost always 
committed by the hands of foot soldiers. Therefore, the costs of repression is dramatically 
steeper than the cost for the executive or military leadership. Because of this difference in 
the costs incurred, protests are likely to spur mutinies.  
Yugoslavia saw protests lead directly to mutiny activity in 1999. Women’s 
protests sparked in Krusevac and Aleksandrovac after the bodies of seven slain soldiers 
were returned home. Mothers, sisters, and wives of soldiers began protesting demanding 
the return of their sons, brothers, and husbands (New York Times 1999).  The women 
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blew whistles (a common tactic in many pro-democracy campaigns that these anti-war 
protestors borrowed) and threw eggs at the Town Hall building. Even though this dissent 
was technically under the emergency military rule put in place during the NATO air 
campaign, the protestors remained committed to their decision. In response to the 
women’s protests, nearly 2,000 soldiers deployed to Istok deserted their posts and 
returned to their home cities of Krusevac and Aleksandrovac. But this anecdote is among 
many others help illustrate how protests can spur mutinies. Romanian soldiers mutinied 
in response to General Chirac’s orders to shoot protestors in February of 1990. In 
response to these orders, 48 officers joined nearly 3,000 soldiers and student protestors in 
the streets and demanded that Defense Minster and the Internal Security Minister be 
ousted. This example highlights the cost argument made earlier. Protests that are met 
with extreme repression are likely to encourage mutinies by imposing steep costs on 
soldiers.  
H4: As a state experiences more protests, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.  
The nature of the protest will also influence the likelihood of mutinies. Returning 
to the cost argument, the cost of repression for individual soldiers will also change 
depending upon whether the protest is peaceful or violent. Repression is easily justified 
when protests are violent. One of the primary objectives of the military is to maintain law 
and order, which is directly challenged by violent protests. However, peaceful protests do 
not pose a similar threat. Firing on peaceful protestors is likely to engender negative 
feelings towards soldiers among the civilian population (Johnson and Thyne 2016).  
The recent Syria example provides an illustration of repressive orders challenging 
troop loyalty. As Assad ordered decisive repression, including firing on and even killing 
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protesters, in largely Sunni populated regions of the state, Sunni factions of the military 
had a decision to make. They could either demonstrate complete loyalty to the regime or 
follow orders – an endeavor that was costly on many levels (e.g., firing on their own 
ethnic-religious kin) or they could resist the orders of the Assad regime and mutiny.  
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that nonviolent campaigns are particularly likely to 
test troop loyalty when compared to their violent counterparts. 18 Returning to the cost 
argument, it is much easier to follow repressive orders when protesters are using violent 
means, whereas firing on peaceful protesters is associated with a much higher set of costs 
(Johnson and Thyne 2016). 
Another recent example highlights this causal process. Burmese troops in 
September of 2007 declared that they supported Buddhist monks that were leading mass 
protests against the regime. A group of dissatisfied soldiers formed a group called the 
Public Patriotic Army Association and drafted a formal letter declaring their support for 
the dissenters. They wrote, “On behalf of the armed forces, we declare our support for the 
non-violent action of the Buddhist Monks and members of the public and their peaceful 
expression” (The Guardian 2007). The soldiers carefully point out that their support for 
this movement was largely conditioned on the nature of the protests. Had these protests 
been violent, it seems much less likely that the soldiers would have signaled their strong 
support. This discussion yields a secondary hypothesis about the effect of protests on 
Nest C mutinies.  
H5: Peaceful protests are more likely to spur mutinies than violent protests.  
                                                            
18 They examine very large-scale military defections that are indicative of a massive 
systemic break down with a dichotomous variable. The dependent variable used in my 
analysis will be capturing smaller breakdowns in troop loyalty.  
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Diversionary war also creates an avenue for disagreement between the three 
actors.  Diversionary war is likely to generate grievances among individual soldiers that 
must do the bidding of the executive even if they realize that the conflict was not started 
on legitimate grounds, but rather only an effort to help the executive maintain his or her 
elite status. Foot soldiers are those that must serve on the front lines and are therefore 
most likely to be killed or injured by conflict. The military leadership is likely to side 
with the executive in such a situation because their elite status is directly tied to the fate 
of the leader. If the leader suffers from a rapid decline in public opinion, the military 
leadership is also likely to suffer similarly. Even more dramatically, if the leader is facing 
the possibility of full scale revolution, military leadership recognizes that such an event 
would completely jeopardize their position. Foot soldiers will pay the steepest costs for 
diversionary conflict as they are the ones in the field. This discussion leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
H6: Divisionary war should increase the likelihood of mutinies. 
Purges are a final avenue of disagreement between soldiers and the executive. 
Purging is a scenario where the executive rids their military apparatus of elites that are 
likely to oppose their policy preferences or are seen as potential coup plotters (Sudduth 
2015).19 Purges are likely to create a situation where leaders are promoted based upon 
loyalty rather than competency (Quinlivan 1999). As such, the newly promoted leaders 
are likely to be aligned with the executive because they recognize that they have been 
                                                            
19 Clearly purges are likely to generate grievances among the military leadership that is 
purged. However, because they are no longer part of the military apparatus, they cannot 
stage a mutiny or a coup. They have simply returned to civilian status. If they were to act 
against the government, it would be a form of civilian dissent (e.g., protests, rebellion).  
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promoted not necessarily because of skill, but because of allegiance to the executive. 
However, soldiers are likely to be angry because they now have relatively ineffective 
leaders, as soldiers would prefer a meritocracy than a system of promotion based on 
ideology and allegiance. It is hard to know whether promotions are based upon merit or 
not, but purges offer a strong indications that the military apparatus is no longer a 
meritocracy. As such, I expect that there is a positive relationship between purges and 
mutinies.  
Cambodia provides an illustrative example of how purges encourage mutinies. 
During the later years of the Pol Pot regime, several purges were initiated from 1976-
1978. These purges specifically targeted Hanoi-trained communists and the Sihanouk 
supporters within the Royal Government of National Unit of Kampuchea (GRUNK) 
(Jackson 1979: 77). Phenom Penh consistently purged the military of higher ranking 
officials that presented a threat to the Pol Pot regime. In October of 1978, Cambodian 
troops joined various anti-government organizations in different parts of the country to 
revolt against the central government in Phenom Penh. Soldiers largely cited that purges 
against military officials as a primary grievance (The Globe and Mail 1978). A more 
recent example can be seen in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland Somalia. 
Mutineers staged a revolt in a garrison near the Galgala Mountains. Soldiers were 
protesting months of unpaid salaries, but the mutiny did not pick up until immediately 
after Puntland president Abdiweli Muhammad Ali fired a top military commander, 
paramilitary members, and other security forces (BBC Monitoring Africa 2015).  
A similar dynamic played out in South Sudan in 2014. Air force and military 
officers defected from the military and joined the rebels. They stated that their defection 
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was a result of lack of diversity and promotion in the military. The officers accused 
President Salva Kiir Mayardiit of tribalism and promotion based only loyalty rather than 
competency. In a press conference, the defected soldiers said that the state had “… poor 
promotion policies. Officers who joined the Air Force in 2007 have never been promoted 
and in some situations promotions are based on ethnicity…” and “… training 
opportunities for South Sudanese joining the Air Force does not reflect diversity; for 
instance, the first batch comprised of 32 pilots, 21 of which were from the Dinka Tribe, 
the remaining 63 tribes were represented by just 11 pilots” (Southern Sudan News 
Agency 2014). While there were no purges in this scenario, purges create situations of 
perceived inequality like the complaints of these soldiers highlight. This logic leads to the 
final expectation in this nested structure, which is that purges will spur mutinies.  
H7: As an executive orders more purges, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.  
Foot Soldiers and Military Leadership as Agents of the Executive (Type 3 Mutinies)  
 The final nest that will be examined organizes the foot soldiers and military 
leadership as collective agents of the executive. This relationship is presented in Figure 
3.6 below. This is the most complex nested structure considered. In this nest, I 
incorporate all the military actors and a civilian principal. The civilian principal, or the 
executive, has an interesting tight rope to walk. The executive needs to maintain power, 
but one of the most effective regime securing strategies might encourage mutinies.  
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Figure 3.6 Foot Soldiers and Leadership as Agents of Executive 
 
  
In order to develop expectations about this final nested structure, I return to the 
coup literature that examines disposition and ability of military leaders (Powell 2012). 
Remember, disposition is essentially asking, “Are military leaders satisfied with the 
status quo?” Here, I will focus more squarely on dimensions of ability. Ability asks, 
“Even if military leaders are unsatisfied, are they able to coordinate in order to launch a 
putsch?” This question is exceedingly relevant in this nested structure. In this nested 
structure, shirking can come by way of mutiny or coup, unlike the previous structures 
where the only possible outcome was mutiny.  The first theoretical expectation put 
forward here is that attempts to increase coordination challenges, specifically through the 
use of coup proofing, will have a direct unintended consequence. While a leader may 
effectively ward of coup attempts by limiting the military’s ability to work across 
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branches horizontally, they may accidentally spur mutinies. Through the process of 
disaggregation and instilling a general sense of suspension between branches, the leader 
increases the odds that soldiers will shirk due to perceptions of unfairness or relative 
depravation. Often times, executives create “multiple, overlapping security forces, which 
report to the executive through different chains of command” (De Bruin 2017). Such 
divisions will spur dissent. Coup proofing measures increase the likelihood that battalions 
feel that the executive is showing favoritism to other groups or basing promotion off of 
loyalty, rather than competency. Thus, the first expectation I will test in this final nest is 
the direct impact that coup proofing measures have on the likelihood of mutinies.  
H8: As coup proofing measures increase, the likelihood of a mutiny should 
increase.  
Coup proofing will not only have a direct linear effect on mutinies.  I expect that 
under conditions in which scholars have demonstrated coups are more likely, we will see 
mutinies given that coordination challenges are too steep to realize a coup. As executives 
are likely to take measures to limit the ability of military leaders to launch a coup, the 
likelihood of a mutiny will be conditional on the level of coup proofing an executive has 
in place. When the entire military apparatus is dissatisfied, we should expect a coup. 
However, there may be situations in which the entire military is unsatisfied, but because 
the leader has anticipated a coup and implemented preventative measures to safeguard 
her tenure, the unsatisfied actors are unable to coordinate. In this scenario, a mutiny is 
likely to occur as a result of the coup’s coordination failure. The grievance is still present 
and agents are still shirking, but due to coup proofing measures, they cannot successfully 
target the executive. There are a number of conditions that are likely to cause wide spread 
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grievances in the military apparatus. These conditions are only likely to result in a mutiny 
in the face of steep coordination challenges that are a result of coup proofing measures.  
Democratization can spur mutinies in this final nested structure. Democratization 
presents a unique commitment problem for the executive. Recent democratization makes 
it nearly impossible for the executive to credibly commit policies that are favorable for 
the military. Because of the introduction of elections, while an executive may be 
supportive of the military, there is no way of ensuring that the next executive will be 
equally committed to policies that favor the military as an institution. Furthermore, when 
the military organization is unsatisfied, it understands that the costs for perpetrating a 
coup have been updated in the wake of recent democratization. The military is not apt to 
stage a coup recognizing that the international community will respond negatively and 
immediately, imposing steep costs for reversing democratization. As Feaver (1999: 215) 
writes, “…in a democracy, the hierarchy of de jure authority favors civilians over the 
military, even in cases where the underlying distribution of de facto power favors the 
military.” As such, the military recognizes that democratization generally means 
relinquishing de jure authority, and thus is counter to their institutional interests.  
Niger’s path to democratization provides a descriptive example of the dynamics I 
outline above. Prior to democratization, the military of Niger was intimately involved in 
politics and officers found this relationship to benefit their personal financial status 
greatly (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). However, after democratization, the military 
budget was constricted to under 1% of the GDP, which left the military replete of the 
necessary resources and the individual luxury of side payments (Bratton and Van de 
Walle 1997). Not only did this diminished budget effect the individual benefits of 
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military officers, it also left them uncertain about the future and concerned about the 
potential of an even less supportive executive and legislature. In January 1996, 
immediately following this budgetary reduction, the military ousted President Ousmane. 
While this event resulted in a coup d’état, I argue that not all patterns of democratization 
will result in the apex of military disloyalty due to counterbalancing efforts made by a 
forward thinking executive. When levels of coup proofing are high, instead of a coup we 
will see a mutiny but for similar dynamics as presented in Niger’s path to 
democratization.  
Dwyer (2015) argues that democratization in Africa will likely decrease the 
probability of military mutinies because of a democracies pluralistic nature that allows 
military actors to express their preferences. I counter her claims by arguing that 
democratization actually makes the military more uneasy as a result of this commitment 
problem. Military leadership does not benefit from the pluralistic nature of democracy in 
the same way that other actors in a society might because military leadership already 
holds elite status prior to democratization. This discussions yields my next hypothesis:  
H9: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences democratization, the 
likelihood of a mutiny should also increase. 
Human rights violations may also generate rifts between the executive and the 
military leadership and foot soldiers. Militaries are challenged by the changing norms of 
the international human rights regime. While executives often order repression and 
human rights violations, soldiers carry out the bidding of the executive on this matter 
(Carey 2006). It is relatively easy for the executive to blame repression on the military, 
eliminating their own personal responsibility in the matter. When rights violations come 
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to light, it is often military actors that are used as “scapegoats” when in reality they were 
simply following orders that were handed down from the executive through military 
leadership. As such, when executives order soldiers to commit human rights violations, 
the soldiers are uncertain whether the executive will defend their actions should the 
violations come to light. This presents a challenging commitment problem that poses a 
steep threat to troop loyalty. Although the actors can agree to cooperate today, there is no 
guarantee that the executive will not be quick to blame the atrocities on soldiers should 
they become public.  
Argentina provides an illustrative case of how human rights violations might spur 
military disloyalty. In 1987, there were a series of military mutinies under the leadership 
of President Raul Alfonsin. General Hector Rios stepped down from his position of 
leadership after not being able to put down a series of military rebellions. These 
rebellions were motivated by the accused officers who violated human rights under the 
previous regime. The soldiers desired blanket amnesty for these officers that were simply 
following the bidding of the regime. This tug-of-war between the executive’s desire of 
appearing to comply with international norms of human rights standards and the 
temptation to betray soldiers that were following orders presents a challenge to military 
loyalty, specifically through increasing the likelihood of mutinies.  
H10: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences more human rights 
violations, the likelihood of a mutiny should also increase.   
 Overall, this chapter presents a novel theoretical framework that allows scholars 
to anticipate mutinies. Unlike past scholarship that uses rather constant conditions (e.g., 
ethnic fragmentation and colonial control) to explain mutinies, this chapter focuses on 
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making proximate arguments using highly variable conditions (e.g., democratization, 
protests, and purges). By presenting a nested principal agent structure, I creat a typology 
of different interactions that lead to different kinds of mutinies. The main contribution of 
this chapter is to provide new, parsimonious explanations for why mutinies happen. The 
next chapters will examine the expectations presented here empirically. The following 
chapter will begin by testing the first set of theoretical expectations. These expectations 
are the ones associated with type 1 mutinies, which involve foot soldiers rebelling against 
the military leadership.  
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018  
74 
 
Chapter 4: Type 1 Mutinies  
This chapter sets out to test the first set of theoretical expectations put forward in 
the previous chapter. I will examine the proximate causes of military mutinies that occur 
when foot soldiers are serving as agents of the military leadership (see Figure 4.1). 
However, because this chapter represents the first effort to systematically predict military 
mutinies, I must first spend time exploring contextual factors that likely explain the onset 
of mutinies. Thus, I will begin this chapter by exploring a number of covariates that will 
be used as control variables for the remaining empirical tests included in this dissertation. 
In this chapter, I will first develop a general, baseline model of mutinies. Then I will 
conduct the first set of empirical tests of theoretical expectations presented in the 
previous chapter.  
Figure 4.1: Nest 1, Foot Soldiers as Agents of Military Leadership 
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Dependent Variable  
To capture the dependent variable, mutiny, I utilize the data collected and described in 
Chapter 2. MMDD defines mutiny as observable acts committed by military actors with 
the intent to display indiscipline towards leadership in an effort to revise the status quo. 
MMDD codes 460 number of mutinies from 1945 – present day, with the majority of 
these events occurring in the latter half of this time series.  
Covariates of Mutinies  
As emphasized previously, there exist no attempts to predict mutinies across space and 
time. As a result, I must begin by outlining potential covariates that likely help explain a 
state’s propensity for experiencing a mutiny. These covariates will be state level and 
military-level factors that influence the general levels of satisfaction among military 
personnel.  
 The first covariate I will hold constant a state’s legacy of military coups. This 
variable is called Coups and is a dichotomous indicator of whether a state experienced a 
coup attempt in the previous year or not (Powell 2012).20 If a state has experienced 
military coups in its past, this signifies that the military has grievances and is willing to 
act on them. Such activity indicates a propensity towards disobedience and rebellion. 
Coups are generally conducted by commissioned officers of high rank. Similar 
indiscipline is likely to be observed and learned by lower-ranking enlisted soldiers. 
                                                            
20 As a robustness check, I will also run the baseline model examining the impact of 
having had a coup in the last 5 years or not.  
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Because lower ranking soldiers are often unable to launch coups, this learned indiscipline 
is likely to only manifest itself in mutiny activity. There is also a strong argument to be 
made that coups and mutinies are part of one single, interrelated process. As such, by 
controlling for coup activity, we are presenting a confusing illustration of reality. Because 
both the arguments for and against controlling for coups are compelling, I will estimate 
all models with and without this control variable. I generally find that results are robust to 
both specifications, as well as alternate temporal specifications of the coup variable.  
 The second covariate I will control for is a country’s level of development. In 
more traditional civil-military relations work, wealth is known to have a “coup-
inhibiting” influence (Londregan and Poole 1990; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 
2012). The causal mechanism put forth by these authors is that a strong economy can 
strengthen the legitimacy of leadership and thus secure the tenure of the executive. I 
expect that a similar logic applies when the outcome of interest is mutinies rather than 
coups. As Mantle (2006:32) writes, one way to enhance obedience within the military is 
for leadership to develop a strong sense of legitimacy specifically through enhancing 
formal authority. One way to enhance formal authority is to offer rewards for good 
behavior. Clearly, the ability to offer rewards depends almost entirely on the strength of 
the state’s economy and its ability to invest in such measures. Therefore, I anticipate that 
a strong economy will have a neutralizing effect on the military either through a direct or 
indirect legitimizing mechanism. Thus, GDP (Gleditsch 2002) per capita, logged is 
included as a control variable to hold constant the pacifying impact of a strong economy 
on the likelihood of mutinies.  
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 Regime type is another state-level factor that is likely to predict the general 
likelihood of mutiny activity. I expect an inverted-U shaped relationship between regime 
type and mutinies. Democracies will have few mutinies as will autocracies, while hybrid 
regimes will have the most. Militaries in strong democracies are less likely to have 
grievances that will lead to indiscipline because there are strong, consolidated 
institutional channels for these militaries to secure their corporate interests. Instead of 
mutinying, these militaries will turn to legislative bodies with strong legislative processes 
to secure their preferences (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002).  
On the other side of the spectrum, I anticipate that staunchly authoritarian regimes 
also less likely to experience mutinies. Such rigid regimes are often associated with 
strong repressive apparatuses that can respond quickly and decisively to such rebellion 
(e.g., Escriba-Folch 2013, Frantz and Kindall-Taylor 2014, Bove and Rivera 2015). As 
militaries are often complicit in the repressive actions of an executive, these actors know 
from firsthand experience that the regime can and will repress (Risee and Skkink 1999). 
Thus, military actors in this environment are less likely to test the resolve and ability of 
the regime to repress. 
Hybrid regimes are likely to experience the most mutinies. As Gandhi and 
Przeworksi (2007) argue, in less-staunchly authoritarian regimes, or hybrid-regimes, one 
way the executive can ward off rebellion is to rely on partisan legislatures to solicit 
cooperation from outsiders. While these nominally democratic institutions shore up 
opposition cooperation, they are likely to be ineffectual legislative bodies that exist as a 
regime survival mechanism rather than a policy making chamber. Thus, I expect that 
militaries in this category have the most to gain by mutinying as institutions do not 
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actually exist to serve their intended purpose. For these reasons, I include two variables 
Democracy and Autocracy. Democracy takes on the value of 1 if the state has a Polity IV 
score of +5 or higher. In contrast, Autocracy takes on the value of 1 if the state has a 
Polity IV score of -5 or lower. The excluded category for the analysis is Anocracy which 
ranges from Polity IV score of -4 to +4.  
 In an effort to control for temporal trends, I hold constant Cold War. This variable 
is simply a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 during Cold War years and 0 
otherwise. As depicted in Chapter 3, mutinies seem to occur more in the post-Cold War 
period. While there are many plausible explanations for this rise in mutiny activity, it is 
essential to account for empirically. One such explanation is that during the Cold War 
period, the rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR held many militaries in the developing 
world together as a result of the involvement of these major powers in the developing 
world. Additionally, in the post-Cold War era, there are increasingly punitive measures 
taken against coup plotters, which might incentivize mutinies versus alternative forms of 
military resistance.  
 Finally, I control for military size which is a military-level factor which likely 
helps predict mutinies. Large militaries will have more opportunities for splintering and 
divergent preferences. In contrast, small forces will have enhanced cohesion and strongly 
aligned preferences among actors. Military Size logged is captured by the total number of 
military personnel from the Correlates of War project.21 In order to address temporal 
dependence, I control for years since last mutiny, years2, and years3.  
                                                            
21 Military size and military spending are highly correlated (0.68). I include military size 
in the baseline model and remaining models as opposed to spending because military size 
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Theoretical Expectations to Test  
As laid out in Chapter 2, I anticipate that mutinies are likely to arise due to a principal 
agent problem between military leadership and foot soldiers. Foot soldiers are likely to 
shirk in this particular nest when they feel that military leaders are not securing strategies 
that mitigate risk for foot soldiers. Military leadership is largely in charge of battlefield 
specific; thus, failures on the battlefield that create dangerous situations for foot soldiers 
and increase risk are likely to result in observable shirking. In this chapter, I focus largely 
on the failure to secure successful strategy in the context of civil wars. However, these 
expectations hold for interstate conflicts as well.   
H1: As the intensity of war increases, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase. 
H2: As the duration of war increases, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.  
Research Design  
 The unit of analysis for this chapter is the country-year. In order to test the 
hypotheses above, I again draw my dependent variable from MMDD. This is a 
dichotomous measure indicating whether or not a mutiny occurred in a given year. There 
are 460 mutiny events in the dataset, but only 392 that fall within the time series of this 
analysis, 1946-2015.  
 The first independent variable I examine is Civil War Intensity. This variable is 
drawn from the UCDP/PRIO civil war onset and duration dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; 
                                                            
has a larger substantive effect than spending.  Both variables are significant in the 
baseline model. Military spending (p<=.086) has a miniscule effect size. While military 
size (P<=.002) has a larger, yet still very small effect size.  
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Strand 2006). This is an ordinal variable that is coded 0 if no significant conflict is 
occurring in a country-year. Civil War Intensity is coded 1 if there are 25-999 battle 
deaths. I label this category “moderate conflict.” Civil War Intensity takes on the value of 
2 if there are more than 999 battle deaths in a given country year. I label this category 
“intense conflict.” This variable is zero inflated with most country-year observations not 
experiencing any significant level of conflict (85%). 10.6% of country-year observations 
experience moderately intense conflict. Only 4.4% of country-year observations 
experience intense civil conflict.  
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Civil War Intensity 
 
The next explanatory variable considered in the analysis is Civil War Duration. 
This variable is again drawn from the UCDP/PRIO civil war onset and duration dataset 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002; Strand 2006). I have created this variable by coding how many 
years a particular conflict lasts. This variable can range from 0-67. The maximum value 
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of 67 represents the longest lasting conflict in these data which occurred in Myanmar. 
This conflict started in 1949 and persisted through 2015. Again, this variable is largely 
zero inflated, with 83% of the observations taking on this value.22 
 
Figure 4.3 
 
Baseline Model Results  
 I begin by evaluating the impact of a number of covariates on the likelihood of 
mutinies. All coefficients can be interpreted in the same way, with a positive coefficient 
indicating that the likelihood of a mutiny increases as the independent variables increases 
                                                            
22 As a robustness check, I will transform this variable many ways due to the heavy skew. 
I will examine the log of this variable and also ordinalize the variable so that one or two 
cases are not making it hard to find results. These results will be reported in a separate 
robustness table.   
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in value. The baseline model largely behaves as anticipated. Figure 4.4 illustrates the 
results of the baseline model substantively. This figure displays the change in predicted 
probability when considering a change in a given independent variable. The diamonds 
represent the point estimate of the predicted probability surrounded by a 95% confidence 
interval. To begin, focus on the baseline model (enclosed in box). This represents the 
predicted probability of a mutiny given that all continuous independent variables are held 
at their means and all dichotomous variables are held at their minimum. 
 
 
Results Table 4.1       Baseline 
Model 
       Intensity Model        Duration Model         Full Model  
Main Results      
     
Primary Independent 
Variables  
    
     
CW Intensity   0.488***(0.105)  0.445***(0.115)
    
CW Duration   0.020***(0.007) 0.005(0.010)
   
State-Level Controls  
 
  
Coups  0.529**(0.210) 0.443**(0.210) 0.525**(0.215) 0.450**(0.211)
  
GDPPC -0.196***(0.071) -0.158**(0.071) -0.184***(0.068) -0.158**(0.070)
  
Military Size 0.000**(.000) 0.000**(.000) 0.000**(.000) 0.000**(.000)
  
Democracy  -0.598***(0.200) -0.519**(0.217) -0.599***(0.204) -0.526**(0.212)
  
Autocracy  -0.377*(0.220) -0.318(0.218) -0.380*(0.225) -0.323(0.220)
 
Temporal Controls 
 
 
Cold War  -0.624***(0.198) -0.581***(0.196) -0.534***(0.201) -0.564***(0.2)
   
Years -0.417***(0.044) -0.403***(0.044) -0.411***(0.044) -0.403***(0.044)
  
Years2 0.017***(0.003) 0.016***(0.002) 0.017***(0.002) 0.016***(0.002)
  
Years3  0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000)
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Table 4.1 continued 
 
    
                        Constant 0.496 -0.0868 0.249 -0.0923 
 (0.483) (0.531) (0.492) (0.531) 
 
Observations 
 
8,156 
 
8,156 
 
8,156 
 
8,156 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Figure 4.4 
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Moving to the left of the baseline prediction, there are three factors that are seen 
to increase the likelihood of a mutiny. The variable that increases the likelihood of a 
mutiny most dramatically is a history of military coups. If a state moves from 
experiencing no coups in a given year to experiencing one additional coup, this increases 
the likelihood of a military mutiny by 65% over the baseline predicted probability. This is 
likely because coups are capturing a state’s military’s underling predisposition to get 
involved in politics and act in indiscipline. The next most important factor that increases 
a state’s propensity for mutinies is its overall wealth. Falling in the 5th percentile of 
GDPPC increases the states likelihood of experiencing a mutiny by 54% over the 
baseline predicted probability. This finding makes sense because often militaries mutiny 
when they are concerned with corporate interests or resources. Richer states are better 
able to alleviate these types of grievances than poor states. The next factor that increases 
the probability of a mutiny is the state’s military size. However, this effect is smaller than 
the other two previously discussed. Falling in the 95th percentile of military size 
increases the likelihood of a state experiencing a mutiny by 16% over the baseline 
predicted probability.   
All point estimates to the right of the baseline predicted probability (highlighted 
by box) are factors that are associated with a diminished likelihood of a state 
experiencing a mutiny. Having a small military decreases the predicted probability of a 
mutiny. Dictatorships are less likely to experience mutinies than semi-democratic regions 
which is the baseline scenario presented here. Rich countries are less likely to experience 
mutinies. By falling in the 95% of GDPPC, a state can reduce its likelihood of 
experiencing a mutiny by 39% compared to the baseline predicted probability. 
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Democracies are less likely to experience mutinies than semi-democracies. As mentioned 
previously, this result is driven by the fact that democracies have consolidated 
institutional avenues for militaries to secure their interests.  Finally, the Cold War era saw 
fewer mutinies than the post-Cold War era.  
Intensity and Duration Results  
 In the subsequent models, I test the independent and additive effects of civil war 
intensity and duration on the likelihood of mutinies. First, the Intensity model seeks to 
uncover the relationship between intense conflict and the likelihood of foot soldiers 
shirking by way of a mutiny. The positive and significant coefficient in Results Table 4.1 
indicates strong support for this expectation that particularly bloody conflict will 
incentivize shirking.  
Figure 4.5 displays the substantive results from the Intensity model. This figure 
plots the change in predicted probability as the value of the Intensity variable changes. 
The first point estimate displayed is the baseline scenario of no conflict. As the Intensity 
variable changes from a value of 0 (no conflict) to a value of 1 (moderate conflict), the 
likelihood of a mutiny increases by 58%. As the Intensity variable increases in value, 
moving from the baseline scenario of no conflict to the most intense conflict with greater 
than 999 battle deaths, the probability of a mutiny increases by 156%. These substantive 
impacts demonstrate that a state experiencing particularly intense civil war is most 
predisposed to mutinies. States experiencing some conflict, but not extremely bloody 
conflict, are more likely to experiencing mutinies than states that are experiencing no 
conflict at all.  
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Figure 4.5 
 
*Predicted probabilities are calculated using Intensity model in Results Table 4.1. 
 
 The Duration model explores the relationship between long lasting civil conflicts 
and the likelihood of foot soldier shirking in the form of mutinies. The expectation here 
was that long lasting conflict will incentivize shirking as foot soldiers blame military 
leadership for poor strategy. Due to risk aversion, foot soldiers will protest continued 
fighting. Again, in Results table 4.1, I find support for the independent effect of duration 
as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient.  
Figure 4.6 shows the change in simulated predicted probability as civil war 
durations changes value. The figure displays the change in the dependent variable as we 
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move from the minimum value of duration through the maximum value (with 25th-75th 
percentiles displayed). There seems to be only a mild increase in the likelihood of 
mutinies as we move from the minimum value of duration to the 25th and 50th percentile. 
However, as duration moves to the other end of the distribution, there is a larger effect. 
Moving from the 50th percentile of duration to the 75th percentile of duration, there is a 
9% increase in the likelihood of a mutiny. As we move from the 50th percentile to the 
maximum duration of civil conflict, there is an 88% increase in the propensity for a state 
to experience a mutiny.  Thus, a state like Myanmar in 2015 (which holds the maximum 
value for civil war duration) is 8 times more likely to experience a mutiny than a state 
that only experiences a year of civil war.  
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Figure 4.6
 
*Predicted probabilities calculated from Duration model in Results Table 4.1. 
 In the full model (see Results Table 4.1) that considers the impact of civil war 
intensity and duration simultaneously, I find that the effect for duration disappears. When 
considering both of the dimensions at the same time, only intensity appears to have a 
statistically significant impact on the likelihood of mutinies. I explored the interactive 
effect of these two variables, but found that it is not statistically significant (p-value = 
0.843). Due to fears of multicollinearity, I examined the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
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between duration and intensity. However, upon investigation it appears that they are not 
as mulitcollinear as expected.23  
Robustness  
I included coups as a control variable to hold constant the general state of civil military 
relations in a country. However, it is possible that coups are mutinies are closely 
interrelated processes, and as such the inclusion of this control variable is problematic. I 
re-estimated the model excluding this variable from the analysis to ensure that my results 
are robust to this specification. I find that the primary independent of variables behave 
exactly the same with or without the coup variable in the model. Likewise, the controls in 
the baseline model do not seem to be responsive to the inclusion or exclusion of this 
variable. Thus, I conclude that this variable does not seem to be driving my results. 
Because there are solid theoretical reasons to suspect that a state’s history of coups 
matters for predicting mutinies, I will keep this variable in the baseline model.  
                                                            
23 The VIF is reported to be 1.80. The Square Root VIF is 1.34. The correlation between 
the two variables is 0.668.  
 
 
 
Results Table 4.2  Baseline Model  Intensity Model Duration Model Full Model 
No Coup Variable Specification      
     
Primary Independent Variables     
     
CW Intensity   0.499***(0.105)  0.462***(0.116)
   
CW Duration  0.020***(0.007) 0.004(0.010)
 
State-Level Controls  
 
GDPPC -0.201***(0.071) -0.162**(0.07) -0.189***(0.067) -0.162**(0.069)
 
Military Size 0.000*(.000) 0.000**(.000) 0.000*(.000) 0.000**(.000)
 
Democracy -0.626***(0.195) -0.539**(0.214) -0.626***(0.199) -0.546***(0.209)
 
Autocracy -0.382*(0.219) -0.319(0.216) -0.384*(0.224) -0.324(0.218)
 
Temporal Controls  
 
Cold War -0.597***(0.198) -0.557***(0.194) -0.506**(0.2) -0.542***(0.198)
 
Years  -0.419***(0.044) -0.404***(0.044) -0.413***(0.044) -0.404***(0.044)
 
Years2 0.017***(0.003) 0.016***(0.002) 0.017***(0.003) 0.016***(0.002)
 
Years3 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000)
 
Constant 0.579 -0.0273 0.331 -0.0313 
 (0.477) (0.523) (0.485) (0.522) 
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Table 4.2 continued  
 
Observations 8,156 8,156 8,156 8,156 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 In an effort to explore the coup variable more thoroughly, I also reestimate the 
models using an alternative specification in Results Table 4.3. Instead of looking at the 
effect of a coup in the previous year, I explore the impact of having a coup attempt in the 
previous two years. When using this specification, all the same findings appear in the 
results table. However, the coup variable falls out of significance. The conclusion here is 
that coups have a very immediate effect on the likelihood of mutinies. When we consider 
a longer timeline, coups no longer help predict mutinies. Thus, for the remainder of this 
dissertation, I will include the original coup variable which codes whether or not a coup 
occurred in the previous year.  
 
 
Results Table 4.3  Baseline Model  Intensity Model  Duration Model  Full Model  
Alternative Coup Speciation      
     
Primary Independent Variables
 
    
Intensity  0.497***(.105)  0.460***(.116) 
 
Duration 
 
State Level Controls  
 
 
 
  
0.02(.007)*** 
 
0.004(.01) 
 
Coup (within 2 years) 0.127(.17) 0.033(.179) 0.112(.174) 0.038(.179) 
     
GDPPC -0.197***(.07) -0.161**(.07) -0.186***(.067) -0.161***(.069) 
     
Military Size 0.000*(.000) 0.000**(.000) 0.000**(.000) 0.000**(.000) 
     
Democracy -0.617***(.2) -0.538**(.217) -0.618***(.204) -0.544**(.212) 
     
Autocracy -0.382*(.219) -0.319(.217) -0.385*(.224) -0.324(.218) 
 
Temporal Controls  
 
    
Cold War -0.606***(.198) -0.559***(.195) -0.515**(.2) -0.545***(.199) 
     
Years  -0.419***(.044) -0.404***(.044) -0.413***(.044) -0.404***(.044) 
     
Years2 0.017***(.003) 0.016***(.002) 0.017***(.003) 0.016***(.002) 
     
Years3 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 
     
Constant 0.534 -0.0376 0.292 -0.0433 
 (0.475) (0.520) (0.482) (0.521) 
     
Observations 8,156 8,156 8,156 8,156 
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Table 4.3 Continued  
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<
96 
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As an additional robustness check, I estimate the same models including various 
dummy variables for regions. It is possible that particular regions are having a strong 
influence over these findings. The excluded category for this analysis is Europe. The 
results demonstrate that the Middle East is the only statistically significant region when 
compared to Europe in the baseline model. In the full model, the Americas are significant 
and negative, suggesting that compared to European countries, these states are less likely 
to experience mutinies during intense or long lasting civil war. What is particularly 
important about this robustness table is that the results of the baseline model do not 
change when including regional dummies. Furthermore, I find stronger support for my 
primary independent variables of interest when I include the regional dummies. This 
suggests that my main findings are not driven by a certain region. My findings are robust 
to a specification that considers that regions may have heterogeneous impacts on the 
likelihood of mutinies.  
 
 
Results Table 4.4     
Regional Dummies Baseline Model Intensity Model Duration Model Full Model 
     
Primary Independent Variables     
     
CW Intensity  0.458***(.114)  0.449***(.124) 
     
CW Duration   0.494**(.218) 0.418**(.211) 
     
State-Level Controls    
 
Coup 0.502**(.215) 0.416**(.21) -0.244***(.08) -0.202***(.079) 
     
GDPPC 0.253***(.084) -0.202**(.079) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 
     
Military Size 0.000**(.000) 0.000***(.000) -0.496***(.19) -0.428**(.203) 
     
Democracy -0.47**(.195) -0.426**(.208) -0.486**(.215) -0.431**(.211) 
     
Autocracy -0.505**(.21) -0.431**(.211) 0.497***(.189) -0.532***(.188) 
     
Regional Controls     
     
Africa 0.209(.298) 0.288(.278) -0.108(.295) -0.03(.285) 
     
Asia 0.026(.296) -0.024(.284) 0.698**(.297) 0.742**(.308) 
     
Middle East 0.876***(.301) 0.75**(.305) 0.125(.286) 0.204(.281) 
     
Americas 0.173(.281) 0.207(.279) 0.405***(.045) -0.397***(.045) 
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Table 4.4 Continued 
 
Temporal Controls  
     
     
Cold War 0.577***(.185) 0.536***(.185) 0.17(.281) 0.284(.275) 
     
Years 0.411***(.044) 0.397***(.045) 0.016***(.003) 0.016***(.003) 
     
Years2 0.017***(.003) 0.016***(.003) 0.000***(.000) -0.000***(.000) 
     
Years3 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.017**(.007) 0.001(.01) 
     
Constant 0.587 -0.0668 0.462 -0.0615 
 (0.738) 
 
8,156 
(0.734) 
 
8,156 
(0.703) (0.721) 
  
8,156 8,156 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 99 
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 As a final robustness measure, I take a deeper dive into exploring the duration 
variable. As presented in Figure 4.3, this variable is zero inflated with a dramatic skew. 
In order to ensure that one or two cases is not driving the results, I create an ordinal 
variable from the quartiles of the duration variable. The results are presented below in 
Results Table 4.5. As presented, the main findings are largely the same. Intensity still has 
a positive and significant effect across all models. This new duration variable has a 
positive and significant independent effect. However, it falls out of significance when 
included in the full model. In this specification the sign flips, but due to the lack of 
statistical significance, this is not too alarming. All in all, the main results to hold up to a 
number of alternate specifications. 
 
 
Results Table 4.5      
Quartiles of Duration  Baseline Model Intensity Model Duration Model Full Model 
     
Primary Independent Variables  
 
    
Intensity  0.488***(.105)  0.728***(.148) 
 
Quartiles of Duration 
 
State Level Controls  
 
 
 
  
0.159**(.065) 
 
-0.146(.105) 
 
Coup 0.529**(.21) 0.443**(.21) 0.479**(.209) 0.450**(.209) 
     
GDPPC -0.196***(.071) -0.158**(.07) -0.172**(.072) -0.161**(.072) 
     
Military Size  0.000**(.000) 0.000**(.000) 0.000**(.000) 0.000**(.000) 
     
Democracy -0.598***(.2) -0.519**(.217) -0.570***(.211) -0.509**(.214) 
     
Autocracy -0.377*(.22) -0.318(.218) -0.343(.223) -0.321(.219) 
 
Temporal Controls  
 
    
Cold War -0.624***(.198) -0.581***(.196) -0.612***(.198) -0.577***(.196) 
     
Years -0.417***(.044) -0.403***(.044) -0.398***(.044) -0.411***(.046) 
     
Years2 0.017***(.003) 0.016***(.002) 0.016***(.002) 0.017***(.003) 
     
Years3 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 
     
Constant 0.496 -0.0868 -0.0721 0.148 
 (0.483) (0.531) (0.584) (0.605) 
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Table 4.5 Continued      
Observations 8,156 8,156 8,156 8,156 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
102 
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Directions for Future Research  
This chapter presents evidence that militaries are particularly prone to splintering in the 
face of long lasting or particularly blood civil war. In conducting the analysis for this 
chapter, I developed a number of ideas for future research projects.  Recently there has 
been a dramatic influx in the number of projects that examine the sub-national 
characteristics of civil conflict.  There are several datasets that code the sub-national 
geographic dispersion of civil conflict intensity (e.g., ACLED and UCDP GED).  MMDD 
is also geocoded, giving the user the ability to locate precisely where mutiny events are 
occurring. In the future, I would like to examine the relationship between intense fighting 
in particular sub-national units and the likelihood of a mutiny occurring in a proximate 
location. This would lend further evidence to the notion that intense conflict is indeed a 
proximate cause of mutinies, rather than just a correlate. By zooming in and examining 
the geographic proximity of these two processes, it might even be possible to test specific 
causal mechanisms that lead soldiers to mutiny in the face of intense conflict.  
 I limited this analysis to civil conflict. However, there are no reasons to suspect 
these theoretical expectations would not hold for interstate conflict. In the future, I intend 
to expand this analysis to interstate conflict. I have considered that MID escalation 
captures this idea of “bad strategy” well. If military leaders are utilizing effective 
strategy, MIDs should not escalate. However, due to miscalculations or errors, MIDs may 
escalate, drawing foot soldiers into conflict. In coding MMDD, I observed that most of 
the cases of mutiny in consolidated democracies came during war times. Very rarely do 
consolidated democracies experience mutinies without being actively involved in an 
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interstate war. Thus, I think this avenue of future research is likely to yield powerful 
explanations for when and why consolidated democracies experience military rebellions.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter I presented a baseline model for predicting mutinies. I found that there are 
a number of state-level factors and temporal dynamics that help predict the occurrence of 
mutinies. I then set out to test the theoretical expectations that predict Type 1 mutinies, or 
mutinies that occur when foot soldiers are displeased with the actions and decisions of 
military leadership. I found strong support for my two primary theoretical expectations. 
First, I found that particularly bloody civil conflict increases the likelihood of a state 
experiencing a mutiny. Second, there is evidence that long lasting civil conflict also spur 
type 1 mutinies, although the intensity finding has more support. This chapter confirms 
anecdotal evidence that civil war countries, like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar, are indeed 
more mutiny prone than their peaceful counterparts.  
 
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018
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Chapter 5: Type 2 Mutinies  
Scholars still lack a complete understanding of the determinants of military 
mutinies. The goal of this chapter is to explore a particular type of mutinies, specifically 
those that arise when foot soldiers and the executive have a divergence of goals. While 
the previous chapter focused on mutinies that arise between the military leadership and 
foot soldiers, this chapter will examine rifts in preferences between civilian principals 
and foot soldier agents, as depicted in figure 5.1. As laid out in Chapter 2, I argue that 
mutinies are likely to arise in a nested principal agent model when actors have divergent 
preferences or agents are asked to carry out extremely costly and risky endeavors. Below 
I will summarize the expectations I derived in Chapter 2 that I will test in this chapter.   
 Figure 5.1: Nest 2, Foot Soldiers as Agents of the Executive  
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Theoretical Expectations to Test  
Shirking in this particular nest of the nested principal agent model will come by way of 
mutiny, since foot soldiers alone rarely launch a coup (Thyne and Powell 2014). In 
chapter 2, I outlined the logic of several testable expectations that flow from this 
theoretical framework. Specifically, I am looking for scenarios that will generate a rift 
between the goals of the foot soldiers and those of the executive. Below are the 
hypotheses I outlined in chapter 2:  
H1: Military Regimes are more likely to experience mutinies than other types of regimes. 
H2: As expenditures per soldier decrease, the likelihood of mutinies should increase. 
H3: As a state experiences more protests, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.  
H4: Peaceful Protests are more likely to spur mutinies than violent protests.  
H5: Diversionary war should increase the likelihood of mutinies.  
H6: Executive ordered purging should increase the likelihood of mutinies.  
Research Design  
 In this analysis, the unit of analysis will be the country-year. The dependent 
variable is again drawn from MMDD, and is a dichotomous indicator of annual mutinies. 
This variable takes on the value of 1if a mutiny occurred in a given year and 0 otherwise. 
Chapter 2 outlines many details about the nature and distribution of this variable.  
 The independent variables of interest for this chapter are drawn from various 
sources. To begin, the military regime variable is drawn from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 
(2012). The Military Regime variable is dichotomous with a zero indicating some regime 
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type besides a military regime and a value of 1 indicating the presence of a military 
regime. Only 7.49% (881 cases of 11,763) of all regime-years are military regimes, 
making military regimes a rarity. Table 5.1 displays the distribution of military regimes 
across region. The Americas have had more military regimes than other regions, followed 
by Asia and Africa.  
Table 5.1  
Distribution of Military Regime Variable across Regions 
 Americas Asia Africa Middle East Europe 
% of all 
regimes in 
region that 
are military 
regimes 
14.4% 11.4% 8.26% 4.2% .002% 
  
 The protest measure comes from The Social, Political, and Economic Events 
Database (SPEED) (Nardulli et al. 2014). This dataset codes “destabilizing human-
initiated” events, which include many acts beyond protests. For this reason, I limit the 
analysis only to protests events carried out by non-state entities targeted at the state. The 
Protest Count variable is a count of the total number of protest events in a given country-
year. This variable can range from 0-214.  The maximum value of this variable occurred 
in the U.S. in 1971 at the height of anti-Vietnam protests.  
The next hypothesis I will evaluate considers the nature of a protest event. I 
anticipate that peaceful and violent protests have different effects on the likelihood of 
mutinies. I expect that peaceful protests will be more likely to encourage mutinies 
because the cost of repressing peaceful protestors is much higher than the cost of 
repressing violent protestors. Fortunately, the SPEED data include a variable that codes 
108 
 
whether or not a protest was violent based upon the use of weapons. This categorical 
variable actually codes what specific instrument was used (e.g., gun, improvised 
explosive, fire, blunt instruments, etc.). However, because my theory does not suggest 
that different weapons should have different effects, I collapse this categorical variable to 
capture whether or not a weapons was used in any of the protest events in a given 
country-year. I create three categories for the analysis: No Protests, Violent Protests, and 
Peaceful Protests.   
Next, I examine the effect of executive ordered Purges on military mutinies. I 
draw from Sudduth (2015). These data make a large contribution to the field by allowing 
scholars to examine purges empirically. However, the dataset has somewhat limited 
temporal coverage (1969-2003) when compared to the full time series in my analysis 
(1946-2015). Despite the limited temporal coverage, I leverage these data as they are the 
best opportunity to examine executive ordered purges. Sudduth imposes a rule that states 
that in order for an event to be a purge it must meet one of the following criteria: the 
executive eliminates rival elites (1) who have support from other elites (2) who have 
different policy preferences than the executive (3) who been suspected to plot the 
overthrown of the executive (Sudduth 2015:18). Figure 5.2 displays the distribution of 
purges across regions. African executives appear to be utilizing this regime securing 
mechanism more than executives in other regions, followed by those in the Middle East 
and Asia.  
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Figure 5.2: Purges by Region  
 
            My final expectation is that divisionary conflict will spur military mutinies 
because they present scenarios where the executive benefits from conflict by 
experiencing a boost in public opinion, but the foot soldiers do not experience a benefit. 
In contrast, the foot soldiers experience steep costs as conflict imposes risk on them. In 
order to proxy for diversionary conflict, I follow Mitchell and Thyne (2010).24 I create an 
interaction term using dispute initiation and an indicator for poor domestic, economic 
conditions. The basic intuition here is that an executive initiating conflict during 
economic downturns is likely trying to distract domestic constituencies from the present 
economic failures through the use of divisionary tactics.  
                                                            
24 Their unit of analysis is directed dyads. Here I simplify and maintain the country-year unit of analysis. 
This means that a MID will only be coded for the initiator state.  
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The MID variable is coded 1 if a state initiates a dispute in a given year (Jones et 
al. 1996). In order to measure domestic turmoil, the CPI variable captures the percentage 
change in a state’s World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Mitchell and Prins 2004; 
Mitchell and Powell 2010). This measure is a common proxy for domestic economic 
conditions and offers better data availability than more direct measures, like 
unemployment or investment (e.g., Mitchell and Thyne 2010; Ostrom and Job 1986; 
James and O’Neal 1991). I then interact these two terms together to get a proxy for 
diversionary conflict. This measure has limited temporal coverage compared to the other 
primary independent variables of interests.  
 I estimate a logistic regression with standard errors clustered by country. All 
independent variables are lagged. I include time since last mutiny, time since last 
mutiny2, and time since last mutiny3 to account for temporal dependency (Carter and 
Signorino 2010). I use all same control variables that are outlined in Chapter 4. These 
are: Coups, GDPPC, Military Size, Cold War.  
Results  
 Results Table 5.1 shows the effect of the primary independent variables of 
interest. This table excludes the final hypotheses regarding divisionary conflict due to the 
fact that this variable is temporally limited. The results for the final hypothesis can be 
found in Results table 5.2. The first hypothesis I set out to test was whether or not 
military regimes are more mutiny prone. The results suggest that military regimes are not 
more mutiny prone than other regime types. In the final full model, military regimes  
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become marginally significant but work in the opposite direction as expected. Thus, I do 
not find support for the expectation that military regimes will be most predisposed to 
mutinies. 
 
 
Prob > chi2 =0.362 Prob > chi2 =0.463 Prob > chi2 =  0.299 
Results Table 5.2  Military 
Regime 
Protest Count Protest Nature  Purges  Full Model 
with Protest 
Count  
Full Model 
with Protest 
Nature  
       
 
Primary Independent 
Variables  
      
       
Military Regime  -0.473(0.324)    -0.804**(.382) -0.908**(.387)
       
Protest Count   0.016***(.005)   0.019***(.005)  
       
Violent Protests   0.831***(.233)   0.739***(.248)
       
Peaceful Protests   0.552**(.258)   0.391(.274) 
       
Military Purges    0.411(.398) 0.604(.429) 0.279(.381) 
       
State Level Controls       
       
Coups 0.414(.260) 0.482**(.24) 0.418(.258) 0.355(.232) 0.264(.326) 0.258(.325) 
       
GDPPC 0.197***(.073) 0.232***(.073) -0.256***(.073) 0.249***(.082) 0.273***(.084) 0.265***(.083)
       
Military Size 0.000***(.000) 0.000(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.001***(.000) 0.000(.000) 0.000**(.000) 
       
Democracy -0.698**(.278) -0.738**(.297) -0.655**(.329) -0.519(.322) -0.639*(0.35) -0.593**(.359)
       
Autocracy -0.55**(.225) -0.408*(.225) -0.486**(.233) -0.409(.254) -0.216(.25) -0.216(.255) 
 
Temporal Controls       
       
Cold War  -0.518**(.205) 0.763***(.218) -0.623***(.215) -0.425**(.244) -0.471(.292) -0.472*(.265) 
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Table 5.2 Continued  
 
      
Years 0.438***(.047) 0.418***(.049) 0.433***(.053)) 0.412***(.053) 0.421***(.054) 0.427***(.061)
       
Years2  0.02***(.003) 0.018***(.003) 0.020***(.003) 0.018***(.003) 0.018***(.003) 0.020***(.003)
       
Years3 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000)
       
Constant 0.463 0.699 0.334 0.487 0.824 0.461 
 (0.464) (0.467) (0.516) (0.547) (0.539) (0.578) 
       
Observations 11,872 12,878 11,619 9,778 9,090 8,646 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Protests do increase the likelihood of a state experiencing mutinies, as 
hypothesized. The positive and significant coefficient indicates support for my second 
hypothesis. Figure 5.3 displays the substantive effects. Here, using simulated predicted 
probabilities obtained through clarify, I plot the change in predicted probabilities given a 
change in the number of protests a state experiences in a given year. There is a 7.8% 
change in the predicted probability of a mutiny given that a state moves from 
experiencing no protests to experiencing 5 protest a year. Moving from the baseline of no 
protests to 10 additional protests, there is an 18.4% change in the predicted probability of 
a mutiny. If a state moves from experiencing no protests to experiencing 25 additional 
protests, the likelihood of a mutiny jumps by 48.3%. Finally, moving from the baseline of 
no protests to 50 protests, the predicted probability of a mutiny changes by a dramatic 
126.8%. 
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Figure 5.3  
 
*Predicted probabilities calculated from protest count model in Results Table 5.1.  
 
I theorized that different types of protests would encourage mutinies more than 
others. Specifically, I expected that peaceful protests would encourage mutinies due to 
the high costs associated with repressing peaceful dissenters. However, the results 
suggest that both peaceful and violent protests predict mutinies and one is not a better 
predictor than the other (Probability chi2 = 0.362).25 I do not include Protest Count, 
Peaceful Protests, and Violent Protests in the same model due to issues of collinearity. I 
present full models, one which includes the protest count variable and one which includes 
                                                            
25 This reports the chi2 of β for each variable.  
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the two protest nature variables. In the full model considering protest nature, we see that 
the difference between violent protests and peaceful protests is indistinguishable from 
zero. Thus, there is no evidence that peaceful protests encourage mutinies over violent 
protests. Both types predict mutinies, but one no more than the other.  
Military purges fail to achieve statistical significance. The coefficient is positive 
as expected, but the effect is indistinguishable from zero. There a few possible 
explanations for this null finding. First, it is possible that the effect of purging is 
immediate. In other words, there is not temporal lag and the mutiny occurs immediately 
after the purge. However, upon investigating this, I do not find support even when 
estimating the model with no lag of the independent variable, although the p-value does 
get closer to reaching statistical significance. Second, it is important to note that these 
data are temporally restricted. The dataset only covers 1969-2003. This limited coverage 
may be making it challenging to find results. I estimated this model for each region to see 
if there are heterogeneous effects across different that are washing out results (reported in 
Results Table 5.3). Interestingly, the coefficient is only positive and significant in the 
Americas. For every other region there is no statistical significance, although Africa and 
the Middle East are close to achieving significance.
 
 
Results Table 5.3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Europe Africa Middle East Asia Americas 
      
Military Purges 0.158(.794) -1.00(.622) -0.755(.462) 0.368(1.082) 1.774**(.804) 
 
 
Coup 0.687(1.735) 0.063(.388) -0.390(.962) 0.535(.596) 1.026(.684) 
 
 
GDPPC -0.508(.369) -0.248(.224) -0.5(.31) -0.538**(.24) -0.455(.306) 
 
Military Size 0.002***(.001) 0.005(.004) -0.001(.002) 0.000*(.000) 0.001*(.000) 
 
 
Democracy -0.872(.693) -0.346(.334) 1.919(1.477) -1.293(.833) 0.592(.986) 
 
 
Autocracy -0.276(.850) 0.439(.386) 0.531(.82) -0.634(.407) -1.298*(.709) 
 
Cold War -1.668**(.676) -1.724***(.477) -1.349*(.744) 1.182***(.337) 0.689(.461) 
 
Years  -0.361*(.209) -0.463***(.01) -0.456***(.095) -0.324***(.099) -0.390**(.18) 
 
Years2 0.016**(.008) 0.023***(.006) 0.025***(.007) 0.011**(.005) 0.020**(.01) 
 
Years3 -0.000**(.000) -0.000***(.000) -0.000***(.000) -0.000*(.000) -0.000*(.000) 
 
Constant 1.782 0.576 2.501 1.199 -0.117 
 (2.364) (1.349) (2.056) (1.616) (2.553) 
      
Observations 2,153 1,898 1,092 1,155 3,480 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
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In Results Table 5.4, I display the results for the diversionary theory hypothesis. I 
find support for the expectation that divisionary conflict will incentivize mutinies by 
creating scenarios where executives benefit from conflict while soldiers suffer. Figure 5.4 
presents the substantive results from this model. I have split the results by two 
dimensions. Each point estimate represents a maximum or minimum value of a 
constitutive term (e.g., maximum or minimum value on MID variable and maximum or 
minimum value on CPI variable). The figure is split so point estimates on the left side of 
the figure represent the minimum values on the CPI variable, or situations of economic 
downturn. Point estimates on the right of the figure represent scenarios of a strong 
domestic economy or the maximum value on the CPI variable. The X-axis alters the 
value on the MID variable, creating scenarios of conflict and no conflict. As the figure 
displays, scenarios of conflict during economic downturns are associated with the highest 
predicted probabilities of military mutinies. Good economic conditions seem to ward off 
mutinies. However, in the context of a strong domestic economy, states that experience 
conflict are more likely to experience mutinies than those that do not. What is most 
important in figure 5.4 is that the interaction of conflict and an economic downturn spurs 
mutinies. 
 
 
Results Table 5.4 MIDs % ΔCPI Interaction Full Model w/ 
Protest Count 
Full Model w/ 
Protest Nature 
      
 
Primary Independent 
Variables  
 
     
Diversionary Conflict   -0.402*(.227) -0.427*(.221) -0.457*(.234) 
      
MID Initiated -0.112(.378)  0.655(.517) 0.970**(.472) 0.811(.513) 
      
% ΔCPI  -0.083(.056) -0.075(.055) -0.095(.058) -0.01(.07) 
      
Military Regime    -2.050**(.874) -1.943**(.887) 
      
Protest Count    0.024***(.007)  
      
Peaceful Protests     0.456(.710) 
      
Violent Protests     0.989*(.588) 
      
Military Purges    1.660**(.74) 1.247*(.691) 
      
State Level Controls       
      
Coups 0.812(.543) 0.724(.521) 0.698(.532) 0.764(.544) 0.841(.527) 
      
GDPPC -0.404(.279) -0.442(.276) -0.433(.274) -0.388(.276) -0.530*(.295) 
      
Military Size 0.001***(.000) 0.001***(.000) 0.001***(.000) -0.000(.001) 0.001**(.000) 
      
Democracy -0.447(.678) -0.426(.709) -0.433(.719) -0.264(.77) -0.058(.762) 
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Table 5.4 Continued 
  
     
Autocracy -1.333***(.458) -1.42***(.482) -1.435***(.496) -1.470***(.448) -1.302***(.471) 
      
Temporal Controls  
 
     
Cold War -0.751*(.39) -1.139***(.404) -1.170***(.406) -1.144***(.385) -0.993***(.381) 
      
Years  -0.537***(.116) -0.552***(.12) -0.555***(.121) -0.544***(.128) -0.480***(.135) 
      
Years2 0.027***(.007) 0.027***(.008) 0.027***(.008) 0.026***(.007) 0.0239***(.008)
      
Years3 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000**(.000) 
      
      
Constant 1.782 2.679 2.611 2.434 2.495 
 (2.144) (2.353) (2.357) (2.270) (2.510) 
      
Observations 5,587 5,587 5,587 5,424 5,424 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 5.4  
 
*Predicted probabilities calculated from Interaction model in Results table 5.3.  
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Ideas for Future Research  
 In this chapter I consider the impact of protests on mutinies. I theorized that 
peaceful protests will be more likely to spur mutinies than violent protests because the 
cost of repression will be steeper. There are other ways to measure the varying cost of 
repression for soldiers and the executive. I would like to carry out an analysis that 
examines the impact of having ethnic kin of soldiers protesting. For example, in Syria in 
2011, Sunni soldiers refused orders to repress dissenters because they identified 
ethnically and culturally with these protesters. Anecdotally, there are many cases of 
mutiny that are spurred by ethnic considerations (e.g., Nigeria 1967, Uganda 1977, CAR 
1996, Niger 1997). I hope to explore this relationship between shared ethnic identity 
between soldiers and civilians and the likelihood of mutinies when repressive strategies 
are deployed.  
 I found support for my expectation about divisionary conflicts spurring mutinies. 
However, there are many proxies for diversionary conflict. I would like to expand this 
analysis to include several more types of diversion. For example, diversion might happen 
during economic downturns, but it may also happen during scandals – which are easily 
observed by soldiers – making the diversion perhaps more obvious. With diversion being 
more obvious, the costs imposed on soldiers should be more obvious, thus making 
military rebellion more likely.  
Conclusion  
This chapter examined the determinants of type 2 mutinies, or those that occur when foot 
soldiers experience high costs and point their discontent at the executive. I theorized that 
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scenarios that benefit the executive and impose steep costs on the soldiers are likely to 
spur this type of mutiny. I found evidence that protests (both violent and peaceful) 
increase the likelihood of mutinies. I also found evidence that military purges in the 
Americas drives mutinies, but do not seem to matter in other regions. Finally, I found 
evidence that diversionary tactics used by the executive encourage foot soldiers to 
mutiny.   
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
Chapter 6: Type 3 Mutinies 
 This chapter will present the final empirical tests of the last set of theoretical 
expectations, which considers an interesting strategic calculation for the executive. As 
Feaver (2003) established, the central issue with civil military relations is that executives 
need strong militaries to ward off both domestic and international threats. However, in 
strengthening their military, they increase the chances that a strong, capable military will 
turn against the executive and use its new-found power to usurp the civilian power. This 
final nest (Figure 6.1) includes all the actors in the military apparatus. Because military 
leadership are included in the interaction, coup plotting is a realistic option for 
disgruntled military actors who may seek to oust civilian principals. However, executives 
are forward thinking and will act in an effort to limit this type of conspiratorial behavior. 
In seeking to introduce new coordination challenges, the executive may be spurring a 
new type of dissent: mutinies.   
Figure 6.1: Foot Soldiers and Leadership as Agents of Executive 
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It is well established that executives are concerned with the military’s ability to 
coordinate against them, and thus take measures to limit the military’s ability to 
coordinate (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011, Powell 2012). It is also well established that coup 
proofing can limit military effectiveness (e.g., Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Brooks 2006; 
Pilster and Bohmelt 2011). I expect that there is yet another unintended consequence of 
coup proofing. Given that the inherent purpose of coup proofing is to factionalize the 
military to raise coordination obstacles, I expect that these measures will increase the 
military’s likelihood of experiencing a mutiny. I also expect that in the context of high 
coup proofing, situations that are known to spur widespread military dissatisfaction, 
should instead predispose a state to suffering from mutinies rather than coups. While this 
type of pervasive and general dissatisfaction should traditionaly result in coup activity, 
the regime-securing strategy of coup proofing will prevent such coordination. Instead of 
large scale conspiracy, we will observe lower level military rebellions in the context of 
high coup proofing.   
Theoretical Expectations to Test  
The expectations I set out to test in this chapter are:  
H8: As coup proofing measures increase, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.  
H9: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences democratization, the 
likelihood of a mutiny will also increase. 
H10: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences more human rights 
violations, the likelihood of a mutiny will also increase.   
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Research Design  
 The dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomous indicator of mutinies. As 
with previous chapters, the unit of analysis is country-year. The first expectation I set out 
to test is the impact of coup proofing on military rebellions. The coup proofing literature 
presents various measures for coup proofing. Most of them are temporally limited and 
difficult to interpret. The shortcomings of these measures are recognized by other 
scholars (e.g., De Bruin 2017, Reiter working paper). The authors point out that while 
coup proofing is conceptually clear, it can be a very challenging concept to capture 
empirically and quantitatively. However, despite these shortcomings, I will utilize extant 
coup proofing measures. Below I will describe each measure that I include in Results 
Table 6.1.  
 The first coup proofing measure I include in the analysis is CB Count. This 
variable is a count of the counterweight forces in a given year within a single country that 
fulfill these criteria: “(1) it is independent from military command. (2) the force is 
deployed within 60 miles of the capital which ensures it has at least to possibility to 
intercept a coup.” Balancing is simply the natural log transformation of the CB Count 
variable. New CB is a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a new counterweight was 
created in a given year. De Bruin (2017) uses 1,200 primary and secondary sources in the 
coding of these data. One major drawback of these measures is that they are only 
available for 65 randomly selected states between 1960-2010. While the sample is 
random and representative, users may still be worried that there is something 
systematically different about this sample from the population. However, the advantages 
of these data far outweigh the drawbacks.  
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 The most established and commonly used coup proofing measures were 
developed by Pilster and Bohmelt (2011). By expanding Belkin and Schofer’s (2003) 
coup proofing measure, Pilster and Bohmelt develop a measure called counterbalancing, 
which is the ratio of military to paramilitary organizations. The second measure 
developed by Pilster a Bohmelt includes a count of ground capable organizations, or 
those that could theoretically be expected to combat a coup or deter a coup attempt. This 
variable is called Effective Organization. Finally, they develop a ratio that measures the 
total number of military personnel relative to the total number of paramilitary 
organizations. A relatively high number of paramilitaries indicates an army that has more 
structural coup proofing in place. All of these measures cover 1970-1999, which is 
improved temporal coverage from Belkin and Schofer’s original measures which only 
covered 1966-1986. However, the dependent variable drawn from MMDD ranges from 
1945-present day; thus, there are many years of the dependent variable that are not 
covered by these datasets.  
 The conditional hypotheses involve a number of domestic conditions. These 
various measures are drawn from different datasets. The first, democratization, is 
calculated using Polity VI scores. This dichotomous variable takes on the value of 1 if a 
country has experienced a three point positive shift in polity over the previous 5 years.26 I 
draw various measures of human rights violations from the CIRI data project (Cingranelli 
and Richards 1999). All of these variables cover 1981-2011. Unfortunately for this 
project, there is limited temporal overlap between the CIRI project and the coup proofing 
                                                            
26 I tried a number of thresholds here, and the results are robust to various other specifications. 
(e.g., 2 point shift in two years, 5 point shift in five years, etc.)  
128 
 
measures. As reported in the results section, this means that the total number of 
observations for this portion of the analysis drops quite significantly. The first variable I 
examine is Political Imprisonment. This is an ordinal variable that is coded 0 if there 
were “many individuals imprisoned for political reasons.” 1 if there were “few 
individuals imprisoned for political reasons.” and 2 if there were no individuals 
imprisoned unjustly. Most of these data are distributed in the “no individuals” category 
(47%). The next type of violation considered is Torture. This variable is coded 0 if 
torture, or “the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain by government officials,” was 
practiced frequently. The variable takes on the value of 1 if torture was deployed 
occasionally, and 2 if it did not occur in a given year. The distribution of this variable is 
different than political imprisonment. 40% of the observations fall in the “some torture” 
category, while 40% fall in the “frequent torture” category, and 20% fall in the “no 
torture” group.  
The next human rights violation examined is Disappearances. These events are 
cases where individuals are disappeared due to political reasons and the victims have not 
yet been found. Like the previous variables, this is coded as 0 if disappearances are 
frequent, 1 if there are occasional, and 2 if they do not occur. Most countries do not 
experience disappearances in a given year (72%). Extrajudicial Killings are the next 
category of rights violations. These events are killings carried out by government 
officials without due process of law. They are categorized in the same way, 0 if killings 
are common, 1 if they are occasional, and 2 if they do not occur. 29% of countries 
experience occasional extrajudicial killings in a given year, and 19% experience frequent 
killings in a year. Finally, I examine the impact of Physical Integrity violations, which 
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are simply an additive index of the aforementioned measures of rights violations. This 
variable ranges from 0 which represents no government respect for rights to 8 which 
represents full respect for rights. Figure 6.2 presents a histogram of the distribution of 
Physical Integrity. Most country-years have moderate to good respect for rights (values 
4-8).  
Figure 6.2
 
Results 
The results for the first hypothesis, examining the effect of coup proofing on mutinies, 
are presented in Results Table 6.1. Of the six measures of coup proofing, four of them are 
positively associated with mutinies. In other words, most conventional measures of 
counterbalancing increase the propensity of state experiencing mutinies. This finding 
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should be included in the dictator’s handbook. Dictators can ward off coups by 
counterbalancing, but they should use this regime-securing strategy with extreme caution. 
Mutinies may likely be direct result of imposing artificial coordination challenges on a 
military. Anecdotally, we know that mutinies can have disastrous impacts, perhaps just as 
consequential to the tenure of a dictator as a coup (e.g., the formation of rebel groups as 
seen in the DRC with the formation of the M23 rebel group). Leaders should use extreme 
caution when implementing such coup proofing strategies as they may likely be a double 
edged-sword. 
 
 
Results Table 6.1 Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3 Measure 4 Measure 5 Measure 6  
Coup Proofing and 
Mutinies 
      
 
Independent Variables 
of Interest 
      
       
CB Count (De Bruin) 0.224***(.062)      
       
Balancing (De Bruin)  0.504**(.249)     
       
New CB (De Bruin)   0.162(.718)    
       
Counter Bal (P&B)    0.292**(.143)   
       
Effective Number (P&B)     0.291**(.148)  
       
Paramilitary (P&B)      0.044(.104) 
 
State Level Controls 
  
      
Coup 0.51(.323) 0.459(.323) 0.384(.314) 0.143(.64) 0.094(.435) 0.271(.459) 
       
GDPPC -0.199(.146) -0.139(.131) -0.092(.132) 0.078(.19) -0.166*(.099) -0.181(.114) 
       
Democracy -0.355(.415) -0.488(.398) -0.705*(.428) -0.804(.811) -0.437(.395) -0.361(.579) 
       
Autocracy -0.452*(.273) -0.523*(.272) -0.508*(.277) -0.931*(.487) -0.212(.275) -0.359(.333) 
 
Temporal Controls 
 
      
Cold War  -0.083(.308) -0.148(.282) -0.347(.291)  -0.452(.287) -0.625**(.315)
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Table 6.1 Continued  
 
      
Years  0.489***(.069) 0.508***(.065) -0.52***(.06) 0.524**(.233) 0.502***(.069) 0.462***(.112)
       
Years2 0.023***(.004) 0.024***(.004) 0.024***(.004) 0.034*(.018) 0.023***(.004) 0.023***(.007)
       
Years3  0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) -0.000(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000)
       
Constant 0.0637 -0.220 0.0322 -2.659 -0.150 0.445 
 (0.977) (0.946) (0.889) (1.746) (0.797) (0.798) 
       
Observations 4,531 4,531 4,531 3,704 7,090 5,065 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The next expectation I examine is the impact of democratization in the context of 
high coup proofing. I expected that when democratization occurs during periods of heavy 
counterbalancing, the military might have the dispositional factors required to stage a 
coup. However, the coup proofing measures will limit the ability of the military to 
intervene. Thus, instead of experiencing a coup, the military will experience a mutiny. 
The results in Results Table 6.2 do not support my initial expectation. Instead, the 
negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates the opposite. In the context of high 
coup proofing, democratization decreases the likelihood of a mutiny. I present the 
marginal impact of the interaction on the likelihood of mutinies in Figure 6.3.
 
 
Results Table 6.2    
Interaction 1 Democratization Coup Proof Interactive 
 
Independent Variables of Interests 
 
   
INTERACTION   -0.940***(.309) 
 
Constitutive Terms  
 
   
Democratization 0.027(.201)  -0.924(.738) 
    
Counter Balance (P&B)  0.292**(.143) 0.325**(.145) 
 
State Level Controls  
   
 
Coup 
0.189(.243) 0.143(.640) 0.123(.604) 
    
GDPPC -0.212***(.665) 0.078(.19) 0.075(.196) 
    
Democracy -0.619**(.259) -0.804(.811) -0.843(.823) 
    
Autocracy -0.604***(.216) -0.931*(.487) -1.066**(.502) 
 
Temporal Controls  
 
   
Years -0.427***(.047) -0.524**(.233) -0.514**(.235) 
    
Years2 0.017***(.003) 0.034*(.018) 0.033*(.018) 
    
Years3 -0.000***(.000) -0.001(.000) -0.001(.000) 
    
Constant 0.687(.463) -2.659(1.746) -2.527(1.8) 
134 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Observations 12,957 3,704 3,697 
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Figure 6.3
 
 
Due to this null finding, I returned to my theoretical expectations in order to see if 
perhaps there was a misstep here. Theoretically speaking, any institutional shift, either 
towards democratization or away from it, should present similar circumstances that 
threaten the military’s ability to secure its corporate interests. When moving from a 
positive high value on the polity scale to a lower or perhaps even negative value, we 
should expect that the military feels its institutional avenues for securing preferences are 
shrinking. In other words, the way resources are secured today may not be the way that 
resources are secured tomorrow. This type of commitment problem should spur the 
military to mutiny against the executive.  
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Given this observation, both democratization and “autocratization” should cause 
mutinies in the context of high coup proofing. Thus, I created a new independent 
variable, regime shifts, which captures any three-point shift in absolute value on the 
Polity scale within five years. I re-estimate this model and with the regime shift variable 
instead of the democratization variable. However, my results do not change significantly. 
I still find that the interaction term is negative and significant, which is the opposite of 
what was expected (see Results Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4). These results are a bit 
disappointing but not all together surprising given the state of measures for coup 
proofing. I am not convinced that these results are actually representative of reality. 
Instead, I believe that the results might be a driven by poor measures with limited 
temporal coverage. I am not ready to recant my theoretical expectations but will continue 
to seek out better coup proofing measures in the future.  
 
 
Results Table 6.3     
Interaction 2 Regime Shift  Coup Proof  Interactive  
 
Independent Variables of Interest 
   
    
INTERACTION   -0.535**(.251) 
 
Constitutive Terms  
 
   
Regime Shift -0.097(.202)  0.195(.561) 
    
Counter Balance (P&B)  0.292**(.143) 0.354**(.144) 
 
State Level Controls  
 
   
Coup 0.325(.244) 0.143(.64) 0.038(.63) 
    
GDPPC -0.191***(.067) 0.078(.19) 0.082(.187) 
    
Democracy -0.631**(.25) -0.804(.811) -0.684(.801) 
    
Autocracy -0.506**(.221) -0.931*(.487) -0.928**(.462) 
 
Temporal Controls  
 
   
Cold War -0.497**(.208)   
    
Years  -0.41***(.049) -0.524**(.233) -0.515**(.236) 
    
Years2 0.017***(.003) 0.034*(.018) 0.033*(.018) 
    
Years3 0.000***(.000) -0.001(.000) -0.001(.000) 
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Constant 0.694 -2.659 -2.770 
 (0.496) (1.746) (1.746) 
 
Observations 
 
12,957 
 
3,704 
 
3,697 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 6.4
 
 
The next expectation I examine is the conditional impact of human rights 
violations and coup proofing on the likelihood of mutinies. To revisit the basic intuition, I 
expected that human rights violations that are ordered by the executive but carried out by 
the military will cause widespread grievances in the military apparatus. Often times, even 
though the executive orders the repression, he or she will blame the act on military 
leadership and foot soldiers. Thus, in this instance, we should expect to see a widely 
dissatisfied military. However, the use coup proofing tactics will limit the dissatisfied 
military’s ability to coordinate. Thus we will only observe a mutiny instead of a coup.  
 
 
Results Table 6.4 Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 Interaction 4 Interaction 5 
 (Political Prison) (Torture)  (Disappearances) (Killings)  (Phys Integ)  
      
Political Prison * Counterbal 0.436**(.21)     
      
Political Prison  -0.340(.603)     
      
Torture * Counterbal   0.01(.022)    
      
Torture  0.009(.016)    
      
Disappear * Counterbal    0.022(.026)   
      
Disappearances    -0.002(.004)   
      
Killings * Counterbal    0.042(.089)  
      
Killings     0.006(.009)  
      
Phys Integ * Counterbal     0.087(.069) 
      
Phys Integ     -0.201(.207) 
      
Counterbalance  0.038(.191) 0.234(.207) 0.304(.21) 0.201(.198) 0.043(.2) 
      
GDPPC 0.075(.313) 0.026(.335) -0.092(.341) 0.009(.344) -0.082(.325) 
      
Democracy -2.733(1.721) -3.119*(1.694) -2.847*(1.651) -3.073*(1.715) -2.35(1.521) 
      
Autocracy -0.625(.693) -0.559(.73) -0.827(.777) -0.57(.724) -0.578(.661) 
      
Years  -0.560*(.294) -0.504*(.278) -0.417(.295) -0.511*(.279) -0.376(.331) 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 Continued  
 
     
Years2 0.029(.018) 0.027(.017) 0.023(.018) 0.027(.017) 0.02(.02) 
      
Years3  0.000(.000) 0.000(.000) 0.000(.000) 0.000(.000) 0.000(.000) 
      
      
Constant -2.359 -2.377 -1.987 -2.220 -1.569 
 (1.984) (2.000) (2.014) (2.090) (2.041) 
      
Observations 1,236 1,252 1,252 1,252 1,226 
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Figure 6.5 
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Results table 6.4 presents the interactive effects of various rights violations and 
counterbalancing. The number of observations in these models plummets due to limited 
temporal overlap between these two data sources. However, I find evidence that Political 
Imprisonment has the expected interactive effect when considered in tandem with coup 
proofing. In other words, as a state experiences more political imprisonments and has 
extremely high coordination obstacles in place, it is much more likely to experience a 
mutiny. Figure 6.5 shows the marginal impact of this interaction on the likelihood of 
mutinies. I have split the sample by democracies and non-democracies, expecting that 
this effect could be more pronounced in non-democracies. Moving across the x-axis, the 
counterbalancing variable moves from its minimum to its maximum. The dark black line 
represents country-years that experience a high number of political imprisonments. It is 
indeed these non-democratic, imprisonment-prone states with high levels of coup 
proofing that are most likely to experience mutinies.  
I do not find support for the other various rights violations. This is not all together 
surprising, especially considering the theoretical expectations put forward. I made an 
implicit assumption that these rights violations would only lead to mutinies if they were 
ordered by the executive, yet carried out by military actors. For these other types of rights 
violations, such as torture or killings, it is not evident that they are necessarily executive 
ordered. Instead, these events could be carried out by rouge soldiers or police without the 
directive of the executive all together. However, political imprisonment is the most likely 
rights violation to be ordered by higher-up civilian leaders, like the executive or his or her 
cronies. Given this observation, it is not surprising that I have only found support for 
imprisonment and not the various other types of violations.  
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Avenues for Future Research  
This chapter presented a number of conditional expectations regarding the effect of coup 
proofing and scenarios that are likely to create general military dissatisfaction. I have 
several other ideas for scenarios that are likely to generate wide-spread grievances among 
foot soldiers and military leaders. In coding cases for MMDD, I came across a number of 
cases in which military actors were upset because the legitimacy of the executive branch, 
and thus their own institutional legitimacy was called into question. Fraudulent elections 
are one avenue by which executive and thus military legitimacy can be questioned. The 
1986 snap presidential election in the Philippines demonstrates the tension that a 
perceived fraudulent election can introduce to the interaction between military leadership, 
rank and file soldiers, and civilian leadership. President Ferdinand Marcos won a snap 
election against the opposition candidate Aquino, a wife of an assassinated opposition 
senator. Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile stated that his and his troop’s 
defection from the Marcos regime was justified because “the mandate of the people does 
not belong to the regime…” (Oberdorfer 1986). Clearly, military actors are sensitive to 
the notion of legitimacy. Especially in younger democracies, military leaders only want 
to operate under an executive with adequate levels of legitimacy and a clear mandate 
from the people. 
As the example from the Philippines demonstrates, fraudulent elections may 
encourage mutinies because the military organization does not want to be associated with 
an executive who has a questionable or shaky mandate from the people. Specifically in 
the post-Cold War era, the international community has taken a strong stance on 
electioneering. International norms have shifted in such a way that fraud, if caught and 
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reported, is likely to be associated with punitive measures. One such measure is the 
withdrawal of military aid. As such, even if an executive seems to look favorably upon 
the military institution, if they are fraudulent, they cannot credibly commit to promoting 
the best interests of the military. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the fraudulent 
leader will receive so much domestic and international backlash that their tenure is short 
lived. Should the military expect the possibility of regime change or popular uprising, 
they will likely find strategic benefits in detaching the institution from the executive.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I demonstrated that coup proofing tactics have a direct yet unintended 
consequence on military loyalty. While leaders can effectively ward off coups through 
the use of such tactics, they are simultaneously spurring lower level military rebellions 
which can have severe impacts. I also demonstrated that human rights violations, 
specifically in the form of political imprisonment, will spur mutinies when executives 
have rolled out steep coup proofing measures. I did not find support for regime changes 
spurring mutinies in the context of high coup proofing. This chapter’s theoretical 
expectations and findings situate my work in the context of the broader civil military 
relations literature by considering how the executive’s decisions may spur different types 
of dissent. 
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion  
This dissertation sets out to develop a foundational framework for understanding (1) what 
mutinies are and (2) why mutinies occur. MMDD represents the first cross-sectional 
dataset on mutinies. This dataset will be useful for civil-military scholars moving 
forwards as there are still many questions to answer about mutinies. This dissertation 
focused on the most foundational question, but many others remain, making this research 
program promising. Below I will explore some of the policy implications that come out 
of this project. Then I will describe where I intend to take the project in the future.  
Policy Implications for External Actors, Major Powers, and IOs  
In part, I chose to study mutinies due to the policy relevance that this project promised. A 
casual reading of current events in major news outlets will clue the reader into the fact 
that mutinies are occurring more and more often. Not only are they occurring more often, 
but they are becoming a policy tool for major powers. Near the beginning of the Syrian 
civil conflict, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pushed strongly for an army mutiny 
among the Syrian forces. In an address at a news conference in Morocco, Secretary 
Clinton spoke directly to Assad’s forces saying, “The longer you support the regime 
campaign of violence against your brothers and sisters, the more it will stain your honor. 
If you refuse, however, to prop up the regime or take part in attacks on your fellow 
citizens, your countrymen and women will hail you as heroes” (Daily News 2012).  
The notion that military rebellions can demoralize and drain an incumbent’s 
ability to continue to wage war is not isolated to the Syrian case. NATO encouraged 
mutinies in Yugoslavia in 1999. By dropping leaflets of encouragement, NATO sought to 
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increase the number of desertions and mutinies against Milosevic (The Guardian 1999). 
The leaflets said, “Stay in Kosovo and meet certain death, or abandon your units and your 
military equipment and run away as fast as you can. If you decide to stay, NATO will 
attack you unfailingly from all sides. The choice is yours. –NATO.” What is most 
striking about this use of mutinies as a policy tool is that scholars and policy makers alike 
actually have no systematic evidence that such defections and desertions facilitate peace. 
The simple calculation being made here is that mutinies will decrease the fighting 
capacity of the state. This observation is certainly true, but I am fearful is an 
oversimplification of reality.  
 Mutinies drain the fighting capacity of the state, but can simultaneously increase 
the fighting capacity of non-state actors. This enhanced fighting capability of non-state 
actors is particularly pronounced when mutinies involve defections. In either scenario, if 
mutinies involve defections or do not, state forces and non-state forces move closer to 
parity. We know from classic international relations work (e.g., Organski and Kugler 
1980) and more recent civil war literature (e.g, Butler, Cunningham, and Gates 2017) that 
the distribution of power and resources matter for conflict onset, duration, and intensity. 
Specifically, parity or an even distribution of resources (as described in the civil war 
literature) is a dangerous condition, increasing the likelihood of conflict onset and 
increased intensity. Given this strong empirical evidence that parity is dangerous, 
Western powers should use extreme caution in encouraging mutinies in ongoing conflicts 
or states that are likely to experience conflict. This policy recommendation is ineffective 
at best and inherently dangerous at worst.  
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 Mutinies that occur organically without outside influence may serve as an 
indicator or “warning sign” for other processes. For example, if mutinies could serve as 
an effective foreshock for coup activity, they would be an extremely useful clue for 
policy makers trying to predict regime change. Coups likely follow mutinies because 
mutinies are a signal to military leadership about whether or not strong dispositional 
factors are present to launch a successful coup. These smaller rebellions reveal 
information about the military’s ability to coordinate on the same signal to oust the 
executive. In an effort to explore this notion a bit, I ran a preliminary model to see if 
mutinies might be a predictor of coups. In Results table 7.1, I have run a basic model 
predicting coups with the standard controls established in the literature. Mutinies do 
indeed appear to be a significant predictor of coup activity.  
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Results Table 7.1: Mutinies as Predictors of Coups D’état  
  
 Coups d’état 
  
Mutiny 0.854***(.203) 
  
GDPPC -0.1**(.046) 
  
Military Expend 0.000***(.000) 
  
Military Size  0.000(.000) 
  
Democracy -0.753***(.142) 
  
Autocracy -0.127(.108) 
  
Cold War 0.283**(.119) 
  
Years -0.441***(.033) 
  
Years2 0.022***(.003) 
  
Years3 0.000***(.000) 
  
Constant -0.480 
 (0.318) 
  
Observations 12,449 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
While preliminary, this finding should be useful to policy makers trying to 
ascertain the likelihood of regime change in a given country. In the future, I would like to 
spend more time theorizing about this relationship and exploring it further. It is possible 
that perhaps there is a non-monotonic relationship between mutinies. In other words, 
having a few mutinies might predict coup activity. However, when mutinies happen 
extremely frequently, the forces that are left are likely to be incredibly loyal, thus 
diminishing the likelihood of a coup after a certain point. This expectation is driven by 
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anecdotal evidence from cases like Syria in its recent conflict. While many scholars and 
policy makers expected Assad’s tenure to get cut short by a coup, it appears that all the 
forces left at this point are loyal, co-ethnics because all battalions that were in question 
have defected or deserted at this point. I do not explore this possibility empirically here, 
but will in future projects.  
Policy Implications for Mutiny-Prone States  
The three empirical chapters of this project offer direct policy recommendations for states 
that are prone to experiencing mutinies. The first chapter finds strong evidence that civil 
war intensity is likely to contribute to military rebellions. Clearly, a leader cannot directly 
and unilaterally control the intensity of conflict in his or her state. However, they can 
strategically deploy units to particularly locations. As mentioned at the conclusion of 
Chapter 4, there is significant sub-national variation in the intensity of civil wars. Thus, if 
a leader is worried about the loyalty of a specific sub-population in the military, they may 
be well advised to deploy these soldiers to lower-intensity conflict zones. For example, 
Assad should be weary of deploying Sunni soldiers to the highest intensity conflict zones 
like Raqqa. Instead, he would be wise to deploy these soldiers of questionable loyalty to 
low intensity zones where their loyalty will be challenged less.  
 I find evidence that protest events increase the chances of a mutiny. While leaders 
cannot do much to prevent protest events, and indeed there is evidence that in trying to 
prevent dissent leaders may actually spur it on (e.g., Davenport 1995), leaders should be 
weary of ordering repression in the face of protests. Repression means that soldiers have 
to go out and face protestors in the street. This often means harming ethnic-kin which is 
where the incentive to mutiny is generated. Leaders can mitigate this risk by keeping 
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soldiers quartered during unrest. This is a tricky dynamic though because idle hands and 
quartered soldiers might increase the likelihood of coup activity, and unchecked protests 
might lead to full scale revolution. For smaller, less threatening protest events, though, 
leaders might be well advised to not order repression if they are concerned with mutinies.  
 One clear policy recommendation offered in Chapter 5 is about the intention of 
conflict. Leaders might participate in conflict in order to generate a rally effect and a 
boost in public approval through the use of diversionary tactics. My findings suggest that 
while leaders might be able to divert the attention of civilians, the military is not as easily 
duped. In engaging in diversionary conflict, leaders are gambling on the loyalty of the 
military. The military appears to have the ability to gauge a leader’s intention. If the 
military perceives that conflict is divisionary in nature, and thus only benefiting the 
leader, they are apt to rebel. Thus, leaders should be very cautious when engaging in 
insincere conflict.  
 Finally, the last empirical model offers a strong word of caution to leaders who 
are concerned with extra-constitutional regime change. Coup proofing is indeed a double 
edged sword. While we know that it can ward off coups effective, it has a lot of 
unintended consequences, of which mutinies are just one (e.g., Powell 2012, De Bruin 
2017). Leaders who are worried about mutinies should coup proof with extreme caution. 
Specifically, the formation of counterbalancing organizations seems to spur mutinies. 
This implication returns to Feaver’s (2003) conceptualization of the military 
problematique, which is that leaders want a strong military to counter sincere threats but 
not so strong that it can usurp civilian leaders. Civilian leaders then, should understand 
that coup proofing severely limits the military’s ability to counter threats both directly 
153 
 
through limiting coordination and indirectly through spurring mutinies. Given this 
observation, leaders must weigh the value of introducing coordination challenges to 
enhance the chances of regime survival and the drawbacks that such coordination 
challenges present.  
Avenues for Future Research  
This dissertation represents the leading edge in mutiny research, but there is still much 
work to be done. I have presented the first quantitative dataset on mutinies across regions 
and time, and I have offered evidence that allows scholars and policy makers to make 
predictions about when mutinies are likely to occur given certain domestic situations. The 
research presented here, however, is just the first step in a much larger research program. 
Below I will describe a number of extensions to this project.  
Table 7.2 lays out a number of avenues for future research. The first column 
presents many of the relationships tested in this dissertation, which are the domestic 
causes of mutinies. There is a potential domestic cause that I hope to explore in the future 
that I have not included in this project. In my reading of cases during the data collection 
process, I found many instances of mutinies that occurred along former rebel lines. As a 
peacekeeping measure, many states incorporate former rebel forces into the military 
apparatus. The logic behind this policy is that by giving former rebel troops a vocation, 
they will not be tempted to revisit rebellion. However, this inclusion of former rebels 
seems to make a military more apt to fracture. For example, most of the Cote D’Ivoire’s 
mutinies have broken out along the lines of former rebel battalions. Guatemala also 
experienced a similar mutiny in 1997 when actors were fearful that a peacekeeping 
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measure would strip them of their jobs. While peacekeeping is a common post-conflict 
measure, it might actually pose a threat to human security and state security. 
 
 
Table 7.2: Future Directions  
 
  Mutinies as Dependent Variable                                                    Mutinies as Independent Variable  
Domestic Causes  International Causes  Domestic Effects  International Effects  
• Intense Civil War  • Rivalries  • Civil war outcomes  • Traditional measures 
of power  
• Long civil war  
 
• MID escalation  • Rebel group formation • Military aid 
withdrawal  
• Protests  • Intense conflict  • Violence against 
civilians  
• Alliance formation  
• Divisionary Conflict  • Long conflict  • Regime change 
(preliminary evidence 
presented)  
• International 
organizations  
• Peace Agreements in 
Post-conflict 
societies  
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While this dissertation largely considers domestic causes of mutinies, there are a 
whole host of potential explanations for mutinies that occur from beyond a state’s 
borders. For example, Chapter 4 tested the effect of intense and long lasting civil wars on 
the likelihood of a mutiny. The theoretical expectations tested in this chapter should 
extend to scenarios of interstate war. A natural extension of this project would be to 
examine the impact of interstate conflict on mutinies. Returning to the theoretical 
argument presented in Chapter 3, bad strategy selected by military leadership should spur 
grievances among foot soldiers. Risk aversion will also increase the chances that foot 
soldiers will shirk in the form of mutiny. I would like to examine intense interstate 
conflict, long-lasting interstate conflict and MID escalation as proxies for bad strategy 
selected by military leadership. This analysis can be facilitated quite easily by the 
Correlates of War data project (e.g. Ghosn et. al 2004).  
Rivalries also present a potential avenue for military mutinies. Rivalries are 
similar to divisionary war in that they generate benefits for the executive but impose 
steep costs on foot soldiers. As Colaresi (2004) finds, dovish leaders in a rivalry context 
are more likely to suffer electorally than hawkish leaders. This finding suggests that in a 
rivalry context leaders have strong incentives to engage in unnecessary conflict in order 
to generate public support for their tenure. Such engagement in unnecessary conflict will 
help the leader maintain his domestic constituency, but will impose greater personal 
danger on foot soldiers. This logic leads to the expectation that international rivalries 
should spur mutinies.  
Beyond examining the causes of mutinies, there is a promising future in 
evaluating the effects of military mutinies. In regards to the implications that mutinies 
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have for human security, this line of research has the most potential to inform scholars 
and policy makers about the dangers of mutinies. Mutinies likely have measurable 
impacts on a number of domestic conditions. First, while Chapter 4 considered the impact 
of civil wars on the likelihood of mutinies, scholars would be well served to consider how 
mutinies during civil conflict effect the outcomes of such conflicts. For example, do 
mutinies make rebel victories more likely? Do they make negotiated settlements less 
likely? Do mutinies make civil wars last longer? Clearly, there will be issues of reverse 
causality that must be addressed here, since I have already demonstrated that long lasting 
civil wars spur mutinies. However, this line of research will be critically important to 
scholars, policy makers, and international actors alike when considering the best plan of 
action in states with protracted civil wars, like Syria and Yemen.  
In reading cases of mutinies, I have found strong anecdotal evidence that mutinies 
are often followed by rebel group formation. I hope to demonstrate that this relationship 
holds up empirically, showing that mutinies indeed have dire downstream effects for the 
state. This exact dynamic played out in the DRC and Yemen. I have presented 
preliminary evidence in this chapter that mutinies spur extraconstitutional regime change 
by way of coups d’état. I would like to expand this preliminary finding into a full analysis 
and situate the preliminary findings in a well-grounded theoretical framework. At this 
point, I have not put forward adequate theoretical expectations for why this relationship 
exists, but I hope to develop this portion of the project in the future. MMDD codes a 
number of important variations in mutiny events, such as: were they violent? Did they 
kill civilians? All of these variations in mutinies can be predicted. In the future, I hope to 
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ask a number of research questions about these interesting variations in the nature and 
quality of mutinies.  
Finally, there are a host of international processes that military mutinies might 
impact. First, conventional measures of power (e.g., CINC) do not consider dimensions 
of loyalty. I hope to undertake a project that modifies extant measures of power by 
considering observable dimensions of military loyalty. Next, my reading of cases during 
the data collection process highlighted that often times when international actors perceive 
militaries as rebellious in nature, they will withdrawal military aid from the mutiny prone 
state. However, this policy further limits that receiving state’s ability to appease 
mutineers through resources. I intend to estimate the effect that mutinies have on the 
likelihood of military aid withdrawal. Then, given that aid is revoked, does this further 
increase the likelihood of more military unrest?  
Potential alliance partners are likely to consider dimensions of military loyalty 
when considering what states to partner with as allies. As we know from the alliance 
formation literature, allies want to select strong and resolute allies. Mutinies are an 
indication of state weakness. As such, mutiny-prone states are perhaps less likely to be 
selected as allies unless they possess some geo-political, strategic advantage. I would also 
like to spend more time exploring international organizations’ reactions to mutinies. In 
recent decades, IOs have become increasingly punitive in the aftermath of coups. I would 
like to examine if responses to mutinies have followed a similar pattern. Due to the 
preliminary evidence offered in this chapters that mutinies are an early indicator of coups, 
perhaps IOs actually offer support to states experiencing mutinies.  
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In sum, this dissertation represents the first deep dive into the empirical, 
quantitative study of mutinies. We have learned that mutinies are occurring more often 
than ever before, and they mark every region in the world. Indeed, no region is immune 
from military rebellions. In fact, most countries have experienced at least one of these 
events. From my reading of individual cases, it is clear that mutinies can have long 
lasting, downstream effects that inhibit peace. Human security is undoubtedly threatened 
by such events. Policy makers often seek to encourage military defections in the 
developing world, but this work provides many reasons why this might be a perilous 
policy recommendation. I am excited to continue this research program and provide these 
data to scholars and policy makers alike so that the broader community can answer 
important questions about mutinies.  
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018 
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Appendix: Case Descriptions  
Country  ccode Event     
date 
 violent civilian Description of Events 
(paraphrased from primary source 
to maintain meaning)
United 
States  
2 1/12/1946 0 0 Troops dissented in 
Frankfort and Berlin in an 
effort to protest their 
continued deployment. The 
article indicates that morale 
was extremely low among 
these battalions. 
United 
States  
2 3/1/1972 0 0 The aircraft carrier USS 
midway received orders to 
leave the San Francisco Bay 
for Vietnam. Anti-war 
protests swept the ship. The 
crewmen deliberately 
destroyed property, spilling 
three thousand gallons of oil 
into the bay in an attempt to 
sabotage the war efforts. 
United 
States  
2 6/1/1972 0 0 The attack carrier USS 
Ranger experienced a 
mutiny when the ship was 
ordered to sail from San 
Diego to Vietnam. The 
mutineers sabotaged the 
ship by destroying gears in 
the engine and other parts of 
the ship. These damages 
delayed the departure of the 
ship by 4 months. 
United 
States  
2 10/12/1972 1 0 A mutiny occurred on the 
USS Kitty Hawk in the 
Subic Bay in the Tonkin 
Gulf. The mutiny broke out 
along racial lines, black 
soldiers were allegedly 
holding a meeting to discuss 
blatant discrimination. This 
meeting was made up of 
over 100 black sailors. As 
Captain Maryland 
Townsend tried to disband 
the meeting, confusion 
broke out and there was a 
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brawl. The fighting left 
nearly 50 soldiers injured. 
more info here: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wik
i/USS_Kitty_Hawk_riot 
United 
States  
2 11/3/1972 0 0 Another racial flare up took 
place on the carrier 
Constellation. 60 black 
soldiers refused to leave the 
mess deck and threatened to 
"tear up the ship". In order 
to avoid a situation like 
Kitty Hawk, the captains 
decided to return to San 
Diego and return the 
mutineers to land. 130 men 
de-boarded the ship at this 
time. The Constellation 
returned to pick up the 
rebellious soldiers a few 
days later but the men 
refused to get on the ship. 
On Nov. 9 they staged a 
defiant strike. More info 
here: 
https://www.usni.org/magaz
ines/proceedings/1976-
01/uss-constellation-flare-
was-it-mutiny 
United 
States  
2 10/16/2004 0 0 17 US American soldiers 
mutinied in Basra Iraq, 
where they were stationed 
to "plug a gap” south of 
Baghdad to limit the flow of 
supplies to Islamic 
insurgents. They refused to 
run a fuel convey which 
they had labeled a "suicide 
mission". All but two of the 
men in the 343rd 
quartermaster company 
refused the orders. 
Canada  20 2/26/1949 0 0 Sailors mutinied and locked 
themselves in their mess 
decks. They refused to 
follow orders or come out of 
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the mess decks until the 
captain would agree to hear 
their grievances. The 
primary mutiny accrued on 
the Athabaskan during a 
fueling stop at Manzanillo 
Mexico. However, other 
ships also experienced 
mutinies, such as the 
Crescent while in port in 
Nanjing China. More info 
here: 
http://www.christopherwilso
n.ca/papers/The_Great_Can
adian_Naval_Mutiny.pdf 
Cuba  40 1/15/1985 0 0 A senior military officer, Lt. 
Col. Joaquin Mourino Perez 
defected from Cuba in 
Spain after serving 
extensively in Africa. He 
gave the CIA inside 
information about Cuban 
operations in Africa. This 
counts as a mutiny because 
he was a commissioned 
officer.  
Haiti  41 4/27/1987 0 0  
Dominican 
Republic  
42 1/6/1966 0 0 Rebel soldiers under Col. 
Francisco Caamano Deno 
were issued a warning by 
the OAS not to attempt a 
coup. The OAS suggested 
that this would be a direct 
threat to security and 
democracy in the country. 
The rebel soldiers seized a 
government radio station 
and declared there was no 
coup attempt. The mutiny 
appeared to be in response 
to the provisional 
government that was put in 
place after Trujillo.   
Mexico  70 9/11/1961 0 0 General Gasca was arrested 
in raid because he was 
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leading rebellion and 
sedition against the state. 
Dissent was also occurring 
in many parts of the state 
that was attributed to 
General Gasca's planning. 
Mexico  70 11/21/1997 1 0 Military personnel mutinied 
in a 14 hour standoff 
because of their alleged 
involvement in the torture-
murder of 6 young people. 
The mutiny was led by Gen. 
Jose Lamberto Ponce, head 
of the Zorros. 
Mexico  70 12/18/1998 0 0 Lt. Col. Hildegardo Bacilio 
Gomez led 50 soldiers in a 
march down Mexico City's 
central street to protest 
heavy handed and unfair 
treatment of the armed 
forces by the justice system. 
Mutiny appears to have 
been peaceful. 
Guatemala  90 11/1/1949 0 0 Officers mutiny in response 
to Col. Francisco Arana’s 
assassination. Not many 
details in article. 
Guatemala  90 11/1/1950 0 0 Not many details in article. 
Lt. Col. Alfredo Pedroza 
sentenced to death for 
assaulting the local military 
base in November, 1951. 
Guatemala  90 2/2/1997 0 0 1000 military police defied 
commanders and seized 
their compound in the first 
army rebellion since the 
peace treaty ended the 36 
year civil war (signed Dec. 
29, 1997). The army police 
were concerned about their 
severance terms and the 
dissolution of their units.  
Guatemala  90 2/1/1997 0 0 400 armed military police 
locked two generals inside 
their fortified compound. 
The military police were 
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demanding the government 
pay them severance when 
they lost their jobs under the 
terms of the recent peace 
accord. About 1,000 
military police defied their 
commanders and seized 
their compound a few 
evenings before. 
Nicaragua  93 11/2/1987 0 0 A senior military officer 
defected to the U.S. This 
was a high ranking officer, 
Maj. Roger Miranda 
Bengoechea. The officer 
took $15,000 of government 
funds with him when he 
left. 
El Salvador  92 1/6/1983 0 0 6 day long mutiny led by a 
military commander in a 
northern province that was 
not associated with 
violence. The colonel began 
the mutiny after being 
ordered to a diplomatic post 
in Uruguay. It also seems 
that the colonel wanted to 
see the defense minister 
ousted. 
Costa Rica  94 3/20/1948 0 0 The military seems to be 
split into two factions: one 
group trained by the U.S. 
that supported the president 
and a second set of 
communist troops that 
followed Rafael Calderon 
Gaurdia in the Bella Vista 
Barracks. The president 
moved to the artillery 
barracks when dissent 
started. The president did 
not have control over 
Guardia's forces. 
Panama 95 12/4/1990 0 0 Rebel soldiers who 
separated from government 
forces in December elude 
capture for over a month. 
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The rebel forces were strong 
and well-armed, better 
armed than state forces. The 
rebels were members of the 
army under the former 
Panamanian leader gen. 
Manuel Antonio Noriega. 
The rebels do not seem to 
have a coherent ideology 
aside from restoring the 
military as Panama's 
dominant institution.   
Venezuela  101 7/22/1958 0 0 Soldiers went on strike in an 
effort to postpone the Nov. 
30 elections. They also 
sought rule for three years 
by a de facto government 
and press censorship. The 
mutiny was led by Gen. 
Jesus Maria Castro Leon. 
He left for the U.S. on 
"official mission" the day 
after the strike ended. This 
event clearly began as a 
mutiny and escalated to a 
coup. It is coded by Powell 
and Thyne. 
Venezuela  101 12/20/1960 1 0 A former officer, Lt. 
Gonzalo Abreu Molina 
recruited a few active 
members of the national 
guard to join him in a 
protest against the state. The 
mutineers were on their way 
to Caracas to set free a 
group of political prisoners 
when they were met with 
loyal state forces. They 
exchanged gun fire and the 
mutiny ended. While the Lt. 
was no longer part of the 
state forces, he was able to 
recruit from those that were 
still active in state forces, 
making this a mutiny. This 
is not a coup attempt as no 
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direct move was made on 
the executive. 
Venezuela  101 4/1/2017 1 0 The article indicates that at 
least 123 members of 
Venezuela's armed forces 
have been detained and 
arrested since April of 2017. 
The charges against these 
individuals range from 
treason to rebellion to 
desertion. 
Venezuela  101 8/5/2017 1 0 Captain Juan Caguaripano 
led a group of rebel soldiers 
(the 41st Armored Brigade) 
in a rebellion against 
Maduro. The soldiers said 
that the event was a 
"legitimate rebellion" 
against a government that 
was destroying the country. 
The mutineers took over an 
army base in the city of 
Valencia. 
Ecuador  130 5/30/1959 1 0 Draftees are joined by 
civilians in mutiny. 
Conscripts were protesting 
against the harsh discipline 
of Galo Quevedo an army 
captain. Mutineers handed 
out weapons to civilians. 
The officer in question was 
killed, and his body was 
dragged through the streets. 
Ecuador  130 3/31/1971 0 0 Soldiers mutinied led by an 
ousted general (fired the day 
prior). They mutinied 
because they wanted the 
president to fire the defense 
minister and the army 
commander. 50 officers 
supported the ousted general 
Jacome Chavez by signing a 
statement demanding the 
resignations of these 
leaders. 
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Ecuador  130 10/1/2010 1 1 Pres. Rafael Correra claims 
this is a coup attempt, but 
Powell and Thyne do not 
have it coded. Soldiers 
mutinied and loyal soldiers 
patrolled a number of cities. 
This mutiny is associated 
with a lot of violence and 
many deaths. Mutineers 
were protesting a new law 
that would strip their 
benefits. While this was 
largely a police mutiny, 
some articles indicate that 
soldiers were involved also. 
Peru  135 6/9/1976 1 0 Rightist general barricaded 
himself in Peru's military 
school with armed officers 
and students. He felt 
strongly that Peru should 
adopt more capitalist 
policies and as a result was 
asked to resign. He staged 
the mutiny in defiance. 
Shots were exchanged. 
Brazil  140 3/26/1964 0 0 Rebels of the marine force 
(3,000 in total) took over a 
building of metallurgical 
workers union in Rio de 
Janeiro. The enlisted men 
yelled that they wanted 
reforms and were dying of 
hunger. The men were part 
of the leftist sailors and 
marines association, which 
Admiral Mora ordered to 
have the leadership of this 
group arrested. 
Brazil  140 2/4/2017 0 0 703 military police went on 
strike demanding that the 
state invest more in public 
security and a salary raise. 
The state of Epirito Santo 
experienced an upsurge in 
violence during this strike. 
According to the article, 121 
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were murdered, 300 shops 
looted, and over 170 cars 
stolen during the strike. 
Bolivia  145 6/15/1946 0 0 Article does not give 
specifics. 
Bolivia  145 2/1/2003 1 0 A revolt over wages 
occurred at barracks. Story 
does not give many details 
at all. This is the same 
facility that will experience 
a mutiny in 2012. 
Bolivia  145 6/22/2012 1 0 Commandos protest over 
pay. Wives join in their 
barracks to protest. Mutiny 
breaks out after their wives 
are thrown out of the 
barracks by the men's 
superiors. 
Bolivia  145 4/22/2014 0 0 Bolivian sergeants from all 
services protest through La 
Paz against the firing of four 
non-commissioned officers 
and discrimination by the 
military's high command. 
Meanwhile, a group of 
military wives went on a 
hunger strike. Head of the 
national association of non-
commissioned officers said, 
"we are not against the 
government... we are 
against this system, this 
capitalistic, neo-liberal, 
colonial model within the 
military." 
Paraguay  150 3/14/1947 0 0 Army troops in Concepcion 
were in rebellion. Report 
alleges that troops in the 
Chaco region also rebelled. 
Not many details given 
about the event. 
Paraguay  150 4/22/1996 0 0 225 soldiers were dismissed 
in Dec. for their 
participation in a barracks 
uprising. The men backed 
Lino Oviedo, a rebel 
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general. Oviedo finally 
backed down when the 
President offered him a 
position of Defense 
minister. Once he stepped 
down, however, his rank 
was stripped and he was 
placed on trial. This was not 
a coup attempt and is not 
coded by Powell and Thyne. 
Chile  155 10/22/1969 1 0 Soldiers mutinied for higher 
pay. This appears to be a 
military strike. Some said it 
was a coup attempt, but 
clearly it is just a lower-
level of military rebellion. It 
did turn violent (14 people 
injured by gunfire). The 
President very clearly called 
this a coup attempt, but 
there was no attempt to 
seize executive power. 
Argentina  160 8/8/1962 0 0 Major General Federico 
Toranzo Montero set up 
rebel headquarters in 
Northern Argentina. He sent 
communication to all army 
establishments saying that 
he was taking over as 
commander in chief "in 
accordance with the opinion 
of a majority of generals". 
This forced Gen. Juan 
Bautista Loza to resign as 
Argentina's Secretary of 
War and Commander in 
chief. 
Argentina  160 4/13/1987 0 0 Soldiers mutiny because 
they are demanding amnesty 
for accused officers in 
human rights allegations. 
Mutiny was peaceful and 
only lasted one day. Rebel 
officers occupied the 
infantry school at Campo 
die Mayo and criticized 
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General Rios Erenu for not 
protecting the army from 
"injustices and 
humiliations". 
Argentina  160 4/21/1987 0 0 150 officers mutiny 
demanding that Gen. Rios 
Erenu be replaced. He made 
many officers angry when 
he ordered them to testify in 
court because of human 
rights abuses during military 
rule from 1976-83. 
Argentina  160 1/17/1988 0 0 Not much information is 
given by article but there is 
evidence that there was a 
second mutiny occurring on 
this same date in Las Lajas, 
a southwestern Neuquen 
Province. Commander Gen. 
Antonio Balsa, commented 
on the second event of 
unrest on 1/17/1988 and 
said that order had been 
restored. 
Argentina  160 1/17/1988 1 0 A violent mutiny takes 
place at Monte Caseros 
camp in Northeastern 
Argentina. Troops loyal to 
the civilian government 
encircled a northern army 
compound after a rebel 
officer and about 100 
sympathizers had seized 
control of the building. 
Seems that rebels were led 
by Colonel Rico. Officers 
were demanding an end to 
the prosecution of officials 
in previous military 
dictatorships, according to 
NYT article. 
Argentina 160 12/5/1988 1 1 Mutiny occurs at Villa 
Martelli arsenal and is led 
by Col. Mohammad Ali 
Seineldin. There was a 
street battle between rebel 
 
 
171 
 
soldiers and protesters that 
resulted in 3 deaths and 
many injuries. Rebels 
demanded an end to the 
prosecution of officers for 
human rights abuses in the 
1976-83 dictatorship. They 
also sought a new military 
hierarchy and better pay and 
equipment.  This event 
escalated to a coup attempt 
that is coded by Powell and 
Thyne. 
Argentina 160 1/23/1989 1 0 There is a lot of uncertainty 
surrounding this event. It 
seems that the mutineers 
were probably in support of 
previous mutineers that 
resented punishment for 
human rights violations. 
However, it remains 
unclear. Some proposed that 
these mutineers had been in 
hiding since the previous 
December mutiny. 
Argentina 160 12/3/1990 1 0 Right wing rebels take hold 
of a number of military 
buildings and depots. They 
stated that were not trying to 
stage a coup or disrupt 
democratic institutions but 
that they wanted to see 
changes in the army 
hierarch and pledged their 
loyalty to Colonel 
Mohamed Ali Seineldin 
who was cashiered after 
launching a similar mutiny 
against ex-president Raul 
Alfonsin 2 years prior. 
There were at least 6 deaths 
associated with this mutiny 
but it's unclear if they were 
civilian deaths.   
Uruguay  165 2/9/1973 0 0 The army rebels against the 
defense minister. This looks 
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a lot like a coup and in fact 
is coded by Powell and 
Thyne, but the attempt to 
oust president Bordaberry 
did not come till 2/12. He 
had to negotiate with the 
armed forces to continue his 
presidency. However, the 
unrest was not initially 
pointed at the president. 
Instead the unrest is pointed 
to the Minister of National 
Defense, Antonio Francese. 
Therefore, until this 
escalated to a coup attempt, 
it was simply a mutiny. 
More information can be 
found here: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wik
i/1973_Uruguayan_coup_d
%27%C3%A9tat. 
United 
Kingdom  
200 5/13/1946 0 0 Soldiers mutinied upon 
arriving in Malay because 
of "shocking conditions". 
They refused to obey orders 
to parade. Charges were 
ultimately dropped against 
most, although this was 
undoubtedly a mutiny. More 
info here: 
http://archives.chicagotribun
e.com/1946/12/01/page/86/a
rticle/englands-heroic-
malaya-mutineers 
United 
Kingdom  
200 2/12/2012 0 0 This is the largest military 
mutiny since WW11 for the 
UK. 16 soldiers sat down 
during a military training 
operation in Kenya. They 
were protesting poor 
leadership- they said they 
were being led by 
"Muppets" and complained 
that officers were hung 
over. More info here: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
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news/uknews/defence/1050
5987/Group-of-soldiers-
mutinied-over-hungover-
bosses-court-martial-
hears.html 
Netherlands  210 2/1/1949 0 0 Article doesn't give many 
details but suggests that 
there was a mutiny of at 
least 200 soldiers in 
Sumatra. It is unclear 
whether the rebel soldiers 
were Dutch nationals or 
Indonesians that were 
rebelling against the 
colonial power. 
Netherlands  210 1/23/1950 1 0 Renegade Dutch officer 
Capt. R. R. P. Westerling 
defected from the Royal 
army while deployed in 
Indonesia. He formed a 
guerrilla operation called 
"Forces of the Queen of 
Justice". This group was not 
only made up of Dutch 
soldiers but they also 
recruited and trained 
Indonesian airborne units 
and commandos. The 
guerrilla forces captured the 
town of Chamahi in the 
mountains of West Java. 
They were approximately 
600 individuals strong. 
France  220 3/10/1947 0 0 400 soldiers mutinied in 
order to hide the individuals 
that were guilty of torturing, 
mutilating, and killing 
individuals that were pro-
France. Occurred in "indo-
china", no specific location 
given. The mutineers were 
chased out of the barracks 
by gas. 
France  220 4/4/1947 0 0 400 Indo-Chinese soldiers 
mutinied due to anti-French 
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feelings. Similar to previous 
mutiny. 
France  220 6/14/1951 0 0 Army chief of staff of the 
Caodai sect of South 
Vietnam, Trinh Minh Tay, 
defected. He and 2500 
troops fled to Cambodia 
from the Tayninh area. 
There was not a specific 
reason cited for the mutiny. 
France  220 4/30/1961 0 0 The story is confusing, but 
French soldiers (conscripts) 
in Algeria rebel against 
officers because they 
disagree with the officers 
that aided in staging a 
mutiny among Algerian 
soldiers to help keep 
Algeria under French 
control. The French soldiers 
refused to march with the 
Algerian mutineers. 
Spain  230 1/22/1994 0 0 18 conscripts mutinied and 
protested the rough 
treatment from instructors 
on the Island of Majorca. 
The conscripts accused 
leadership of physical and 
psychological abuse. 
Spain  230 6/10/1996 0 0 Soldiers refused to partake 
in a parade celebrating 
Armed Forces Day because 
of the conscription policy. 
The article indicated that at 
this point, the government 
was hoping to end 
conscription within 6 years 
and transform Spain's 
military to a purely 
professional force. 
Portugal  235 10/7/1975 0 0 Mutiny occurred in a leftist 
artillery garrison.  This 
mutiny lasted for 8 days 
after general Carlos Fabiano 
acted on his own to offer 
concessions to the rebellious 
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artillery regiment in Oporto. 
Many sources indicated that 
General Fabiano did not 
clear the terms of the 
agreement with the 
President. Many felt that his 
offer would not help restore 
military discipline. 
Germany 255 2/3/1945 1 0 German troops in Norway 
mutinied when ordered to 
go to the Eastern Front. 
They fired on their officers 
and refused orders. The 
mutiny was suppressed 
quickly. 
Germany 255 2/5/1945 1 0 German soldiers mutinied in 
barracks in Copenhagen. 
This lead to a battle that 
lasted two hours at night 
between German soldiers 
from Norway in route to the 
Eastern front and Nazi elite 
guard troops. This battle 
caused 300 causalities. All 
of the mutineers were 
executed by firing squad. 
Germany 255 3/25/1945 1 0 Article is brief but indicates 
that Austrian troops in the 
German military mutinied in 
Copenhagen and fought in 
the streets with military 
police. 
Germany 255 4/15/1945 1 0 German troops comprised of 
Russian and Polish soldiers 
mutinied and "batches" of 
soldiers defected to a 
Quebec Armored Regiment. 
This lead to fighting 
between German Loyal 
troops and Russian/Polish 
troops. 
Germany 255 4/28/1945 1 0 Article is extremely brief. A 
mutiny occurred in the 
German navy and it 
included events of 
desertion. Hitler was 
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informed of the event by a 
group of Nazi generals. 
There was no information 
about size or duration of 
mutiny. 
Poland 290 2/15/1982 0 0 Several hundred soldiers 
defected and regrouped in 
the forests of Silesia. They 
went on to form an active 
resistance unit. 
Czechoslova
kia  
315 7/18/1948 0 0 General Antonin Bohumil 
Hasal defected to the U.S. 
zone in Germany and 
signaled an important rift in 
the "iron curtain". This 
defection was particularly 
notable because Hasal was a 
high ranking military 
commander and a top 
military aid to the president. 
The article indicates that he 
likely knew a number of 
details about strategy and 
military structure in 
Czechoslovakia, which 
would be of great interests 
to military intelligence 
officers. 
Czechoslova
kia  
315 2/1/1967 0 0 Maj. General Jan Sejna 
defected to the United 
States because he was more 
right leaning than the 
executive and the military 
leadership. He kept warning 
of the Soviet threat. 
Albania  339 3/5/1997 0 0 Article does not give many 
details, but indicates that 
Western diplomats reported 
widespread military 
mutinies among conscripts 
of the Albanian military. 
This was likely a result of 
their dissatisfaction with 
President Berisha. More 
info can be found here: 
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http://www.nato.int/docu/re
view/1998/9802-07.htm 
Macedonia  343 5/27/2001 0 0 Macedonian commanding 
officer and his troops 
refused to follow orders and 
fight against a four month 
old Albanian insurgency. 
The leader of the troops 
complained that they did not 
have enough resources and 
that the conscripts were 
poorly trained. There 
seemed to be no end in sight 
to the insurgency. 
Yugoslavia  345 9/19/1991 1 0 Army soldiers disobeyed 
their orders and moved an 
armored column from 
Belgrade towards Croat 
territory. More columns 
were reported to be on the 
move to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. These were 
not orders handed down 
from the President, but 
rouge troops taking matters 
into their own hands. 
Yugoslavia  345 6/25/1991 0 0 Army appears to be losing 
command structure and 
hierarchy. Article says that 
at least 250 rank and file 
deserted in Slovenia. The 
article mentions that officers 
are also being rebellious. 
Yugoslavia  345 5/19/1999 1 0 Mutiny occurred among 
Serb forces when 3 
battalions (2,000 soldiers 
mentioned in second article) 
mutinied at Istok, in 
Western Kosovo. They stole 
vehicles and left with their 
weapons still in their 
possession. They fired 
weapons in the air. The 
mutiny was in response to 
protests in the troops' home 
towns of Krusevac and 
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Aleksandrovac lead by 
soldiers' mothers who took 
to the streets to call their 
sons home. 
Yugoslavia  345 10/8/2000 0 0 The military elite troops 
mutinied in order to display 
their disdain for Milosevic. 
The mutineers were at least 
100 strong and staged the 
mutiny inside and outside of 
the parliament building. 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
346 9/10/1993 1 0 Soldiers mutinied in 
response to perceived 
corruption. Specifically, the 
article notes that the state 
has used its influence to 
take from minorities that are 
already economically 
disadvantaged. The 
mutineers were led by 
Captain Dragovan Babic. 
They fired weapons into 
empty stalls at a market 
where black market goods 
were often sold. 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
346 10/5/1993 1 0 2,500 soldiers defected to 
the rebel forces in the Bihac 
district. At least five people 
died in this incident. 
Greece  350 5/25/1973 0 0 Navy men mutinied on a 
destroyer that was off the 
coast of Fiumicino Italy. 
They were said to be 
protesting the military 
government. The mutineers 
were said to be fewer than 
15, but included Capt. 
Nicholas Pappos and several 
other officers. They were 
arrested before they had 
time to return to Athens and 
carry out further plans. 
Cyprus  352 8/1/2011 0 0 Soldiers mutinied after a 
blast in July killed 13 
soldiers and injured 60 
more. The conscripts 
 
 
179 
 
demanded that they were let 
off the national guard. They 
were asked to sign a 
statement saying where they 
wanted to be posted but they 
refused to do so. They 
blocked the base with their 
cars and proceeded to leave 
the camp, against orders. 
Bulgaria  355 1/28/1997 0 0 A mutiny occurred at 
Georgi S. Rakovski military 
academy in protest of pay. 
Officers were disgruntled 
because their pay did not 
correspond with new 
legislation and contracts 
they had signed with the 
defense minister. The 
officers refused monthly 
pay as a sign of protest 
against deception. 
Romania  360 2/12/1990 0 0 This mutiny was largely a 
result of soldiers resisting 
repressive orders from 
General Chirac, who 
ordered soldiers to shoot at 
protesters. In response, 48 
officers joined by nearly 
3,000 soldiers and students 
protested and demanded the 
ousting of Defense minister 
Gen. Nicolae Military and 
the Minister of Internal 
Security General Mihai 
Chitac. This represented a 
large threat to the 
provisional, interim 
government that came to 
power after the Ceausecu 
Government. This interim 
government was considered 
to be one of the most 
repressive regimes in the 
Eastern Bloc.   
Russia  365 1/9/1980 0 0 14 Russian soldiers defected 
to the side of Muslim rebels 
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in Afghanistan. They 
declared that they were also 
Muslims from the Tajik 
republic and could not 
follow the heartless Kremlin 
policies in Afghanistan. 
They did not want to kill 
religious kin. 
Russia  365 2/19/1991 0 0 121 soldiers defected and 
sought asylum in Germany. 
The defectors were placed 
mostly in former East 
Germany with the right to 
temporary residence. 
Russia  365 12/15/1994 0 0 Four top generals were fired 
because they refused orders 
in Chechnya. A leading 
general, advancing on 
Grozny halted his forces 
and said that they would not 
shoot at local people. The 
Kremlin responded by 
saying that this general was 
fired for "Indecisiveness 
and inaction." 
Russia  365 2/4/1995 0 0 An elite unit mutinied in 
Chechnya in response to 
"inhumane and chaotic 
conditions". The mutiny 
was carried out by a 100 
strong unit that disagreed 
with Yeltsin's crackdown in 
Chechnya. They were not 
punished for their sedition. 
Russia  365 7/21/1997 0 0 Article states that 230 
conscripts have defected in 
the last week. It points to a 
larger military crises, where 
an estimated 4,000 soldiers 
have defected from 1992-
1997. This crises was a 
result of the country's larger 
economic crises. Soldiers 
were not receiving adequate 
pay or resources. 
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Russia  365 9/11/2002 0 0 54 soldiers mutinied by 
deserting in masse from the 
motorized infantry division. 
They were protesting 
brutality by one of their 
commanders. 
Estonia  366 7/30/1993 0 0 Soldiers mutinied in 
response to a lack of food 
and poor working and living 
conditions. The article 
indicates that the mutiny 
may have also been in 
response to the controversial 
Mr. Rabas, a controversial 
choice for defense minister 
because he was actually a 
Swedish citizen. 
Lithuania  368 9/22/1993 0 0 60 mutineers fled the 
barracks to hide in a forest, 
taking 130 automatic 
weapons along. The 
mutineers wanted higher 
wages and better living 
conditions. Eventually they 
returned from the forest 
near Kaunas. 
Ukraine  369 7/24/1992 0 0 The Black Sea Fleet was 
ordered by both President 
Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and 
Leonid Kravchuk (Ukraine) 
to not declare allegiance to 
either country as they were 
patiently working out a deal. 
However, despite these 
orders, a ship with a crew of 
about 60 soldiers mutinied 
and declared allegiance to 
Ukraine and set off from a 
naval base in the Crimea to 
a Ukrainian port of Odessa. 
Other warships chased the 
mutineers. 
Ukraine  369 3/1/2014 0 0 This event is distinct from 
the 2014 Feb. Ukrainian 
coup. Ukrainian troops were 
defecting in large numbers 
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in Crimea. While the 
Ukrainian defense minister 
denied and denounced the 
assertion of defections, the 
information seems to be 
true. The soldiers continued 
to face pro-Russian soldiers. 
Over the next several weeks 
there are various, specific 
reports of defections that 
have all been coded as this 
single event. 
Ukraine  369 6/8/2014 1 0 300 Ukrainian soldiers 
defected over the course of 
a few days due to shelling at 
the Donetsk airport. This 
event is similar in nature to 
other mutinies that occurred 
in Ukraine in 2014. 
Ukraine  369 12/13/2016 0 0 27 Ukrainian soldiers 
defected to the pro-Russian 
group in Eastern Ukraine 
after being held captive in 
Donbass. 
Georgia  372 10/19/1998 1 0 Mutinous soldiers took 
hostages and clashed with 
government forces. There 
were soldier deaths 
associated with this mutiny. 
The mutiny was led by 
military commander who 
supported the late president 
Gamsakhurdia who died 
because of mysterious 
circumstances after being 
ousted in 1994. 
Georgia  372 3/14/2000 0 0 65 conscripts of the Kodjor 
Training Facility deserted 
their post due to bad living 
conditions and inadequate 
food supplies. After 24 
hours, 30 of them returned 
but the rest remained at 
large. 
Georgia  372 5/26/2001 0 0 Troops took over an interior 
ministry base in a mutiny 
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over pay. They were 
demanding overdue wages. 
Article does not give details 
about the size and nature of 
the military protest.  More 
info here: 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/europe/05/26/geor
gia.army.02/ 
Georgia  372 2/26/2004 0 0 A mutiny occurred as a 
wave of protest surged 
through the Georgian army. 
The Adjara government (a 
semi-autonomous region) 
was accused of trying to 
carry out a coup. However, 
this does not appear to be a 
coup attempt and is not 
coded by Powell and Thyne. 
Georgia  372 5/5/2009 0 0 Russia backed a mutiny in 
Tbilisi in order to disrupt 
major NATO exercises in 
Georgia that were due to 
start on this day. Originally 
Georgian officials were 
saying that Russia was 
sponsoring a coup against 
the President. However, 
they later dropped these 
allegations. This was clearly 
not a coup attempt and is 
not coded by Powell and 
Thyne. This mutiny was 
peaceful. 
Azerbaijan 373 9/4/2002 0 0 3,000 cadets at the most 
prestigious military 
academy in Azerbaijan 
mutinied and deserted 
without leave. Many 
returned the next day but 
some did not. The mutiny 
was a response to senior 
officers demanding bribes 
from cadets and cancelling 
their leave. 
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Denmark  390 2/16/1953 0 0 Danish soldiers mutinied at 
Bornholm by straining. 
They were protesting 
against the extension of the 
draft period from 12 to 18 
months. The soldiers 
reportedly beat other 
soldiers that were not 
joining the protest. The idea 
of the protest started a day 
prior in Copenhagen. 
However, this planned 
protest was anticipated and 
squelched by military 
leaders. 
Denmark  390 7/15/1957 0 0 Article does not give many 
specifics. Danish Navy men 
staged a mutiny in July of 
1957 in Groennedal 
Greenland. The Danish 
Chief Naval Prosecutor flew 
to investigate the ordeal. 
Officials would not give 
specific details of the event. 
Guinea-
Bissau  
404 3/17/1993 1 0 Article doesn't give many 
details, but Major Robalo, 
was shot and killed at the 
FIR barracks in Alto de 
Bandim. Soldiers were 
disgruntled about not 
receiving back pay. 
Guinea-
Bissau  
404 10/7/2004 0 0 600 soldiers mutinied citing 
poor living conditions in 
barracks, rampant 
corruption in the high 
command, and a pay 
dispute. The mutineers were 
very explicit that this was 
not a coup attempt and 
indeed, it is not coded by 
Powell and Thyne as there 
was no attempt to oust the 
executive. 
Gambia  420 7/22/1994 0 0 This event is clearly a 
mutiny that escalates to a 
coup attempt. Rank and file 
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soldiers began a mutiny 
after returning from a tour 
in Liberia serving with 
ECOMOG. The mutineers 
were protesting back pay of 
allowances. While this 
event started as a pay 
mutiny, it escalated when 
military leadership became 
involved. 
Gambia  420 12/30/2014 1 0 6 mutineers (including 
commissioned officers) 
attacked the State House. 
They were Led by Lt. Col. 
Sarjo Jarju and various 
other Lts. And Capts.  This 
is not a coup attempt and is 
not coded by Powell and 
Thyne 
Mali  432 5/23/2006 0 0 Lt. Col. Hassan Sagaga led 
the mutineers which were 
made up of former Tuareg 
rebels. The mutineers took 
control of two main military 
camps of Kidal town. 
Civilians seemed very 
fearful of the mutineers, 
although there were no 
civilian deaths. 
Mali  432 3/21/2012 1 0 This event very clearly 
begins as a mutiny and later 
escalates to a coup attempt. 
The mutiny began at a 
military camp in Bamako 
during a visit by the 
Defense Minister Gen. 
Sadio Gassama. The 
Defense minister did not 
assuage mutineers’ 
grievances over the 
governments mishandling of 
the rebellion by Tuareg 
separatists in the Northern 
part of the country. Many 
soldiers were killed fighting 
the rebels and were sent to 
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battle without sufficient 
supplies. The mutineers 
fired weapons into the air. 
Later, it seems that officers 
get involved and this event 
escalates to a coup event 
(coded by Powell and 
Thyne). 
Mali  432 2/8/2013 1 1 Paratroopers mutiny in 
Bamako in response to 
disciplinary measure taken 
against some of the unit's 
members. This mutiny was 
violent. 
Mali  432 3/10/2013 0 0 "Several dozen" soldiers 
deserted their posts in 
Diably. The deserters fired 
shots into the air and 
demanded that they receive 
their deployment bonuses 
because it was "a right" 
guaranteed by the state. 
Mali  432 9/29/2013 1 0 Mutineers lead by Col. 
Youssou Traore, stormed an 
office at the Kati camp and 
shot an army colonel and 
held him hostage for hours. 
This occurred at the same 
camp where a coup began 
the year prior (2012). 
Benin  434 8/4/1992 0 0 Capt. Tawes led mutineers 
in taking control of the town 
and the military camp in 
Natitingou. 45 mutineers 
were captured when the 
govt. forces regained 
control. The motivation is 
unclear from the story. 
Niger  436 3/1/1992 1 0 Mutiny is led by unpaid 
soldiers. The mutiny caused 
local business and traffic to 
a dramatic halt. Mutineers 
briefly seized the state 
broadcasting center. Other 
soldiers called this a coup 
attempt although no plot 
 
 
187 
 
was directed at the 
executive and this event is 
not coded by Powell and 
Thyne. Soldiers fired 
weapons into the air while 
driving around the city. 
Civilians marched in protest 
against the military. 
Niger  436 7/10/1993 0 0 "Dozens" of soldiers 
mutinied in Zinder barracks 
demanding three months of 
back pay. 
Niger  436 6/3/1997 1 0 A mutiny occurred after an 
attack on an army supply 
truck. The attack was 
blamed on an ethnic 
Tuaregs. The mutiny then 
occurred, demanding the 
departure of leadership 
because they were ethnic 
Tuaregs. 
Niger  436 2/25/1998 1 0 Troops revolted and were 
driving around firing in the 
air. It appears they were 
upset over late payment of 
salaries. Story does not give 
many details. 
Niger  436 10/5/1999 1 0 Mutiny occurred in Maradi 
as soldiers were protesting 
unpaid salaries. Mutineers 
took several local 
administrators hostages and 
drove through the streets 
firing shots into the air. 
Niger  436 11/4/1999 1 0 100 soldier mutinied due to 
not receiving their salary for 
8-12 months. Mutineers 
fired on officers.  This 
mutiny may also have been 
an effort to protest rape 
allegations against two 
soldiers. 
Niger  436 8/4/2002 1 0 5 day long mutiny sparked 
because of unpaid salaries. 
A simultaneous mutiny 
occurred in Diffa. Mutineers 
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join each other as those in 
Diffa were fleeing east to 
join comrades. 
Ivory Coast 437 5/13/1990 1 0 Troops took over airport 
and protested pay in the 
capital city. They were 
largely upset that they were 
not allowed to stay on after 
their terms of conscription 
in the military and receive 
pay. They fired weapons 
into the air, but this act 
seemed largely symbolic. 
They were easily convinced 
to end their mutiny by 
higher military officials. 
More info on all Ivory Coast 
mutinies here: 
https://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article
/view/1051/1058 
Ivory Coast 437 4/29/1993 0 0 A two-day occupation of the 
Ivory Coast's presidential 
palace occurred because of 
low pay and living 
conditions. Story doesn't 
give many details. President 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
was guarded by loyalists at 
his private residence. Does 
not appear to be coup 
attempt and is not coded by 
Powell and Thyne. 
Ivory Coast 437 12/23/1999 0 0 Troops protest in Abidjan 
over pay. This event clearly 
begins as a mutiny. During 
the process of mutiny, 
Robert Guei used this 
moment of opportunity to 
launch a coup. 
Ivory Coast 437 3/1/2000 1 0 Article doesn't give many 
specifics but there was a 
mutiny in Daloa that 
appeared to be over issues 
of pay. More info (although 
not much) can be found 
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here: 
http://uca.edu/politicalscien
ce/dadm-project/sub-
saharan-africa-region/ivory-
coast-1960-present/ 
Ivory Coast 437 7/5/2000 1 0 Mutineers were protesting 
in the capital city, Abidjan, 
demanding money from the 
ruling junta for their role in 
the Dec. coup that brought 
the current leaders to power. 
Soldiers fired weapons into 
the air. Soldiers tore through 
Abidjan and terrorized 
civilians by commandeering 
hundreds of private cars. 
Ivory Coast 437 9/17/2002 1 0 Soldiers mutinied in order 
to protest demobilization. 
This event clearly started as 
a mutiny with foot soldiers 
expressing a grievance then 
escalated to a coup. 
Ivory Coast 437 6/28/2008 1 0 Soldiers loyal to the former 
rebel chief Zacharia Kone 
attacked military 
headquarters in Vavoua and 
Seguela. This mutiny was in 
response to Kone being 
sacked after not responding 
to and taking part in a 
demobilizing event. 
Ivory Coast 437 1/6/2017 1 0 Mutiny is spurred by 
concerns of pay. Mutineers 
fired Kalashnikovs into air 
outside local government 
offices. The mutiny spread 
to other major cities. The 
mutiny was spearheaded by 
ex-rebels that were 
incorporated into the 
military as part of 
peacekeeping measures 
after the civil war. 
Ivory Coast 437 5/13/2017 1 1 Mutiny is spurred because 
soldiers claim they never 
received bonuses that were 
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promised to them after the 
Jan. mutiny. This mutiny 
follows a very similar 
pattern to the Jan. mutiny. 
At least three civilians were 
killed when they were being 
denied access to Bouake. 
The article indicates that the 
bonuses likely weren't paid 
as a result of a down turn in 
to cocoa market (the IC's 
main export). 
Ivory Coast 437 7/15/2017 1 0 Three soldiers were killed 
during a mutiny that 
involved infighting in a 
barrack at Korhogo. It 
seems that the mutiny also 
spread to the capital city 
Abidjan with similar 
violence. 
Guinea  438 5/26/2008 1 0 Mutiny begins May 26 over 
unpaid back wages. Soldiers 
fire into air in Kouyate. The 
mutiny occurred at one of 
the country's largest military 
bases. Mutiny appears to be 
led by foot soldiers, who 
targeted Defense Minister 
General Mamdou Baillo 
Diallo, looting his house. 
Burkina 
Faso  
439 5/30/2011 1 0 The President (Blaise 
Compaore's) personal guard 
mutinied and soldiers ran 
riot for two days. The 
mutiny began in the 
barracks, including one in 
the compound of 
Compaore's residence in 
Ouagadougou. This does 
not appear to be a coup 
attempt and is not coded by 
Powell and Thyne. Soldiers 
are upset about housing 
conditions and food 
allowances. They said they 
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do not want "to work for 
them (leaders) to get rich." 
Burkina 
Faso  
439 4/14/2011 1 0 Soldiers from the second 
largest military base took to 
the streets of the country's 
economic capital and fired 
shots into the air. About 80-
100 soldiers mutinied. The 
state said there was no 
looting associated with the 
event, but it might be the 
case the state wants to 
appear strong. Despite the 
fact that the military has 
been offered a range of 
benefits over the previous 
months, there remains a 
high level of discontent with 
working conditions and pay. 
Liberia  450 4/3/1963 0 0 A mutiny at a military base 
near Monrovia ended after 
the president threatened to 
send troops to crush the 
rebellion. The article doesn't 
give many details about 
why the mutiny occurred in 
the first place. A battalion 
of artillery troops had 
mutinied on the ground and 
3/4 of supplies for common 
mess had been stolen by the 
officers. 
Liberia  450 6/30/2009 0 0 300 soldiers defected at the 
Tubman military barracks in 
Gbarnga, Bong County. The 
defections were a result of 
low morale among soldiers 
who had entered the service 
"with high expectations, 
amongst them 
[expectations] were foreign 
training and scholarship 
with accompanying 
benefits." 
Liberia  450 1/9/2018 0 0 Soldiers and their wives 
protested by marching from 
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the Edward Binyan Kessely 
Military Barracks to the 
Robertsfield highway and 
erected a roadblock on the 
highway leading from the 
airport to the capital city of 
Monrovia. The soldiers 
were dressed in civilian 
clothing. They were 
demanding money that was 
deducted from their salary 
but the Ministry of Defense. 
They claimed that each 
month the military 
leadership was deducting 
$20 (USD) from their 
salaries, amounting to 
thousands of dollars in their 
pockets. 
Sierra 
Leone  
451 4/29/1992 1 0 This event began as a pay 
mutiny and escalated to a 
coup within 24 hours. 
Truckloads of soldiers drove 
into Freetown firing 
machine guns into the air 
and demanding back pay 
and better working 
conditions. Later, the 
mutineers surrounded the 
State House but were 
opposed by soldiers sent 
from the military 
headquarters. 
Sierra 
Leone  
451 2/5/1998 0 0 70 soldiers from Sierra 
Leone defected and joined 
the Nigerian-led West 
African Peacekeeping force 
(ECOMOG). The leader of 
ECOMOG stated that the 
defectors would be 
integrated into the 
peacekeeping forces and 
will form their own Sierra 
Leonean contingent. 
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Sierra 
Leone  
451 1/2/1999 0 0 Army soldiers defected to 
rebels operating in the north 
and east of the state. 
Sierra 
Leone  
451 8/15/2013 0 0 The news stories were only 
published once the case was 
pending trial. There aren't 
many details about the 
actual event. It is clear that 
the soldiers were violating 
the chain of command. 
Junior officers were leading 
the charge. 
Ghana  452 1/15/1961 0 0 Article does not give many 
details but says that three 
Ghanaian soldiers are being 
sentenced for their 
involvement in a mutiny 
involving 100 mutineers. 
This mutiny occurred in 
Congo during a UN 
peacekeeping mission. 
Ghana  452 1/12/2001 0 0 Soldiers refused to take part 
in a parade that celebrated 
President Jerry John 
Rawlings successful coup 
that occurred on December 
31, 1981. The mutineers 
indicated that they got the 
idea to mutiny from soldier 
in the Ivory Coast. 
Cameroon  471 6/12/2017 0 0 50 soldiers form the air 
force mutinied in the 
Northern most region of 
Cameroon. The mutineers 
were demanding back pay 
from up to two years prior. 
They said that officials 
owed them this back pay as 
well as various other 
expenses. They set up a 
road block and stopped 
traffic. Mutiny does not 
appear violent. 
Nigeria  475 8/10/1967 1 0 A mutiny occurred amongst 
Ibo (ethnic minority) 
soldiers in the Eastern 
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region of Nigeria. This 
mutiny was largely over a 
federalism-regionalism 
issue. Specifically, the 
soldiers did not want to 
repress their ethnic kin. 
Nigeria  475 7/4/2009 1 0 28 Nigerian soldiers 
mutinied and demonstrated 
in the streets of Akure, the 
Ondo State Capital over 
allowances and pay. The 
state officials said that 
soldiers that have a 
"monopoly of all kinds of 
weapons provided by the 
state" should not enjoy the 
same right to go on strike as 
civilian counterparts. The 
news article comes t the 
point of trial, where 
soldiers’ convictions are 
downgraded from life in 
prison to only 7 years in jail. 
News report says that the 
mutiny was violent. 
Nigeria  475 2/15/2014 1 0 Soldiers deserted their posts 
in N. Nigeria due to being 
heavily outnumbered by 
Boko Haram. Because of 
their desertion, Boko Haram 
was able to launch 
extremely aggressive 
attacks that killed 33 
civilians. 
Nigeria  475 5/14/2014 1 0 Soldiers mutinied and shot 
at the vehicle of the General 
Officer Commander in 
Borno State. Soldiers in the 
Barracks initially thought 
the attack was from 
insurgents, rather than from 
soldiers within the barracks. 
The attack followed the 
killing of 12 soldiers who 
were reportedly ambushed 
by members of Boko Haram 
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while on their way to 
Maiduguri from Kala-Balge 
area. 
Nigeria  475 8/1/2014 0 0 News story comes at the 
point of sentencing for 54 
soldiers that refused to 
deploy for an operation 
against Boko Haram 
Islamists. After Boko 
Haram captured a series of 
town in the North East 
earlier in the year, the 
military vowed to retake all 
lost territory back from the 
insurgent group. However, 
soldiers report that they are 
unhappy with pay, 
resources, and strategy. 
Central 
African 
Republic 
482 11/15/1996 1 1 400 soldiers demanded their 
paychecks and mutinied. 
This mutiny was 
exceptionally violent and 
involved the mistreatment 
of civilians. Soldiers looted 
and released hundreds of 
criminals after breaking into 
Bangui's largest prison. 
Mutineers also broke into 
homes of business leaders 
and demanded money, 
beating those that did not 
cooperate. Soldiers that 
remained loyal clashed with 
mutineers right outside the 
presidential palace. 9 
people, 5 civilians and 4 
presidential guards were 
killed and at least 50 
civilians were wounded. 
Central 
African 
Republic 
482 5/18/1996 1 0 The mutiny began May 18. 
There were an estimated 
200 soldiers that rebelled. 
They did not agree to end 
their dissent until French 
military forces essentially 
offered them protection and 
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helped them return to the 
barracks. The mutiny 
included looting. Four 
hostages were taken by the 
mutineers, including a 
government minister and 
parliamentary speaker. 
Central 
African 
Republic 
482 4/19/1996 1 1 Mutineers were protesting 
low pay and the army's 
diminished role under 
President Ange-Felix 
Patasse, whose election in 
1993 ended 12 years of 
military rule. The rebellious 
soldiers fired mortars at a 
French-owned hotel in the 
capital and a 2 hour firefight 
with presidential guards and 
French troops. Rebel 
soldiers abducted a former 
government minister and his 
son and shot them dead. 
Some stories suggest that 
the mutiny broke out along 
ethnic fragmentation. The 
Yakoma ethnic group is the 
group that most mutineers 
belonged to. The mutineers 
also beheaded a regional 
prefect and his daughter 
who were related to 
president Patasse and served 
a districted that has a 
Yakoma majority 
constituency. 
Central 
African 
Republic 
482 1/5/1997 1 0 Troops mutinied against 
president Patasse. Specific 
reason not outlined in 
article. The mutiny was 
violent, killing two French 
soldiers. 
Central 
African 
Republic 
482 6/25/1997 1 1 Mutinous soldiers were met 
by opposing peacekeeping 
troops, as reported on by the 
Red Cross. Thousands of 
civilians had to flee the 
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capital of CAR, Bangui. 
Camp Kasai military base 
represented the mutineers’ 
headquarters since 
November of the prior year. 
Peacekeepers from 
neighboring African states 
and French troops were able 
to re-gain control over the 
city's southwest region after 
the mutineers had captured 
it over the weekend. 
However, they were 
unsuccessful in breaking up 
the mutineers’ control of 
Camp Kasai. 
Chad  483 6/26/1991 0 0 This case is interesting. 
Frankly, it is hard to 
determine if this is a mutiny 
or not. However, since 
Dwyer (2015) includes this 
case in her dataset, I also do 
on account of precedent. 20 
military officers write and 
publish a letter to the 
president stating their 
grievances. They ignore the 
typical hierarchy and chain 
of command and make these 
grievances known publicly. 
Chad  483 5/19/2004 0 0 Officers and soldiers 
mutinied in Ndjamena but 
the mutiny was quickly put 
down. The mutineers were 
responding to an executive 
order that froze military pay 
and bonuses for two months 
and arrested several 
officers. This came after an 
investigation that suggested 
that officers were pocketing 
salaries that were being paid 
to military battalions that 
did not actually exist. The 
President seems to think this 
was a coup attempt, but 
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there is no clear attempt to 
oust or assassinate the 
executive. This event is not 
included in Powell and 
Thyne's coup dataset. 
Chad  483 10/15/2005 0 0 "Tens of soldiers" defected 
in the Adre region. The 
mutineers were upset with 
internal dynamics of the 
military, such as 
appointments and 
promotions. The article 
indicates that these 
mutineers likely have ties to 
the 2004 mutineers. 
Chad  483 2/28/2006 0 0 56 soldiers and two colonels 
defected to join the rebels in 
the East. 
Chad  483 7/9/2007 0 0 35 armed soldiers and 
Major Abakar Al Bechir 
defected from the Chadian 
army and joined a group of 
resistance fighters led by 
Ahmat Hassballah. 
Congo  484 1/21/1992 1 1 Soldiers, acting under the 
orders of the army high 
command, demand the 
resignation of Milongo 
(PM) and his interim 
government. Mutineers took 
over radio and TV 
buildings. At least 3 
civilians were killed in 
street fighting with rebel 
soldiers. Milongo went into 
hiding, although the state 
officials continued to state 
that his government was 
still in charge. This does not 
appear to be a coup attempt 
and is not coded by Powell 
and Thyne. The soldiers 
report to have been seeking 
back pay and higher wages. 
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Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 7/12/1960 0 0 Congolese soldiers rebelled 
against Belgian officers. 3 
Congolese soldiers were 
killed by rockets from a 
Belgian military plane. This 
caused Congolese troops to 
mutiny at Camp Hardy in 
Thysville. The troops took 
control of the military camp 
and jailed all white officers. 
They held hostages 48 
whites but later released 
them. Lots of threats, but it 
does not appear that the 
mutineers used direct 
violence. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 9/22/1960 1 0 This almost appears to be a 
counter coup but the 
mutineers to not overtly try 
to oust Mobutu who had just 
come to power through a 
coup. Instead, they surround 
his house and protest pay. 
There is clearly no attempt 
to take his life or kick him 
out of power. After soldiers 
were reassured that there 
was no truth in reports about 
pay increases to officers, 
they stopped their rebellion. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 11/15/1961 0 0 Mutiny started in Thysvill 
garrison over pay. Several 
officers and men were 
arrested by military police. 
Mr. Lumumba, the deposed 
president and opposition 
leader, was said to have 
been released from prison 
by mutineers, thus 
threatening the leadership of 
President Kasavubu and 
Col. Mobutu. However, the 
reports seem to be 
overstated, according to the 
article. 
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Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 1/13/1961 0 0 Rebellious soldiers took 13 
Italian airmen prisoner in 
the town of Kindu. The 
action was likely led by 
Antoine Gizenga in an 
effort to defy central 
government. Major. Gen. 
Victor Lundula attempted to 
free the airmen but attempt 
failed. The troops moved to 
Albertville and went on a 
rampage stealing civilian 
property and looting houses. 
They set road blocks and 
demanded money. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 6/4/1963 1 0 Congolese troops left post at 
Camp Shinka and began 
"plundering property and 
molesting everyone on their 
way". 4 civilians died in this 
incident. This appears to be 
a particularly violent 
mutiny. The catalyst 
appears to be a civilian 
beating a soldier until he 
was "half dead" and then he 
later died. Story is a bit 
confusing and doesn't give 
many important details. 
This does appear to be a 
mutiny as these events were 
not ordered directly by a 
commander or the 
President. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 3/29/1963 1 1 Congolese troops terrorized 
a copper mining town in 
Kolwezi. This event killed 
at least one Belgian and one 
"African". Article does not 
indicate whether or not they 
were civilians. Story does 
not give many details, but it 
seems like soldiers 
plundered and looted 
through this resource rich 
city.   
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Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 9/23/1964 0 0 Mutiny occurred when 
troops led by Christophe 
Gbenye began fighting in 
military barracks and in 
residential parts of the city 
of Stanleyville. Gbenye 
requested that an aircraft be 
placed at his disposal in a 
Burundian airport. Fighting 
was reported on the 
Northern bank of the Congo 
river. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 7/15/1966 1 1 Rebellious troops in 
Kisangani were former 
members of the Katangese 
gendarmerie, which fought 
for Tshombe against the 
central government. 
However, they were 
technically incorporated 
into the Congolese National 
Army, which is why this 
event is considered a 
mutiny. The troops mutinied 
in July of 1966. The central 
government was not able to 
crush the mutiny decisively 
and had to reach a 
compromised settlement. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 7/8/1967 1 1 This story is very confusing, 
but it seems that mutinous 
soldiers went to Bukavu and 
started killing any 
Europeans they suspected of 
support anti-regime 
mercenaries. This was not 
an ordered attack, but rather 
soldiers just taking their 
own initiative. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 10/25/1991 0 0 3,000 paratroopers mutinied 
in Zaire. The mutineers 
pillaged stores in Kinshasa. 
The country's main airport 
was forced to close There 
were unconfirmed reports of 
shootings and civilian 
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deaths. Soldiers mutinied 
over back pay that they had 
not received for several 
months. Firing was heard in 
two neighborhoods that 
house wealthier residents. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 9/24/1991 1 0 Mutineers rebelled because 
of back pay they never 
received. The mutiny spread 
to at least four southern 
towns. Soldiers began 
looting and committing acts 
of "vandalism", specifically 
targeted at foreigners. The 
unrest appears to be spurred 
by the firing of Etienne 
Tshisekedi, a popular 
opposition leader that 
Mobutu named prime 
minister. The appointment 
of Tshisekedi was made 
under the pressure of 
western governments after a 
similar mutiny occurred the 
month prior. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 12/20/1992 0 0 News story does not give 
many details. Mutiny 
appears to occur over pay. 
Soldiers began looting and 
arrested a regional 
governor. The state radio 
said that mutinous soldiers 
were blaming their 
commander for bad pay. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 1/25/1993 1 1 Mr. Tshisekdi (PM 
appointed under pressure of 
Western powers) urged 
soldiers to not accept a 
newly printed 5 million 
Zaire bank note as pay. This 
mutiny appears to be 
particularly violent and 
bloody. As least 1,000 
people were killed over the 
weekend. Most of them 
appear to be soldiers, but 
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there are also civilian 
deaths. Civilians had to flee 
areas of conflict. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 6/8/1997 1 0 Mutineers formed a militia 
and fought troops loyal to 
President Pascal Lissouba. 
Mutineers vowed their 
loyalty to ex-president 
Denis Sassou Nguesso. The 
mutiny appears to be 
extremely bloody and 
violent. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 1/22/1998 1 0 Mutiny was sparked over 
back pay. The senior 
military source interviewed 
in story seemed to 
downplay the sedition and 
imply that it was localized. 
However, other reports 
suggested the unrest was 
much more serious and two 
soldiers had died. Mutineers 
engaged in looting and 
firing weapons into the air.   
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 8/2/1998 1 0 This mutiny was spurred 
largely by ethnic division. 
The military revolt was 
sparked by officers and 
troops of Tutsi and other 
minority ethnic groups, and 
fighting in the capital, 
Kinshasa. Officers 
reportedly pitted Tutsi army 
units against those of other 
groups. This mutiny spread 
to a number of other cities. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 1/15/2007 1 0 The news story for this 
event comes at the point that 
soldiers were fired for 
sedition (about 5 mo. After 
the actual event). The 
mutineers rebelled in 
January and looted a 
number of civilian 
properties. There was an 
accusation of rape of a 
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young girl but the charge 
was not upheld by the court 
for lack of evidence. The 
story does not detail the 
cause of the mutiny. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 6/16/2009 1 0 Soldiers opposed to their 
redeployment and back pay 
of 5 months’ worth of salary 
caused mutiny. The 
mutineers fired shots into 
the air and caused civilians 
to flee certain areas. The 
soldiers were redeployed 
with a joint operation with 
the UN Mission in DR 
Congo to root out the 
Democratic forces of the 
liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR). 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 2/14/2012 1 0 Mutineers were protesting 
tough living conditions and 
corruption that they 
observed in the national 
army. On Feb. 15 and 16 
they protested in the streets 
sand fired shots in the air. 
Negotiated outcome was 
achieved and the fourth 
brigade of DRC armed 
forces was broken into 4 
regiments controlled 
directly by a high ranking 
general in order to increase 
surveillance. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 4/30/2012 1 0 The Congolese army 
suspended military 
operations in order to bring 
a mutiny under control. The 
army had been fighting 
defectors and hunting order 
rebel leaders and mutinous 
soldiers. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo  
490 6/11/2012 1 1 A general leads soldiers in a 
mutiny in DRC. The story is 
told through the perspective 
of Rwandans that were 
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recruited to join the mutiny. 
The rebellious soldiers and 
general eventually came to 
be known as M23, an actual 
rebel movement. But at this 
moment, they are simply 
mutinous factions form 
within the state.   
Uganda  500 1/23/1964 0 0 Mutineers rebel because of 
complaints of pay. 250 
soldiers if the Ugandan 
Rifles mutinied at Camp 
Jinja on Lake Victoria and 
held their British Officers 
hostage. The state denied 
reports of the mutiny. 
However, the Minister of 
the Interior responded to the 
event and agreed to grant 
soldiers a pay increase. 
Uganda  500 2/19/1977 1 0 The news story calls this 
event a coup attempt, but it 
does not appear to be and is 
not coded by Powell and 
Thyne. There seems to be a 
divide between ethnic 
groups in the military. The 
mutineers are largely 
comprised of Langi and 
Acholi tribes which are 
Christian tribes. 6 soldiers 
died during the dissent. 
Uganda  500 10/30/1978 0 0 Mutiny started in barracks 
at Mbarara a town 25 miles 
from the Tanzanian border. 
The town appeared to be in 
control of the mutineers. 
The mutiny might have 
been in response to 
allegations that Cuban-
backed Tanzanian forces 
launched an invasion into 
Uganda. However, some 
argued that this was actually 
diversionary tactics used by 
President Amin and the 
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invasion was actually made 
up or overstated. The news 
story isn't exactly clear 
about why the mutiny 
occurred. 
Uganda  500 11/1/2004 0 0 UPDF soldiers deserted 
their official work stations 
and stayed with civilian 
women around town. This 
mutiny occur in the Gulu 
municipality. 
Kenya 501 1/2/1947 1 0 150 Askari troops mutinied 
because they wanted to be 
demobilized. They refused 
to perform their duties. The 
mutiny was violent as 
mutineers took over an 
ammunition depot in Gilgil. 
Kenya 501 1/25/1964 0 0 Mutineers were calling for 
the dismissal of senior army 
officials that were British. 
The mutiny represents a 
push back against colonial 
powers controlling military 
operations. 
Tanzania 510 1/24/1964 0 0 This mutiny appears to be 
spurred by a push back 
against colonial powers 
leading the military. The 
mutineers were seeking the 
"Africanisation" of the 
military. 
Tanzania 510 1/21/1983 0 0 Haya tribe led a mutiny that 
involved officers but was 
quashed rather quickly by 
loyalists. The mutiny seems 
to be in response to 
economic decline that 
caused grievances among 
the Haya. 
Burundi  516 3/5/1995 1 0 There was a mutiny in 
barracks in Bujumbura that 
involved a shootout. No one 
was injured or killed. 
Burundi  516 12/12/2015 1 0 Rebels attacked a military 
base, but then soldiers 
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joined the rebels and 
attacked various other 
bases. The location that was 
primarily targeted trains 
Burundi officers. The 
mutiny was violent. 
Rwanda  517 5/30/1992 1 0 Article does not give many 
details but a mutiny 
occurred in Gisenye and 
Ruhengeri in the norths of 
the country. The mutiny was 
violent and killed at least 
27. The article does not say 
if these deaths were military 
actors or civilians. 
Rwanda  517 8/1/2014 0 0 Former Presidential Guard 
Chief and Serving Col. Tom 
Byabagamba, and Brig-Gen. 
Frank Rusagara were 
arrested for inciting military 
rebellion against strong man 
President Kaul Kagame. 
While there were only 2 
implicated in this mutiny, it 
is included because they 
were military leaders and 
commissioned officers. 
Somalia 520 4/1/1989 0 0 Article does not give many 
details, but indicates that 
there was a mutiny in 
Kismayu, the capital of 
Lower Juba. Somali 
Defense minister Husayn 
Abd al-Rahman Husayn 
Mattan and Commander of 
the armed forces Brig-Gen 
Masleh Muhammad Siyad 
visited the barracks in order 
to talk about "the 
consolidation of defense" 
and "the strengthening of 
national unity". 
Somalia 520 4/2/2008 0 0 Somalian soldiers defect 
from the Puntland state 
government on the 
frontlines of the battle with 
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secessionist Somaliland. 
The leader, Col. Jama Muse 
Umar told local radio 
station that the soldiers 
came to speak with 
traditional elders in the 
Puntland capital because 
they had not been paid in 
months. There were reports 
that soldiers and military 
leaders had driven into 
Somaliland, in act of 
defection. Apparently they 
were welcomed warmly by 
Somaliland leaders. 
Somalia 520 3/21/2009 0 0 Somalian soldiers defect to 
the Bay and Bakool regions 
of southwestern Somalia. 
About 100 men with 
armored vehicles crossed 
into Bay and Bakool 
regions, moving away from 
the government of 
Mogadishu. 
Somalia 520 9/6/2010 0 0 General Muhammad Gelle 
Kahiye was accused by 
TFG President Sharif of 
being responsible or tons of 
weapons missing from the 
government's military 
facilities in Mogadishu. The 
President fired the military 
chief and several 
subordinates. Meanwhile, 
hundreds of TFG troops in 
the few areas under 
government control have 
mutinied due to nonpayment 
of salaries. 
Somalia 520 10/2/2010 0 0 Ahmed Amin Ma'alin 
(military officer) defected 
from Billa Baydhabo 
military camp in 
Mogadishu. He deserted the 
apostate administration and 
asked for amnesty from Al-
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Shabab. All Shabab paraded 
the defected military officer 
in Baydhabo town. 
Somalia 520 1/1/2011 1 0 Soldiers mutinied in 
Mogidishu over 
nonpayment of their 
salaries. The mutiny was 
violent. 
Somalia 520 4/4/2011 0 0 Soldiers defected to Al-
Shabab forces. A parliament 
member blamed this 
defection on some cabinet 
ministers (a delegation of 
government officials) that 
arrived in this region, 
spurring a mutiny and 
subsequent defection. The 
number of defected soldiers 
doesn't appear to be too 
large (although the article is 
not explicit). The rebel 
soldiers did take an armored 
vehicle with them in their 
defection. The 
parliamentary member said 
that he and his colleagues 
used to contribute parts of 
their salary to funding 
government forces in the 
region in an effort to 
promote loyalty. 
Somalia 520 7/20/2013 0 0 500 soldiers and 13 
improvised fighting vehicles 
defected from the Khaatumo 
regional administration to 
Somaliland. An agreement 
between local elders in the 
south of Sanaag Region 
(Northern Somalia) and the 
Somaliland administration 
led to the defection of the 
soldiers in an attempt to 
combine previously warring 
forces. 
Somalia 520 3/15/2014 0 0 Article doesn't give many 
details but Puntland Defense 
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Forces in 54th Somali Army 
base staged a mutiny. They 
set tires on fire and chanted 
their military rights. 
Somalia 520 7/31/2014 0 0 20 Puntland soldiers 
defected to Somaliland's 
separatist administration 
after striking over salaries 
that were unpaid. 
Somalia 520 1/27/2015 0 0 Presidential Security Unit 
(PSU) soldiers mutinied at 
Boosaaso palace over 
delayed pay. They had not 
been paid for seven months. 
Somalia 520 6/14/2015 0 0 A senior Commander of the 
Interim Jubba 
Administration defected to 
Al-Shabab. Yusu Ma'alin 
Abdi Nur defected because 
of the atrocities carried out 
by Jubaland forces against 
civilians in the region. He 
reportedly said that he 
defected because he was 
"disillusioned" by the 
atrocities being carried out 
by the local forces against 
resides of the town 
Husingow. 
Somalia 520 7/1/2015 0 0 Mutiny is spurred over the 
sacking of a military 
commander by the Puntland 
President. Soldiers were led 
by General Muhidin. The 
Puntland government 
responds quickly due to the 
geographical proximity of 
the mutiny to Al-Shabab 
activity. 
Somalia 520 9/23/2015 0 0 Puntland paramilitary 
soldiers entered the 
administration's finance 
office in Northern 
Gaalkacyo and a local bank. 
The soldiers were mutinying 
over salaries that had not 
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been paid in the last 7 
months. The soldiers stated 
that they were "not out to 
cause trouble". 
Somalia 520 10/14/2015 0 0 Troops formerly stationed in 
the town of Gaalkacyo 
mutinied. The exact reason 
was not identified in the 
article, but this seems like a 
pay mutiny, which Somalia 
is particularly prone to 
during this time period. 
Somalia 520 1/13/2016 0 0 An officer that previously 
worked for the Galmudug 
region government in 
central Somalia handed 
himself over and defected to 
Al-Shabab. He was received 
in ceremony at Xarardheere 
town. He pledged his 
allegiance to Al-Shabab and 
vowed that he would never 
return to work for 
Glamudug and Puntland 
administration in the future. 
Somalia 520 6/11/2016 0 0 Soldiers mutiny over unpaid 
salaries. Article doesn't give 
many details. 
Somalia 520 3/9/2017 0 0 Puntland military officers 
took over the main customs 
office and complained of 
lack of salaries and 
allowances from the 
administration of President 
Abdiweli Mohamed Ali 
"Gas". Soldiers also seized 
the region's parliamentary 
compound several days 
prior. 
Somalia 520 5/20/2017 0 0 Soldiers were being housed 
in Bali Doggle Airbase, 
after 1500 mutineers were 
drive out of Mogadishu. The 
soldiers were protesting 
unpaid salaries. The soldiers 
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have been battling Al-
Shabab for years. 
Ethiopia  530 2/27/1974 0 0 Troops who were sent to 
quell riots and dissent were 
upset about pay. After 
suppressing dissident 
activity, soldiers requested 
higher pay. They were 
ultimately granted an 
increase but said that it was 
not good enough. The 
dissident activity was 
largely in response to an 
economic downturn caused 
by inflation and severe 
drought and famine. A 
second article discusses the 
mutiny within the air force 
which occurred 
simultaneously. This mutiny 
appears to be largely over 
pay concerns and working 
conditions. 
Ethiopia  530 3/29/1974 0 0 Troops ended a three day 
occupation of Asmara. The 
rebel troops were making 
various demands to the 
central government and the 
article indicates that most 
times, the government 
complied. The dissident 
soldiers took hostages. The 
unrest appeared to be 
spreading to other parts of 
the country. 
Ethiopia  530 6/28/1974 0 0 Troops revolted and began 
holding parts of Addis 
Ababa. They took over a 
radio station and forced 
employees to broadcast 
statements denouncing 
former cabinet ministers and 
army officers. The rebel 
soldiers were protesting 
their officers’ inaction 
against 8 members of 
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Parliament who called for 
the release of 25 officials 
that were held on corruption 
charges. 
Ethiopia  530 7/7/1974 0 0 Similar to event described 
above. A rebellious faction 
of the military took over a 
radio station to appeal to the 
population to help them 
located individuals that 
were on wanted list for 
suspicion of corruption. 
Ethiopia  530 5/28/1991 0 0 Military officers defected to 
neighboring countries 
including Kenya as the 
intensity of conflict in 
Ethiopia increased. 
Ethiopia  530 8/9/2006 0 0 An army general (Gen. 
Kemal Gelchu) deserted the 
government and headed to 
Eritrea (enemy of Ethiopia) 
across the border with tens 
of senior army officers and 
hundreds of fully armed 
soldiers. The general 
allegedly defected because 
of what he called 
widespread violations of 
human rights throughout the 
country. 
Ethiopia  530 3/27/2007 0 0 7 high ranking Ethiopian 
military officers defected to 
Ogaden National Liberation 
Front. The officers defect to 
ONLF and asked for a  safe 
passage to Somalia where 
they believe they can get 
Somali smugglers to take 
them to Kenyan Refugee 
camps. The article suggests 
many more soldiers were 
expected to defect in the 
coming days, but there is no 
follow up article to suggest 
whether or not this actually 
happened. Defectors 
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reported that corruption 
within the Ethiopian 
Military, delayed pay and 
bad strategy were the 
primary reasons for the 
defection. 
Ethiopia  530 11/9/2009 0 0 6 high ranking military 
officers defected from the 
state after being scheduled 
to deploy to Ogaden in 
Southeastern Ethiopia 
where government forces 
are engaged in fighting 
against rebels of ONLF. It 
appears that this defection 
was a result of 
overwhelming losses and 
commando attacks from 
ONLF. 
Ethiopia  530 4/22/2011 0 0 60 soldiers and two high 
ranking colonels defected 
from Ethiopia and fled to 
Kenya. The article states 
that the Weyane (Ethiopian) 
government was trying to 
return the defected soldiers 
back to Ethiopia illegally. 
Ethiopia  530 10/1/2014 0 0 Eight pilots crossed the 
Eritrean boarder with an 
unspecified number of 
fighter jets to join the 
Ginbot 7 and the Ethiopian 
People's Patriotic front 
armed opposition forces. 
Ethiopia  530 12/26/2014 0 0 Three high ranking pilots 
using sophisticated MI-35 
helicopter gunship defected 
to Eritrea. The Ethiopian 
regime accused Eritrea of 
hijacking the military 
planes. However, this was a 
high level defection. 
Eritrea  531 1/21/2013 1 0 100 soldiers lead by Saleh 
Uthman, an officer, 
surrounded the perimeter of 
Eritrea's ministry of 
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Information. The mutineers 
had a long list of demands 
that included: 
implementation of the 
constitution, installation of a 
transitional government, 
accountability, elimination 
of officers' corruption, 
release of political 
prisoners, and others. This 
does not appear to be a coup 
attempt and is not coded by 
Powell and Thyne. 
Angola  540 7/17/1990 1 0 A mutiny broke out among 
MPLA units stationed in 
Huambo. Dozens of soldiers 
were injured in the fighting 
between rival factions of the 
MPLA army. The mutiny 
spread to the town of 
Longonjo, where there were 
more shootouts. 
Angola  540 12/12/1990 0 0 Soldiers mutinied and 
abandoned their units 
fearing possible reprisals 
from civilians in the event 
of peace. During the 15 year 
long war, many civilians 
were subject to human 
rights violations at the 
hands of MPLA soldiers. 
The mutinies were 
occurring in several parts of 
the country. 
Angola  540 3/7/1991 0 0 The 47th Tactical Group of 
the MPLA stationed in Uige 
mutinied because they were 
demanding regular food 
supplies. The mutineers 
stated that they had been 
without food from the 
Luanda government for 
months. They had been 
relying on food that they 
looted from local civilians. 
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Angola  540 9/4/1991 0 0 Article does not give many 
details but states that a 
mutiny occurred in Cahama. 
Mutineers rebelled against 
their commander. The 
soldiers stormed the house 
of the commander and took 
civilian property that the 
officer had stolen. 
Angola  540 4/20/1992 1 0 Government troops 
mutinied in Lunda Province. 
The unhappy soldiers were 
demanding immediate 
demobilization and 
reintegration into civilian 
live. The article indicates 
that the mutiny was violent. 
Angola  540 9/5/1992 1 1 A mutiny erupted in 
Cabinda because soldiers 
were demanding an 
immediate demobilization 
and payment of salary 
arrears. The army confirmed 
that three government 
soldiers were killed in the 
violence. 9 individuals in 
total were killed. 
Angola  540 9/23/1992 0 0 Demobilized soldiers 
mutinied. More than 50 
mutineers put up barricades 
blocking main routes into 
the city of Soyo. 
Mozambiqu
e  
541 8/1/1992 0 0 300 soldiers from Maputo 
garrison mutinied in 
Marracuene. The mutineers 
set up a barricade on the 
road to the north of the 
country. The government 
said that the mutinies may 
have been because soldiers 
were, "manipulated by 
agitators alien to the army." 
Mozambiqu
e  
541 9/23/1992 0 0 Soldiers mutinied for two 
days because they had not 
been paid for 18 months. 
They looted and robbed 
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local shops. They seized a 
plane of the state-owned 
light aircraft company and 
took the pilot hostage for 
one night. They ended their 
mutiny but threatened to 
resume on 10/1 if their back 
pay was not paid. 
Mozambiqu
e  
541 1/14/1993 1 1 Two civilians were killed 
after a mutiny in Chimoio. 
The mutineers were 
protesting, demanding 
social reintegration and food 
assistance. 
Mozambiqu
e  
541 4/7/1993 0 0 100 demobilized soldiers 
mutinied near the Nampula 
provincial government 
building. They were 
demanding that they be paid 
funds that were made 
available by the central 
government to help soldiers 
reintegrate into society. 
Mozambiqu
e  
541 7/1/1994 0 0 Soldiers mutinied because 
they were protesting delays 
in demobilization. Attempt 
to assuage them only made 
matters worse. The article 
indicates that this was likely 
several mutiny events 
(average of 1 per day in 
July). 
Mozambiqu
e  
541 7/30/1994 1 0 Mutineers undertake 
rebellion in response to the 
peace process. The 
mutineers blocked a dozen 
roads and looted markets. 
Reports suggest that women 
were raped by rebellious 
soldiers. The troops were 
demanding immediate 
demobilization. 
Mozambiqu
e  
541 12/15/1994 0 0 4 sergeants were found to 
incite mutiny of 43 soldiers. 
The mutineers were part of 
the Mozambique Defense 
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Armed Forces (FADM) but 
were previously part of the 
rename ranks (National 
resistance army). 
Mozambiqu
e  
541 2/28/1995 1 0 A 16 hour long mutiny 
began because soldiers were 
protesting their working 
conditions and the fact that 
their salaries had not been 
paid (specifically the 
salaries of demobilized 
soldiers), due to peace 
agreement. The government 
in Maputo quickly agreed to 
pay the soldiers more in an 
effort to end the rebellion. 
Mozambiqu
e  
541 5/25/1996 0 0 100 demobilized soldiers 
mutinied in front of the 
Machava administrative 
building because they were 
promised to be paid 
subsidies by Culima, a 
Mozambican 
nongovernmental 
organization. A Culima 
official was held hostage. 
Malawi  553 11/11/1980 0 0 Two air force officers 
defected from Malawi and 
fled to Tanzania, asking for 
political asylum. The prior 
month, 12 army officers fled 
to Zambia and asked for 
political asylum. 
Malawi  553 8/2/1994 1 0 200 armed guards from 
nearby tea plantations 
marched into Milange and 
demanded demobilization 
money ahead of the October 
elections and the conclusion 
of 16 years of civil war. 
Malawi  553 4/28/1995 0 0 Soldiers of the UDF were 
involved in a maize-
smuggling scheme. The 
Minister of Information 
pointed out that this was a 
mutiny, not a coup attempt 
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like media outlets had been 
reporting. 
Malawi  553 7/1/1996 0 0 Article does not give many 
details but suggests that Lt. 
Col. James Joloma was 
inciting soldiers to mutiny 
using violence. 
Malawi  553 12/10/1997 0 0 50 soldiers rebelled and 
threatened to shoot their 
military commander 
General Kelvin Simwaka 
due to a disagreement over 
training allowances. A 
paying officer told the 
soldiers that they were 
getting underpaid, which set 
the mutiny into motion. The 
army general did not move 
to rectify the situation 
which lead the soldiers to 
mutiny. Soldiers were 
rounded up by military 
police and locked up at a 
military barracks. 
Malawi  553 6/5/2015 0 0 Officers within the 
Malawian army were 
dissatisfied with Army Chie 
Ignancio Maulana because 
their salaries were deducted 
when they were serving on a 
peace keeping mission in 
the DRC. They protested 
and stated that if he did not 
step down that they would 
take action to have him 
removed. 
Zimbabwe  552 2/1/1981 1 0 New story doesn't give 
many details. It indicates 
that there were mutinies and 
desertions that marked Mr. 
Mugabe's rule in 1980 and 
1981. These mutinies and 
desertions seem to be a 
result of ethnic divisions 
(between the shonas and 
Ndebeles). 
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Zimbabwe  552 11/14/1998 0 0 50 soldiers plus a few 
officers refused to deploy to 
Congo and have been 
arrested. Many were 
arguing that the war is not 
constitutional and therefore 
invalidates their contracts of 
service. 
Zimbabwe  552 3/15/2003 1 0 26 army deserters were 
recruited by the opposition 
Movement for Democratic 
change (MDC) and were 
deployed into high-density 
suburbs of Harare and 
Chitungwiza to terrorize and 
beat up civilians while 
wearing army uniform in an 
effort to prompt an uprising 
by civilians. The deserters 
were suspected to have 
strong links with the MDC's 
underground military wing 
which had allegedly planned 
to bomb all service stations 
in Harare and other major 
cities during this uprising. 
The MDC later denied that 
it had any connection to 
these renegade soldiers. 
Zimbabwe  552 10/2/2008 0 0 During the height of a 
Cholera epidemic, soldiers 
mutinied after they failed to 
access their paltry wages as 
a result of cash strapped 
banks. The mutiny is violent 
and full of riots, but the 
soldiers were unarmed. The 
news story suggest that this 
unrest is a reflection of 
Mugabe's waning popularity 
and legitimacy. 
Zimbabwe  552 12/2/2008 0 0 Mutineers take to the streets 
of Harare and attack and rob 
foreign currency dealers 
because they had not been 
paid. They had demanded 
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money from the banks but 
the mint had not been able 
to print enough. The news 
story suggest that the "vast 
majority" of all troops are 
very unhappy with Mugabe. 
The unrest seems to be a 
symptom of the 
disintegration of 
Zimbabwe's economy. 
Zimbabwe  552 1/20/2009 0 0 15 armed soldiers looted a 
shop belonging to an 
opposition movement, 
Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC). The 
soldiers said that they were 
looting because their 
salaries were not sufficient. 
Zimbabwe  552 8/11/2012 0 0 The military took over the 
census tracking and 
counting process because it 
paid $90 a day. Thousands 
of soldiers stormed centers 
where enumerators (mostly 
teachers) were completing 
their final training session. 
The soldiers forced the 
teachers out and started 
counting. 
South Africa  560 5/30/1983 0 0 Lt. Gerald Andreas Eckert 
defected to Mozambique in 
order to, "show that there 
are also whites inside the 
South African armed forces 
who do not agree with 
apartheid". While this 
mutiny was only carried out 
by one individual it is 
included because he was a 
commissioned officer. 
South Africa  560 1/12/1984 0 0 Story doesn't give many 
details but the mutiny was 
largely in response to the 
troops' unhappiness with 
their involvement in the 
Angolan War. The state 
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leadership was subsequently 
accused of brutality while 
breaking up the uprising. 
The state and loyal military 
officials seemed to be quite 
heavy-handed in their 
repressive response. 
South Africa  560 10/23/1987 0 0 400 black soldiers mutinied 
and refused to fight on the 
side of the rebels of the 
National Union for the total 
indolence of Angola, or 
UNITA, which was trying 
to overthrow the soviet-
backed Angolan 
government. South African 
troops were in southern 
Angola fighting on the side 
of guerilla forces against 
Angolan Troops. These 
battles seemed to be 
extremely bloody. 
South Africa  560 9/1/1992 0 0 Transkei soldiers that were 
part of the state military 
took 23 senior officers 
hostage. They were 
protesting pay disparities 
between the south African 
defense force and their 
traskei military battalions. 
General Holomisa promised 
to reform the command 
structure in response to the 
demands of the mutineers. 
South Africa  560 11/26/2008 0 0 Close to 200 men mutinied 
and complained about 
corrupt generals and poor 
working conditions. They 
were expected to travel via 
government vehicle 20 km 
from Lenasia to Doornkop 
every day. However, due to 
a shortage of space in 
vehicles, they decided to 
walk in a form of protest. 
 
 
223 
 
South Africa  560 8/26/2009 0 0 Soldiers marched in Pretoria 
to the Union Buildings and 
demanded a 30% increase in 
pay. At the time of the 
story, the soldiers and the 
state were still negotiating. 
The news story implies that 
there will likely be more 
mutinies, however there are 
no follow up articles. 
Military intelligence had 
exposed a plan to kidnap 
senior military officials at a 
function at a military base 
earlier in the month. 
South Africa  560 9/6/2009 0 0 3,000 soldiers in Pretoria 
mutinied over pay 
grievances. The story 
doesn't give many details, 
but this appears to be a foot 
soldier mutiny. 
Namibia  565 7/28/2009 0 0 2/3 of the Namibia Defense 
Force (NDF) did not show 
up at a military parade 
because they were in shock 
over the news that their 
Chief. Lt-Gen Martin Shalli 
had been suspended. The 
soldiers claimed to be sick 
but they were really defying 
orders because of Shalli's 
suspension. 
Lesotho  570 1/23/1994 1 0 Mutiny was spurred by pay 
grievances. South African 
officials seemed extremely 
concerned about the 
potential for diffusion of 
this unrest to their state. The 
mutineers fired mortars and 
machine guns. The 
mutineers originally 
demanded a 100% pay 
increase. 
Lesotho  570 4/14/1994 1 0 Mutineers killed one 
minister and kidnapped four 
others who were taken to 
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army barracks and later 
freed. The soldiers were 
mutinying over pay rather 
than trying to stage a coup. 
A mutiny was put down just 
a few months ago over pay, 
and pay policies were never 
adjusted or updated. 
Lesotho  570 9/22/1998 1 0 Protests over a disputed 
election led to a mutiny. A 
fresh election was to be held 
15-18 months after the 
disputed election. More than 
60 soldiers were killed 
during the mutiny 
(including troops sent from 
South Africa and Botswana 
to quell unrest). 
Lesotho  570 5/15/2015 1 0 23 soldiers of the Lesotho 
Defense force (LDF) 
mutinied. They were lead by 
army commander, Lt-Gen 
Maaparankoe Mahao. Lt-
Gen was shot by other 
military colleagues who 
suspected him of leading 
this mutiny. The mutineers 
sought to topple the LDF 
command. 
Madagascar  580 11/18/2006 0 0 General Fidy went on the 
run after a mutiny. 
Presidential candidates said 
that his defection was 
legitimate. His rebellion 
was spurred by problems of 
low pay for foot soldiers. 
Madagascar  580 3/8/2009 0 0 Soldiers mutinied at a major 
military camp just outside 
of Antananarivo in protest 
of the government's 
repression of opposition 
demonstration in months 
prior. The soldiers were 
calling on all the country's 
law and order forces 
(police) to join their 
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rebellion. The article 
indicates that officers 
supported and backed the 
actions of the soldiers. 
Madagascar  580 5/20/2010 1 0 Story does not give many 
details, but troops mutinied 
in Antananarivo. The rebel 
troops and security forces 
exchanged fire and two 
soldiers were killed. The 
mutiny only lasted a day. 
Madagascar  580 7/22/2012 1 0 The story doesn't give 
details about why the 
mutiny happened. Mutinous 
soldiers took over a military 
camp and shot an army 
officer that was sent in to 
negotiate their surrender. 
Comoros  581 8/30/2001 1 1 The story calls this a coup 
attempt, but it is not a direct 
action to oust the executive 
and is not coded by Powell 
and Thyne. A breakaway 
Comorian island of Anjouan 
experienced a mutiny. 
Troops seized Anjouan's 
radio station in an effort to 
reinstate their preferred 
leader, Col. Said Abeid. The 
mutiny was violent and 
included a civilian death. 
Seychelles  591 8/19/1982 1 0 Soldiers mutinied and took 
nearly 200 hostages. The 
Seychelles government 
called for help from 
Tanzania, South Africa, and 
UK. The story seems to 
indicate that the mutineers, 
led by Sgt. George Nichole, 
were not happy with the 
Rene Government. 
However, this was not a 
coup attempt and is not 
coded by Powell and Thyne. 
Rebellious soldiers reported 
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that they had been treated 
like "pigs" by officers. 
Morocco  600 2/4/1991 0 0 2,000 Moroccan soldiers 
left their camps and crossed 
over into Algeria. 
Algeria  615 2/20/1956 0 0 50-100 soldiers deserted 
during a battle with rebel 
nationalists. The French 
leadership started a big 
round-up to catch the 
deserters. Not many details 
given. 
Algeria  615 4/25/1961 0 0 The stories are confusing. 
To condense a lot of 
material, French troops 
spurred a mutiny in Algiers. 
They were staging the 
mutiny against President De 
Gaulle. It's not immediately 
clear what their intentions 
were. 
Algeria  615 4/2/1995 1 0 This mutiny was a very 
large, barracks mutiny. 
Reports suggest that 2,500-
5,000 soldiers rebelled. 
These were mostly young 
conscripts doing their 
compulsory military service. 
The government forces 
responded with extreme 
violence and bombed the 
barracks. 
Algeria  615 11/23/2013 0 0 An officer in the Algerian 
army defected and fled to 
Morocco. His decision to do 
so was motivated by human 
rights abuses in Algeria and 
economic hardships. 
Although this is only one 
individual, it is included as 
a mutiny because he was a 
commissioned officer. 
Libya  620 8/7/1980 0 0 600 soldiers rebelled and 
troops loyal to Col. 
Muammar el-Qaddafi 
crushed the rebellion. There 
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were no known deaths 
associated with the mutiny. 
The article doesn't indicate 
why the original mutiny 
occurred. It is clear that the 
state was trying to cover-up 
the rebellion and down play 
its significance in an effort 
to look strong and resolute. 
Libya  620 8/31/1985 0 0 Libyan Army and Air force 
mutinied after receiving 
orders to invade Tunisia. 
The article says that troops 
tried unsuccessfully to 
overthrow the Libyan 
Leader, Qaddafi, but this 
doesn’t appear to be a coup 
attempt and is not coded by 
Powell and Thyne. 
Libya  620 3/3/1987 0 0 A lieutenant colonel, a 
senior officer, and his crew 
landed their plane in Abu 
Simbel airport in upper 
Egypt after defecting from 
the battlefield in Chad. The 
individuals disagreed with 
the campaign and strategy 
in Chad. Also, they may 
have been upset about the 
killing of three dissident 
soldiers several weeks 
before the event. 
Libya  620 5/15/1986 1 0 A mutiny occurred in the 
Aziza camp after the U.S. 
amped up air raids. 8 
mutineers were shot and 
killed. The mutiny was in 
response to Gadhafi's 
extreme policies that 
resulted in the ramping up 
of U.S. aggression. 
Libya  620 10/7/1993 0 0 Troops mutinied over pay at 
the Zawiyah barracks. 
While this happened in very 
close proximity to a coup, it 
is clear that there is a low 
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level mutiny occurring 
several days before the coup 
attempt. 
Libya  620 3/6/2011 1 0 Mutiny broke out when 
units of the army refused to 
attack Misrata, Libya's third 
largest city and the only 
place in the west of the 
country that was still 
defying Gaddafi's rule. 
There was infighting 
between troops loyal to 
Gaddafi and those that 
weren't. 
Libya  620 4/1/2011 0 0 A limited mutiny took place 
inside Gaddafi's residence. 
The mutiny was led by 
junior officers from the pro-
Libyan regime armed 
forces. Gaddafi's security 
forces intervened and 
crushed the mutiny 
immediately. This does not 
appear to be a coup attempt, 
but rather intimidation 
tactics. This event is not 
coded by Powell and Thyne. 
Libya  620 6/1/2011 0 0 A Colonel, four lieutenant 
colonels, and four rank and 
file soldiers left their post 
and fled to Tunisia. This 
seems to be one event of 
many like this in the same 
month. 
Sudan  625 8/24/1955 1 0 360 soldiers of the 
Equatorial corps of the 
defense force mutinied and 
forced senior officers to 
flee. This mutiny was 
violent. Powell and Thyne 
have this coded as a coup 
but I think this is incorrect. 
At least from the sources I 
located, this event was 
targeted at military 
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leadership, not the 
executive. 
Sudan  625 12/11/1965 0 0 60 army officers mutinied 
because they were 
dissatisfied with the 
government's attempts to 
repress the rebellion among 
southern Sudanese. During 
the mutiny, officers refused 
to receive orders from 
superiors. Later they 
demanded that the army 
commander listen to their 
demands and grievances 
while he was detained. 
Sudan  625 2/1/1983 0 0 Article was written in 2014, 
but recounts a mutiny that 
occurred in 1983. Sudanese 
army units took place at Bor 
and the Khartoum army 
leadership dispatched 
Colonel Garang to suppress 
the mutiny. However, Col. 
Garang joined the mutiny 
and became its leader rather 
than suppressing it.  Many 
trace back to this event to 
explain the rise of SPLA, 
the guerrilla movement. 
Sudan  625 3/15/1983 0 0 Article doesn't give many 
details, but states that a 
detachment of Division 105 
of the First Battalion of the 
Southern Region mutinied. 
The command had shown 
signs of indiscipline over 
the proceeding months. The 
mutineers stole large 
quantities of arms, 
ammunition, and explosives 
from a store in Bor. 
Sudan  625 9/25/1985 1 1 Mutiny occurs in North 
Khartoum and in 
Omdurman. Mutiny 
appeared to have ben in 
response to northern troops 
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refusing to obey orders to 
enter the war zone in the 
south. Civilians died during 
this mutiny. Roadblocks 
were set up to apprehend 
deserters and mutineers. 
Sudan  625 3/19/1986 1 0 State troops mutinied in 
Juba as they were ordered to 
transfer to the north. They 
took control of the Juba 
airport and ordered an 
airline to take them to 
Khartoum. 65 men 
including the commander 
and his deputy were 
captured and killed by loyal 
forces. 
Sudan  625 8/21/1996 0 0 A military battalion 
stationed at the Kutum 
Garrison in Darfur refused 
orders from the Armed 
Forces General Command's 
operations department in 
Khartoum. The battalion 
had been ordered to move to 
the Eastern border for 
military preparations. Local 
populations expressed 
sympathy for the rebel 
battalion and supplied them 
with food and water. The 
battalion warned that they 
would fire on anyone who 
went near them. 
Sudan  625 6/12/1998 0 0 Students in military training 
program defected and fled 
the camp in response to a 
controversial program that 
may have involved 
deploying students to war 
zone in southern and eastern 
Sudan. 
Sudan  625 6/3/1999 0 0 Two army convoys in 
Sudan mutinied after trying 
to recapture the town of 
Togan from the opposition 
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(National Democratic 
Alliance - NDA). The 
troops rebelled after 
suffering a major defeat 
against the NDA. 
Sudan  625 1/1/2004 0 0 The date given in the article 
is rather unclear. It says the 
mutiny occurred sometime 
in 2003 or 2004. As such, 
the mutiny has been coded 
to have occurred in Jan. of 
2004, but the article isn't 
precisely clear. The mutiny 
occurred when 18 soldier 
refused to deploy from Al-
Ubayyid city to the town of 
Umbro in northern Darfur 
and instead went to al-
Fashir capital city with 26 
vehicles. 
Sudan  625 12/16/2006 1 0 Mutiny occurred over 
unpaid salaries. Heavy gun 
fire was reported in Juba, 
the administrative capital of 
South Sudan. The mutiny 
began in the barracks. 
Sudan  625 2/4/2011 1 1 50 people died in this 
mutiny. The mutiny 
occurred in Makalal during 
the separation of Sudan's 
northern and southern 
armies right before 
secession. The members of 
an army unit refused to 
redeploy with their weapons 
to the north and trend on 
other members of their unit. 
Sudan  625 4/21/2013 1 0 A paramilitary (central 
reserve police) mutinied in 
Darfur. They mutineers 
fired weapons into the air in 
the state capital El Geneina 
near the Chadian border. 
Members of this 
paramilitary group used to 
belong to the Janjaweed, 
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before being folded back 
into the state's military. 
Sudan  625 12/2/2015 0 0 "Dozens" of soldiers from 
the Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF) and other 
paramilitaries deserted their 
posts in Makja, Disa, and 
Dondero. There are two 
possible reasons for this 
rebellion. First, the officer 
indicated that soldiers 
defected because they did 
not want to take up arms 
against possible relatives in 
the state in which rebels 
were operating. Second, 
they were protesting against 
the non-payment of their 
salaries after the battles of 
Malkin and Kalgo. 
South 
Sudan  
626 12/16/2013 1 0 A mutiny occurred between 
troops loyal to Salva Kiir, 
the president, and troops 
backing Riek Machar, the 
former deputy and leading 
cleric. Hundreds of civilians 
had to flee to UN bases. The 
fighting largely took place 
around a barracks. The 
article calls this a coup 
attempt but it is not coded 
by Powell and Thyne and 
there is no attempt to oust 
the executive.  
South 
Sudan  
626 9/12/2014 0 0 Air force officers joined 
SPLM/A in opposition to a 
lack of diversity in the 
army. The officers accused 
South Sudan's government 
of tribalism and a poor 
promotion policy. 
South 
Sudan  
626 1/30/2015 0 0 Major Losuba Lodoru, a 
SPLA officer, defected and 
formed a new rebel 
movement. This officer had 
been really well respected 
 
 
233 
 
by military leadership prior 
to his rebellion. This event 
is included since a 
commissioned officer 
defected. 
South 
Sudan  
626 5/17/2015 0 0 Renegade Deputy 
Commander Johnson Olony 
defected to the rebels. The 
state accused him of aiding 
the rebels and helping them 
cross a river from the 
western side of Malakal 
city. This helped the rebels 
claim part of Malakal city 
and recapture it from the 
control of President Salva 
Kiir's forces. 
South 
Sudan  
626 11/9/2017 0 0 General Chan Garang 
defected to the rebels. While 
this mutiny does not meet 
the threshold for size, it is 
included because he was a 
high ranking officer. 
Iran  630 10/30/2015 0 0 Because of a rising death 
toll within Iran's Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, 
senior commanders and 
junior officers refused to 
obey orders to fight in 
Syria. The mutineers were 
referred to a court-marshal 
on charges of mutiny and 
treason. This mutiny 
followed many pounding 
losses in Syria and several 
deaths of Iranian soldiers, 
even though Iran denied the 
presence of Iranian soldiers 
on the ground in Syria. 
Iraq 645 9/25/1990 0 0 500 men from the elite Iraqi 
republican guard defected 
and fled with their arms 
together to Anarab state. 
The soldiers did so in 
response to Iraq's 
aggression against Kuwait. 
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Iraq 645 8/10/1995 0 0 Two of Saddam Hussein's 
sons defected to Jordan. 
They were Lieut. Gen. 
Hussein Kamel, the husband 
of Hussein's oldest 
daughter. Kamel oversaw 
the biological and chemical 
weapons and nuclear 
research program in Iraq. 
The other defector was Col. 
Saddam Kamel who was 
married to Hussein's other 
daughter, Rana. Kamel was 
in charge of Iraq's special 
forces. 
Iraq 645 4/1/2004 0 0 Article mentions a mutiny 
that occurred when a 
battalion of the Iraqi army 
was ordered to deploy to 
Fallujah in order to assist 
U.S. marines who were 
actively fighting there. The 
troops refused the orders to 
deploy and during the 
weeks that followed more 
than 15,000 soldiers and 
police officers deserted. 
This forced the U.S. to 
reevaluate recruiting and 
retention strategies. 
Iraq 645 4/25/2004 0 0 A second mutiny occurred 
is Fallujah. After being 
involved in heavy fighting 
with insurgents, a second 
unit of Iraqi forces 
mutinied. Part of the 36th 
battalion rebelled after 11 
days of brutal conflict. U.S. 
marines had to parse 
through and separate 
soldiers that wanted to fight 
from those that refused. The 
article suggests that the 
battalion may have split 
along ethnic lines. About 
half of the soldiers were not 
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Iraqi, but Kurdish 
Peshmerga. The Kurds were 
ready to fight but the Iraqi 
Arab soldiers had vowed 
that they had enough 
fighting. 
Iraq 645 5/1/2006 0 0 After completing a 5 week 
training program at Camp 
Habbaniyah, a base 45 miles 
west of the capital, dozens 
of soldiers began to protest 
the fact that they would 
have to serve outside their 
home areas. The soldiers 
began ripping their clothes 
off in rage. The mutiny was 
rather short lived and was 
brought under control 
quickly. 
Iraq 645 8/23/2006 0 0 100 soldiers defied orders to 
move into Baghdad as part 
of a large security 
crackdown in the capital 
city. The mutiny was 
spurred by sectarian divides. 
The soldiers believed they 
would be operating in their 
own region or "homeland" 
and did not want to patrol 
other areas. 
Iraq 645 3/15/2008 0 0 1,300 soldiers and 
policemen refused to fight 
against Shiite militias in 
Basra during an attack. 
Iraq 645 4/6/2009 1 0 The awakening guard, 
which was heavily funded 
by the U.S. experienced a 
mutiny in which members 
feared they might be 
receiving unfair treatment 
from the Shia-led 
government for sectarian 
reasons. The rebellious 
troops clashed with Iraqi 
forces. Some were 
suspected of planting a road 
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side bomb. This lead to a 
U.S. air strike targeting the 
rebellious soldiers. 
Iraq 645 6/11/2013 0 0 1,000 Kurdish troops from 
the Iraqi army (16th 
Brigade) deserted. They 
desired to be integrated into 
forces loyal to the Kurdish 
region. The troops 
disobeyed orders to take 
part in an operation against 
a mainly Sunni Arab town. 
Iraq 645 6/12/2014 0 0 Iraqi army deserted Kirkuk 
and have been replaced by 
Peshmerga fighters. The 
soldiers even abandoned 
their uniforms and fled in 
civilian clothing. These 
desertions were largely in 
response to the growing 
threat of ISIS. 
Egypt  651 10/20/1952 0 0 Major General Hussein 
Sirry Amer and Col. El 
Sayed Farah were charged 
with desertion and 
attempting to spread alarm 
among their troops. The 
article doesn't give many 
details. While this event 
only includes 2 individuals 
(although it may have 
included their troops too, it's 
unclear) it is considered a 
mutiny because these were 
commissioned officers. 
Egypt  651 2/25/1986 1 1 25,000 conscripts of the 
CSF (paramilitary force) 
staged protest in Cairo in 
response to a rumor that 
conscription was going to 
mandate 4  years of service 
instead of three. The mutiny 
was very violent. More info 
here: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wik
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i/1986_Egyptian_conscripts
_riot 
Egypt  651 1/21/1991 0 0 There was a mutiny among 
Egyptian forces in Saudi 
Arabia due to a 
disagreement between lower 
ranking Egyptian Officers 
and the Egyptian forces' 
commander. Mubarak sent a 
military delegation to Saudi 
Arabia to resolve the issue. 
Egypt  651 5/9/2012 0 0 In Obour City, hundreds of 
Central Security Forces 
conscripts mutinied over 
torture that they endured 
committed by their officers. 
They blocked the road and 
started chanting anti-police 
songs. The mutiny was put 
down quickly. The 
conscripts were poorly paid, 
fed and had to endure 
torture. 
Syria  652 1/16/1963 0 0 Col. Kerim Nahlawi staged 
a mutiny and recruited 
active soldiers. The Syrian 
government was locked in 
negotiations with the 
mutineers that threatened to 
occupy Damascus if their 
demands were not met. The 
article does not clearly 
outline what the demands of 
the mutineers were. This 
event escalated into a coup, 
although it very clearly 
started as a mutiny. 
Syria  652 3/4/1963 0 0 The article doesn't give 
many details but says that 
Syrian troop mutinied on 
the Israeli frontier because 
they demanded that Syria 
reunite with Egypt. 
Syria  652 1/21/1991 0 0 Syrian troops mutiny in 
Saudi Arabia after seeing 
that some of the Western 
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military personnel were 
wearing a star of David. 
Syria  652 3/15/2011 0 0 Desertions were occurring 
in Deir al-Zour in the 
northwestern province of 
Idlib, and in towns around 
Homs and Damascus. Size 
of desertions not mentioned. 
Syria  652 6/8/2011 1 1 Soldiers mutinied in Jisr al-
Shughor is response to 
heavy repression committed 
by pro-government gunman 
known as "shabiha". 
Soldiers ultimately defected. 
It seems that the soldiers 
were most likely Sunni, 
resizing the Alawite 
minority that rules. Mutiny 
was certainly spurred by 
sectarian divisions. 
Syria  652 10/20/2011 1 0 Similar as above. Defectors 
were reported to launch 
deadly guerrilla raids on 
state loyal convoys and 
fortifications. Article points 
out that Syrian defectors 
lack international support, 
which is likely why Assad is 
able to weather such large 
defections. 
Syria  652 3/8/2012 0 0 4 high ranking Syrian 
officers defected to camp in 
Turkey. Many of them seem 
to have ties to the FSA. Lt. 
Khaled al-Hamoud joined 
the ranks of the FSA as an 
advisor. 
Syria  652 4/28/2012 1 0 Report suggests that there 
were "major defections" 
from units in the Syrian 
Army that were 
headquartered close to the 
Republican Palace in 
Latakia. The mutiny 
involved 30 soldiers. 
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Syria  652 6/21/2012 0 0 Syrian air force colonel 
defects to Jordan. This event 
does not meet the threshold 
for mutiny, but because 
commissioned officer 
defected, it is included in 
dataset. The article indicates 
that this was an anti-Assad 
act on behalf of the colonel. 
Syria  652 6/24/2012 0 0 A general, a major, 2 
colonels, and 33 soldiers 
defected from Syria in an 
act against Assad. They fled 
to Turkey. 
Syria  652 10/11/2012 0 0 A female military officer 
announced her defection 
from Assad on video. 
Colonel Zubaida al-miki - 
an Alawite Muslim, calls on 
other officers to join her in 
defection against Assad. 
She stated that he was 
fomenting a "sectarian 
conflict in order to destroy 
the revolution." While this 
event does not meet the 
minimum threshold for a 
mutiny, it is included 
because Al-Miki is a 
commissioned officer. 
Syria  652 12/7/2012 0 0 15 military officers and 
their families crossed the 
Syrian border to the Turkish 
Reyhanli area in the 
Antakya-Hatay province. 
The motivation of this 
mutiny was not stated. 
Syria  652 12/27/2012 0 0 Major General Abdul Aziz 
Jasssem al-Shallal, the chief 
of the military police, 
appointed by Bashar al 
Assad to prevent defections, 
defected himself. He said 
that the Syrian military had 
"deviated from its mission 
to protect the country and 
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had transformed in a gang 
for killing and destruction." 
He fled to Turkey.  This 
event does not meet the 
threshold for mutiny, but 
because commissioned 
officer defected, it is 
included in dataset. 
Syria  652 3/16/2013 0 0 A Syrian general (high 
ranking) who once led the 
military intelligence office 
defected from the army and 
presumably joined the 
rebels. This defection 
occurred immediately after 
the rebels' top military 
commander called for 
members of the armed 
services to join the uprising 
against Assad. Although 
this doesn't meet minimum 
threshold for size, it is 
included because this was a 
commissioned rank that 
defected. 
Syria  652 8/6/2013 0 0 Soldiers turn in their 
weapons to state loyal 
leaders. This events 
occurred because regime 
forces wanted to instant a 
rocket launcher to shell the 
Eastern Ghouta District of 
Jaramana, which residents 
felt to be a breach of a 
previous agreement to keep 
this area out of the Syrian 
war.   
Jordan  663 2/7/1974 0 0 Mutineers were led by 
Junior officers in a mutiny. 
The mutineers demanded a 
salary increase and also the 
dismissal of the Premier; the 
army chief of staff, and Lt. 
Gen Zaid Ben-shaker. 
Lebanon 660 2/11/1990 1 0 A Christian officer, Col. 
Paul Faris, led a rebellion 
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against General Aoun. He 
set up a "neutral Command" 
in Amsheet and encouraged 
soldiers to join him in 
resisting General Aoun 
because of the way he led 
the army. Faris argued that 
Aoun deserved to be 
executed. Aoun condemned 
Faris's actions and called 
him a renegade. 
Lebanon 660 5/21/2012 1 0 Article doesn't give many 
specifics. Sheikh Ahmad 
Abd-al-Wahid was killed at 
a military check point. It 
was not clear exactly who 
killed him, but it clearly was 
not ordered by military 
leadership. More 
information can be found 
here: 
https://www.theguardian.co
m/world/2012/may/23/syria
-uprising-lebanon-assad 
Israel  666 10/1/1952 0 0 Article is brief but says that 
15 mutineers were 
imprisoned for their recent 
protest against extending the 
draft period from 2 years to 
30 months. The article 
indicates that the mutiny did 
not last very long. 
Israel  666 3/31/1971 0 0 The article does not give 
many details but states that 
Abraham Isaac Polack, a 32 
year old officer in the Israeli 
army, defected to S. 
Lebanon. He is one of four 
soldiers to do so within the 
month. While this event 
does not meet the minimum 
size threshold it is included 
because a commissioned 
officer was involved. 
Israel  666 2/27/1998 0 0 60 soldiers mutinied 
because their commanding 
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officer would not allow 
them to sleep and forced 
them to train in a state of 
sleep deprivation. They 
announced that they refused 
to eat, drink or change until 
the officer was replaced. 
Finally, the brigade 
commander was brought in 
and was able to end the 
strike. 
Israel  666 11/30/1999 0 0 Israel soldiers mutinied 
because of what they felt 
was mismanagement by 
some of their officers. The 
officers had failed to 
anticipate and ambush 
because they literally fell 
asleep on the job. The 
situation was complicated 
by illicit drug trade 
conducted by Israeli 
officers. 
Israel  666 9/25/2003 0 0 28 air force pilots were fired 
and set to be tried for their 
mutiny which resulted in 
them refusing to attack 
Palestinian towns. The 
pilots wrote a letter that 
outraged the military 
establishment and must of 
the public who had 
previously held the pilots 
with high esteem. The pilots 
were unsatisfied with the 
grand strategy of the 
military establishment. 
Israel  666 4/17/2006 0 0 20 soldiers mutinied and 
forced commanding officers 
to chase them through the 
streets in public in the 
northern border town of 
Kiryat Shmona. The mutiny 
was staged in support and in 
solidarity with 6 soldiers 
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after infantrymen had their 
privileges suspended. 
Israel  666 8/5/2007 1 0 10 soldiers and 2 officers 
refused to take part in a raid 
that was intended to remove 
thousands of Jewish settlers 
from the Gaza strip. More 
than 40 soldiers considered 
not following orders after 
consulting with rabbis and 
family members, according 
to the article. 
Israel  666 10/15/2009 0 0 A mutiny followed a protest 
by conscripts that disrupted 
a swearing in ceremony. 
These mutineers were pro-
settler soldiers. There was 
another small mutiny in 
November but it was not 
large enough to meet formal 
coding rules. 
Israel  666 12/15/2009 0 0 Article doesn't give specific 
date, but mutineers were 
protesting what they saw as 
incompetence on the part of 
their platoon commander. 
They had reported concerns 
that went unanswered. As 
such, they refused orders 
during training in the Jordan 
Valley. 
Saudi 
Arabia  
670 5/30/2017 0 0 Article says that Saudi 
troops mutinied in 
Awamiyah after an 
accidental explosion killed 
many soldiers. The article 
suggests that the mutineers 
rebelled because they did 
not want to carry out field 
operations against civilians 
and follow the regime's 
orders to "crackdown" on 
protestors. 
Yemen  679 1/27/1969 1 0 Republican security forces 
in the Yemeni capital shot 
and killed Maj. Abdel 
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Raqeeb Abdel-Wahab. The 
major shot at the forces that 
had surrounded his house. 
The general was considered 
to be a hero among leftists 
and those that belonged to 
the Shafei sect of Sunni 
Islam. 
Yemen  679 3/21/2011 0 0 Article doesn't give many 
details but a mutiny 
occurred within the divided 
army apparatus. The rebel 
soldiers defected while a 
large portion of the military 
remained loyal to president 
Saleh. 
Yemen  679 6/29/2011 1 1 300 Yemeni soldiers 
defected to rebels. The state 
responded with heavy 
repression and fighting. One 
strike hit a bus carrying 
civilians, resulting in 
causalities. 
Yemen  679 11/19/2011 0 0 400 Yemeni troops mutinied 
as they refused orders to fire 
on peaceful protestors. They 
were welcomed by troops 
that had mutinied in the 
previous March. The 
protestors celebrated the 
defections. 
Yemen  679 1/22/2012 1 0 Soldiers rebelled against the 
authority of General 
Mohamed Saleh al-Ahmar, 
former president Saleh's 
half brother. The rebel 
soldiers staged a sit-in at a 
military base and 
encouraged other soldiers to 
join them and support their 
demands. The soldiers cited 
corruption in the form of 
military leadership stealing 
portions of their salaries to 
line their own pockets. The 
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state responded by heavily 
repressing soldiers. 
Yemen  679 2/21/2012 0 0 Article discusses a mutiny 
against a rebellious general. 
This does not count as a 
mutiny as these troops had 
already split from the state, 
but the article discusses two 
other mutinies that occurred 
in military camps. On in the 
southern Shabwah 
Governorate. Hundreds of 
soldiers mutinied 
demanding payment of 
overdue salaries. 
Yemen  679 2/22/2012 1 0 Same as above but occurred 
in Aden. Shots were fired 
into the air to disperse 
soldiers. 
Yemen  679 3/17/2012 0 0 "Thousands" of airmen 
mutinied in order to 
encourage the new president 
to dismiss the commander 
of the air force who held his 
post for more than 20 years. 
The commander had had 
familial ties to the ousted 
president. Airmen camped 
out for weeks near the 
president’s home. Many low 
ranking airmen went on 
strike for more than two 
weeks to press their 
demands. 
Yemen  679 5/10/2012 0 0 A new leader of the 3rd 
Republican Guard Brigade, 
Al-Halili, was unable to 
assume control of his new 
position. He was appointed 
to replace former president 
Salih's nephew, by new 
President Hadi. Maqwala, 
brigadier chief of staff and 
on of the former president's 
aides, deployed tanks in and 
outside of the brigade's 
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headquarters. He instructed 
soldiers to reject the new 
appointment and resist the 
commander's orders. 
Yemen  679 8/14/2012 1 0 93 soldiers and officers 
mutinied and assaulted a 
military defense complex in 
Sanaa. They deserted their 
posts, refused orders, fired 
on military leaders. 
Yemen  679 1/13/2013 0 0 According to available 
information, Brigadier Al-
Qushaybi was besieged in 
the Al-Amaliqah Brigade's 
headquarters, which he 
visited the day before 
yesterday to contain the 
incidents. Other protesters, 
who demanded that their 
former commander return to 
his post, prevented General 
Al-Qushaybi from leaving 
the headquarters to perform 
the Friday prayers. 
According to information 
leaked from the brigade's 
headquarters, this triggered 
severe tension as loyal and 
protesting officers drew 
their guns against one 
another, prompting 
Brigadier Al-Qushaybi to 
remain at the headquarters 
and perform the prayers 
there. 
Yemen  679 3/13/2013 1 0 Mutineers demanded the 
ousting of commander 
Brigadier Mohammad al-
Bukhaiti. They besieged his 
office and a clash broke out 
between guards of the 
commander and the soldiers 
who were wanting him to be 
dismissed because of 
accusations that he was 
making illegal deductions 
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from their payroll. Weapons 
were used. 
Yemen  679 4/8/2013 1 1 In Rada, soldiers mutinied 
form the RG 1st Mountain 
Infantry division. They 
blocked roads and forced 
locals to close businesses. 
Many believe that this event 
was carried out in collusion 
with or under the directive 
of al-Qaidah. The mutinous 
soldiers were very 
aggressive and conducted 
violent confrontations with 
civilians that resulted in 
civilian casualties. 
Yemen  679 5/27/2013 1 0 Mutineers opened fire in the 
air to prevent security chief 
from entering the 
administrative building in 
the capital. They blocked 
Chief of capital secretariat 
security, brigadier Dr. Umar 
Abd-al-Karim Abdu from 
entering his office until 
demands are met. The goals 
of the mutineers were not 
directly stated. 
Yemen  679 8/3/2013 1 0 About 500 soldiers mutinied 
against president Abd- 
Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. The 
soldiers were from the 
former presidential Guard 
used weapons to confront 
units of the presidential 
protection force. Mutineers 
demanded the dismissal of 
the defense minister 
Muhammad Nasir Ahmand, 
and Finance minister Sakhr 
al-Wajih stating that they 
had abused human rights. 
The mutiny was suppressed 
within hours. This does not 
appear to be a coup attempt 
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and was not coded by 
Powell and Thyne. 
Yemen  679 11/12/2014 0 0 Parts of the Special Security 
forces mutinied in response 
to the former president, 
Hadi, being fired from his 
post as secretary general. 
The new appointee, Maroni, 
had close ties to the Houthi 
movement. The 
appointment was thought be 
part of the government's 
plan to integrate Houthi 
militants into the country's 
military. 
Yemen  679 7/8/2015 1 0 A portion of Yemeni troops 
tried to defect to Houthi 
rebel forces. They were met 
with air strikes. More 
information here: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-
33443092 
Yemen 
People's 
Republic 
680 6/16/1959 1 1 Soldiers rebelled and took 
control of the Kingdom's 
primary port, Hodeida. A 
soldier was killed by a 
judge, which did not stop 
his car when the soldier was 
trying to get him to stop. 
This resulted in troops 
killing the judge and his 
brother. They then paraded 
the body through the streets 
and destroyed the judge's 
house. 
Afghanistan  700 10/16/1979 1 0 Afghan troops mutiny 
against Soviet-backed 
government. Mutiny puts 
pressure on soviets to 
repress heavily or pull out 
completely. 
Afghanistan  700 8/4/1979 1 0 Mutiny occurs in Kabul. 
Government loyal forces 
were able to put it down. 
There were civilian deaths, 
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but these deaths appear to 
be unrelated to the mutiny 
itself. Article doesn't 
indicate why mutiny 
occurred in the first place. 
Afghanistan  700 5/4/1981 1 0 Troops of the 8th division in 
the Afghan army deployed 
in South Kabul mutinied 
against their Soviet 
commanders The troops 
used their weapons against 
the Soviet troops. The 
Soviet troops responded by 
moving against the 
rebellious troops and 
dropping bombs. 
Afghanistan  700 1/1/1983 1 0 Demoralized Afghan 
soldiers mutinied, killing 30 
officers and blowing up an 
ammunition dump. Not 
immediately clear who led 
mutiny. 
Afghanistan  700 7/23/1983 1 0 100 Karmal troops of the 
8th division mutinied. 
About half of the mutineers 
defected to join insurgent 
groups. 
Afghanistan  700 3/7/1984 0 0 Afghan soldiers deserted 
their posts after news came 
that tours were to be 
extended from three to four 
years. Many soldiers on 
guard near Kabul airport 
and the main army bases in 
SW Kabul fled their posts 
after hearing the news. The 
size of the mutiny is not 
reported. 
Afghanistan  700 10/5/1985 1 0 Afghani troops mutiny after 
Soviet officers execute one 
of their comrades. Said 
comrade was executed 
because he reportedly 
bought hashish frequently 
from Muslim rebels. Violent 
mutiny with lots of 
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destruction of military 
property. 
Afghanistan  700 11/25/1988 0 0 184 Afghani soldiers 
defected to a leading 
guerilla group. The article 
indicates that the defection 
was likely a result of low 
morale because of a lack of 
supplies. 
Afghanistan  700 5/20/1997 0 0 Assassination of Abdul 
Rahman Haqqani, a member 
of the Afghan Mujahedeen, 
sparked mutiny. General 
Abdul Malik led the mutiny 
because he felt that a 
general was protecting 
Haqqani's killers. 
Afghanistan  700 10/20/2013 0 0 Afghanistan Special Forces 
Commander defects to 
insurgents. While this event 
does not meet the minimum 
threshold, it is considered a 
mutiny since a commander 
was involved. The 
commander took with him 
his teams guns and high 
tech equipment. 
Afghanistan  700 2/16/2014 0 0 25 soldiers defected to the 
Taliban in Qaysar. 
Afghanistan  700 10/20/2014 0 0 300 Arbakis joined the 
Taliban and vowed to 
support its interests 
Afghanistan  700 10/25/2014 0 0 Very similar event to 
10/20/2014 defections, but 
smaller and in a different 
location. 25 soldiers 
defected in Kohestanat and 
joined the Taliban. They 
took with them over 15 
Kalashnikovs. 
Afghanistan  700 5/26/2015 0 0 71 active soldiers defected 
to the Taliban. They took 
with them tanks, vehicles, 
and weapons. They vowed 
to support the goals of the 
Taliban. 
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Afghanistan  700 9/17/2015 0 0 30 Afghan soldiers defected 
to the Taliban in Kohestanat 
district. They pledged to 
support the goals of the 
Taliban for the rest of their 
lives. They took their 
weapons and ammunition 
with them when they 
defected. 
Afghanistan  700 11/16/2015 0 0 70 Afghan soldiers and 5 
commanders defected to the 
Taliban in the district of 
Sangin. The deserters took 
their weapons with them 
when they defected. A local 
tribal elder indicated that 
the soldiers defected due to 
a lack of weapons, 
ammunition and rations. 
The Taliban had distributed 
leaflets stating that if the 
soldiers stayed and fought 
they would be killed but if 
they defected they would be 
spared. 
Afghanistan  700 10/29/2016 0 0 41 Afghan National army 
soldiers surrendered their 
base to the Taliban in Chora 
district. This follows several 
other small events of base 
surrender in the same week. 
Tajikistan  702 1/15/1996 0 0 Two army commanders 
partnered to lead mutiny. 
The mutiny was "short 
lived" and the mutineers 
were appeased by changes 
in the cabinet. Opposition 
fighters took advantage of 
the confusion and launched 
a new assault in the 
mountains of central 
Tajikistan. 
Tajikistan  702 11/1/1998 1 0 Colonel Mahmud 
Khudoiberdyev led 1,200 
troops in the North and 
seized several towns. For 
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more information see: 
http://www.rferl.org/a/1089
948.html 
Tajikistan  702 9/1/2015 1 0 Mutiny commanded by 
former deputy defense 
minister Abukhalim 
Nazarzoda. Attack on police 
station and weapons depot 
in Dushanbe. Participants 
were recently tried. 
China  710 4/23/1949 1 0 Communist troops attacked 
Nanking and the state troops 
fled the area. This gave way 
to looting and the 
destruction of civilian 
property. The article 
suggests that the troops 
deserted the city because 
they believed that their 
commanders had lost 
control of the situation. 
China  710 12/22/1952 1 0 The article is very brief but 
says that a battalion of 
Chinese communist (6th 
security regiment( mutinied 
on Dec. 22 on Taishan 
Island off the south China 
coast. The mutiny was led 
by a battalion commander. 
200 (possibly more) of his 
troops turned machine guns 
on other loyal soldiers. It 
appears that the mutineers 
left their post and joined 
Chinese guerrillas. 
China  710 3/21/1985 1 0 China military vessel 
experiences mutiny. Several 
soldiers die. Floats into 
South Korean waters when 
runs out of fuel. Is returned 
eventually to China. 
China  710 6/4/1989 1 1 Troops fought among 
themselves at the Nanyuan 
military air base south of 
Beijing. The fighting was 
very violent and shelling 
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could be heard from far 
away. The People's 
Liberation Army was deeply 
split over the massacre that 
occurred earlier in the week. 
Sections of the army wore 
white arm bands to signify 
support for the student 
protestors. 
China  710 12/1/2000 0 0 Xu Junping, a senior colonel 
in the People's liberation 
army defected to the U.S.. 
He also held the position of 
director at the Defense 
ministry's Bureau of North 
American and Oceanic 
Affairs. This event does not 
meet the minimum size 
threshold for a mutiny but 
because it was a colonel (or 
a commissioned officer) it 
counts as a mutiny. 
Taiwan  713 8/11/1981 0 0 Maj. Huang Che Cheng 
flew his plane into Chinese 
territory and defected. This 
event does not meet the 
minimum size threshold for 
a mutiny but because it was 
a major (or a commissioned 
officer) it counts as a 
mutiny. 
Taiwan  713 4/23/1983 0 0 Maj. Li Dawei flew his 
plane into Chinese territory 
and defected to communist 
China. This event does not 
meet the minimum size 
threshold for a mutiny but 
because it was a major (or a 
commissioned officer) it 
counts as a mutiny. 
North Korea  731 5/23/1996 0 0 A North Korean fighter 
pilot flew his plan into 
South Korean air space and 
dipped his wings to signal 
that he was not hostile. He 
landed the plane and was 
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monitored closely. He 
indicated that he could no 
longer live under the North 
Korean regime. The article 
indicates that this pilot was 
someone who the regime 
trusted and clearly a higher 
ranked military actor. Thus, 
while this event does not 
surpass the threshold of 
minimum size for a mutiny, 
it counts because a high 
ranked military actor was 
involved. 
South Korea  732 8/23/1971 1 0 31 men mutinied against 
their commanders in 1971 
in a secret mission that was 
never fully realized and 
carried out. Unit 684 was 
kept on an island because 
relations had improved with 
north Korea so the mission 
was postponed. Several died 
in bad conditions and the 
rest mutinied in order to 
escape the conditions. 
South Korea  732 12/12/1979 1 0 5 generals led a mutiny of 
Dec. 12 1979 that killed 
three men and seriously 
injured many others. The 
leading general (General 
Chung) was charged with 
sedition. There were 
allegations that he was 
taking side payments for his 
actions. There article does 
not indicate why the 
original mutiny occurred. 
India  750 2/18/1946 1 0 Indian troops revolt against 
British leadership. 8 
causalities and 33 wounded. 
Revolt was against imperial 
rule and contributed to 
independence of India. 
India  750 2/26/1946 1 0 Similar as above 
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India  750 6/11/1984 1 0 Article only briefly 
mentions information on 
1984 mutiny. Sikh soldiers 
mutiny as Indian military 
desecrates holy sites. More 
info found at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/
1984/0612/061237.html 
India  750 5/15/2016 0 0 A young soldier died after 
the infantry units leadership 
ordered a 10 km march. 
After the soldier’s death, 
several other soldiers 
mutinied and began fighting 
senior officers. There aren't 
many details about the 
event. 
India  750 1/3/2017 1 0 Soldiers took to social 
media complaining about 
poor food and facilities. 
While this alone does not 
constitute an obvious 
mutiny, one paramilitary 
soldier in India's elite 
security units shot for of his 
senior officers dead in an 
act of protest. Taken 
together, this month’s 
events represent an 
observable violation of the 
chain of command. 
Pakistan  770 6/1/2011 0 0 Brig Ali is charged and 
convicted of encouraging 
mutiny among 4 other 
officers. He himself is a 
Brigadier. 
Bangladesh  771 2/25/2009 1 0 Large mutiny, up to 70 
killed in Dhaka. Elements of 
the paramilitary Bangladesh 
Rifles mutinied for 33 
hours. 
Myanmar  775 8/10/1948 1 0 There was a four day long 
mutiny that occurred in the 
town of Thayetmyo. It 
appears that the mutineers 
began attacking loyal 
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troops. The article does not 
give many details about this 
event, but it appears to be a 
violent mutiny that lasted 
four days. Other articles 
indicate that this was a 
mutiny among the Burma 
Rifles battalions. 
Myanmar  775 8/8/1988 1 1 Troops joined 
prodemocracy protests 
because regime was 
targeting peaceful 
protesters. 
Myanmar  775 9/9/1988 0 0 200 air force pilots defected 
to the anti-government 
protestors side. This event 
was in close proximity to a 
coup. This is clearly mutiny 
activity because the pilots 
make no attempt to depose 
the executive. 
Myanmar  775 10/3/2007 0 0 Officer defects to Thailand 
after being ordered to beat 
protesting monks. This 
event comes among many 
other reports of mutiny in 
East Myanmar. Soldiers all 
over country seem to be 
resisting orders to repress 
protesters. 
Sri Lanka  780 8/13/1984 1 1 Troops mutiny after fighting 
Tamil rebels in northern Sri 
Lanka. Military leadership 
tried to blame destruction 
and chaos on rebels, but 
civilians report that it was 
the state's troops 
perpetrating the violence. 
Civilians were killed and 
businesses were burned 
Sri Lanka  780 11/5/1999 1 0 Tamil rebels establish edge 
over state forces. After 
driving state forces out of 
several towns, state troops 
refuse to fight and kill two 
military policemen in 
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resistance. There are a 
number of additional 
articles that detail desertions 
that occur between 1999-
2005. However, these 
articles do not discuss 
specific events. It seems that 
there is a slow stream of 
desertions that occur during 
this period. 
Sri Lanka  780 5/1/2009 0 0 3,000 soldiers and 7 officers 
were arrest for desertions 
that took place during the 
military campaign against 
the Tamil Tigers in the lead 
up to victory in 2009. 
Nepal  790 6/11/2007 0 0 An officer from the APF 
defected with weapons and 
joined rebel forces. While 
the article calls the APF a 
police force, this groups is 
actually a paramilitary 
organization that carries out 
military objectives as well 
as law enforcement. 
Because this was an officer, 
while this event does not 
meet the minimum 
threshold for a mutiny, it is 
included. 
Nepal  790 6/26/2008 0 0 Poor living conditions and 
discrimination lead 200 
soldiers to mutiny. 
Nepal  790 3/28/2011 0 0 The Indrabaksha Battalion 
mutinied after Army Major 
Arun Bahadur Singh forced 
soldier Ram Bahadur 
Chaudhary to continue 
exercise after complaining 
of chest pain. The soldier 
died as a result, and the 
troops were furious with 
major. 
Cambodia  811 8/10/1946 1 0 Rebel soldiers (members of 
the Burma Rifles battalions) 
mutinied and seized the 
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Rangoon. They advanced 
southward in an attempt to 
overrun Rangoon and 
establish military rule, 
according to the article. 
However, this event is not 
coded by Powell and Thyne. 
There seems to be no direct 
action made at the 
executive. The rebel troops 
captured Thayetmo, 
petroleum center. The 
mutiny appeared to last 
around 20 days. 
Cambodia  811 8/11/1948 0 0 Rebel soldiers mutinied in 
Thayetmyo.  The 
government forces indicated 
that they had the situation 
under control after four 
days. The article does not 
give a clear reason for the 
mutiny other than rebel 
soldiers may align with 
communist factions. The 
government assured 
civilians that everything 
would be okay and there 
would be no food shortages 
despite food and commodity 
price shocks. 
Cambodia  811 10/24/1978 1 0 Troops kill senior officers 
and take over airport control 
tower. This mutiny was in 
response to a purge of the 
military earlier in the year. 
Cambodia  811 7/1/1979 1 0 Article doesn't give many 
specific details about the 
event. It says "hundreds of 
soldiers of the puppet Heng 
Samrin army of Kampuchea 
stationed in a barrack near 
Kompong Cham recently 
staged an uprising against 
the control of the 
Vietnamese aggressor 
troops..." The mutineers 
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killed many Vietnamese 
troops and crossed over to 
Pol Pot's army. 
Cambodia  811 10/4/1981 1 0 A two day mutiny occurred 
in Kompong Thom when 
Cambodian soldiers were 
forced by Vietnamese 
enemies to carry out orders 
in Kampuchea. The 
mutineers used tanks and 
cannons against the 
Vietnamese, causing deaths 
on both sides. The soldiers 
were upset due to the 
Vietnamese use of chemical 
weapons and genocidal acts 
in Kampuchea. 
Cambodia  811 12/16/1985 0 0 Cambodian troops mutinied 
against the allied 
Vietnamese occupation 
troops. The mutineers were 
upset over the forcible 
recruitment of local people 
to work at security posts 
near the border. The 
Cambodian mutineers (850 
soldiers strong) seized two 
tanks and five trucks. This 
mutiny set back the 
Vietnamese strategy in 
Cambodia. 
Cambodia  811 1/10/1986 1 0 5 truckloads of Cambodian 
soldiers mutinied when they 
arrived in Thmar Puok. 
They killed 6 Vietnamese 
soldiers then fled back to 
their hometowns. There 
were several small mutinies 
this month. They were in 
protest to orders given by 
the Vietnamese to conduct 
operation in the jungle. 
Cambodia  811 8/17/1986 1 0 Cambodian soldiers 
mutinied in Chakrei Ting 
against a company of 
Vietnamese soldiers. They 
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were upset because 
Vietnamese soldiers were 
forcibly recruiting 
Cambodians to fight. The 
mutiny was violent, 13 
Vietnamese were killed, and 
24 injured. 
Cambodia  811 5/23/1987 1 0 100 Cambodian soldiers 
deserted their post at a 
Vietnamese (ACO) military 
training center. They killed 
a number of Vietnamese 
soldiers and fled to their 
homes. They took their 
weapons with them, in order 
to defend their villages and 
families from the DK 
national army. 
Cambodia  811 7/22/1988 1 0 200 Cambodian soldiers 
deserted after being ordered 
to the Pailin battlefield by 
Vietnamese officers. They 
revolted a killed some of 
these officers. It appears 
that most mutineers returned 
home after the event. 
Cambodia  811 9/6/1989 0 0 This mutiny appears to be a 
classic example of 
desertion. 500 forcibly 
recruited soldiers deserted 
their posts upon being sent 
to the Pailin battlefield, 
which they felt meant 
certain death. 
Cambodia  811 2/4/1990 1 1 Troops mutiny and rampage 
through Koh Kong. Soldiers 
reportedly destroyed houses 
and property. Troops were 
disgruntled about longer 
deployment than they were 
promised. 
Laos  812 11/12/1960 0 0 The article does not give 
many details about the 
mutiny event but states that 
troops defected in Luang 
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Prabang to right wing 
rebels. 
Laos  812 3/25/1965 0 0 Article doesn't give many 
details about this event. 
500-1,000 soldiers rebelled 
and seized the town of 
Thakhek. They were given a 
48 hour ultimatum to 
surrender but ultimately fled 
north. Although this event 
occurs in close proximity to 
a coup, there is not attempt 
made to depose the 
executive. 
Laos  812 4/19/1965 0 0 300 soldiers mutinied in 
support of an exiled rightist 
general, Phoumi Nosavan. 
The mutineers deserted their 
positions in the Mekong 
River town of Paksane. 
While this event occurs in 
close temporal proximity to 
a coup, the act of desertion 
clearly makes this event a 
mutiny. These 300 soldiers 
make no attempt to oust the 
executive. 
Laos  812 10/21/1966 1 0 Powell and Thyne have this 
event coded as a coup. 
However, its clear that the 
mutineers are targeting 
military leadership at the 
beginning of the event. 
Since they target military 
headquarters, this is a 
mutiny event that picks up 
steam and also becomes 
coup activity. 
Vietnam 816 7/9/1980 1 0 40 Vietnamese soldiers at 
Phum Anlung Toek rebelled 
against their commanders. 
They killed these two 
commanders and fled home 
to Vietnam. These 
commanders were notorious 
for being cruel and 
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threatened to kill any 
Vietnamese soldiers who 
refused to go on operations. 
Vietnam 816 7/10/1980 1 0 22 soldiers mutinied and 
lobbed grenades at company 
commanders then fled 
home. They were constantly 
ordered to go on operation. 
Additionally, Vietnamese 
soldiers from the North and 
South were in daily conflict 
with each other. The Khmer 
soldiers and the Vietnamese 
often fired at each other. 
This constant conflict made 
conditions very dangerous 
for soldiers. 
Vietnam 816 3/4/1981 1 0 The article doesn’t give 
many details, but a fight 
broke out within a 
Vietnamese unit in the 
village of Thnol Tah. The 
fight ended with 15 
casualties. 
Vietnam 816 3/30/1981 1 0 Mutineers killed three of 
their own officers and 19 of 
them fled. It appears that the 
soldiers were deserting their 
posts to go home. 
Vietnam 816 9/30/1981 0 0 10 Vietnamese soldiers flew 
across the border into 
China's Guangzi Zhuang 
region. They explained that 
they were unhappy with 
their conditions in Vietnam. 
They flew the helicopter 
into Chinese airspace and 
hung a white flag. They 
were led by Luit. Khieu 
Than Luc. While 10 
individuals falls below the 
threshold of a mutiny, 
because they were led by a 
higher ranking official, this 
meets the formal definition 
of a mutiny. 
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Vietnam 816 8/4/1982 1 0 Vietnamese soldiers posted 
in Trapeang Svay mutinied 
against their commander 
and killed him. They fled 
back home to Vietnam. 
They deserted their posts 
due to low morale among 
soldiers fighting in 
Kampuchea. 
Vietnam 816 9/30/1984 1 0 Vietnamese soldiers 
mutinied in Prey Veng 
province. They began firing 
on commanders when the 
commanders threatened to 
kill them with pistols after 
refusing orders to fight in 
Kampuchea. 
Vietnam 816 6/25/1992 1 0 13 Vietnamese soldiers 
from a platoon in Treng 
were angry with aggressive 
and abusive commanders. 
The mutineers lobbed 
grenades and the 
commanders and killed two 
of them. They then fled 
back to Vietnam. 
The Repulic 
of Vietnam 
817 4/2/1966 0 0 Three thousand South 
Vietnamese troops marched 
through the streets of Hue in 
protest of the military 
government. These soldiers 
were encouraged to protest 
by their officers. The article 
discusses a number of other 
dissident activities, but this 
appears to be the only 
mutiny event with military 
actors involved. 
The Repulic 
of Vietnam 
817 4/27/1969 0 0 The article indicates that the 
Vietcong were defecting in 
gradual waves all spring. 
However, it specifically 
mentions that 556 soldiers 
defected from Sedac. The 
article points out that most 
of these defectors are very 
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young men that failed to 
adopt the ideology of the 
Vietcong. 
Philippines  840 3/21/1968 1 0 Soldiers at a military camp 
mutinied and deserted their 
post due to harsh conditions. 
The camp was on 
Corregidor island. The 
mutineers killed the camp 
commander. 
Philippines  840 4/18/1987 1 0 50 soldiers mutiny and try 
to free comrades that were 
in jail after the unsuccessful 
coup of the previous 
January. This is not a coup 
attempt, as the target was 
not the executive, although 
it comes at a time when the 
Philippines were 
particularly apt for coup 
activity. 
Philippines  840 11/30/1989 1 1 A rebellion from within the 
Philippine Military came 
despite the government's 
claim that the attempted 
coup against president 
Corazon C. Aquino had 
been crushed. This is clearly 
a mutiny as rebel soldiers 
were fighting within the 
army headquarters at Camp 
Aguinaldo. Rebel soldiers 
were using cannons and 
various other weapons 
against state loyal forces. 
This was not a counter coup 
or an attempt at ousting the 
executive, although it 
happens wihtin close 
temporal proximity to the 
Dec. 3 coup. One article 
points out that the main 
objective of the mutineers 
was to kill the country's 
military leadership (Ramon 
Montanto, the chief of the 
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constabulary forces and 
Renato de Villa the army 
chief of staff). 
Philippines  840 10/4/1990 0 0 Major Cerdena led about 
200 soldiers and took 
control of a military camp in 
Butuan. This event was 
followed by a clear coup 
attempt, however, this act of 
taking over a military camp 
does not explicitly target the 
executive. Thus, this event 
is a mutiny. 
Philippines  840 7/27/2003 0 0 300 soldiers mutiny against 
Mrs. Arroyo, who enjoyed 
large amounts of support 
from Bush Administration. 
The mutiny was clearly 
organized by officers, not 
just haphazardly thrown 
together by idealistic foot 
soldiers. The Philippines 
has one of the most corrupt 
military organizations. The 
Bush Administration had 
actually supported 70 of the 
officers that turned out to be 
rebellious, prior to their 
sedition.  Referred to as the 
"Oakwood mutiny" 
Philippines  840 11/29/2007 1 0 30 officers and soldiers on 
trial for coup plotting in 
2003 and 2006 walked out 
of the courtroom during 
their trial and 
commandeered the nearby 
Peninsula Manila Hotel. 
They demanded the ouster 
of President Arroyo and 
were calling for a dissident 
movement against the 
government. 
Indonesia  850 4/13/1950 1 0 Capt. Andi Abdul Aziz, 26 
year old, led a mutiny 
against the central 
government. The forces 
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under Captain Aziz were 
Indonesian soldiers that had 
recently transferred to the 
Indonesian Army from the 
Royal Netherlands 
Indonesian army after 
independence in December 
of 1950. The revolt was 
largely in response to the 
disbanding of the Royal 
Netherlands Indonesian 
Army and its subsequent 
absorption into the 
Indonesian army. 
Indonesia  850 12/22/1956 0 0 Colonel Simbolon and 
5,000 rebel soldiers 
declared that they had 
seceded from Indonesia's 
central government because 
the president had failed to 
clean up corruption as the 
army had been putting 
pressure on him to do so. 
The mutiny appeared to be 
non-violent. 
Indonesia  850 3/9/1957 0 0 Colonel Barlian, 
commander of the Second 
Territorial District, 
announced that Jakarta had 
failed to lead the country 
toward attainment of its 
ideals and for this reason 
stated that he was going to 
take over administrative 
processes. 
Indonesia  850 3/15/1958 1 0 Rebel soldiers turned on the 
government and seized the 
military center of Medan, a 
strategic location. The 
mutiny only lasted 1 day, 
before U.S. trained military 
officials took back control 
of Medan. The original 
cause of the mutiny is 
unclear. 
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Indonesia  850 11/3/1996 0 0 Timorese soldiers in the 
Indonesian army serving in 
East Timor mutiny after the 
death of a sergeant. 
Sergeant was killed by 
Indonesian soldiers, not east 
Timor rebels, as the 
Indonesian army claimed. 
300 soldiers refused to 
return to barracks and 
insisted on answers 
surrounding their leader’s 
death. 
Indonesia  850 9/7/1999 0 0 Troops mutiny in East 
Timor, threatening 
Indonesian democracy. 
Article does not give much 
information about the 
motivation of the mutineers, 
other than resisting 
Indonesia's power over the 
military apparatus. 
Indonesia  850 5/20/2001 0 0 Military signals its defiance 
by protesting in very clear 
opposition to the presidents 
tactics to stave off 
impeachment proceedings. 
They parade through the 
streets in opposition. 
Indonesia  850 6/2/2001 0 0 Police and military troops 
mutiny because Wahid 
dismissed the chief, gen. 
Suroyo Bimantoro. 
Mutineers accused the 
president of trying to 
politicize the police and 
military in order to secure 
his own tenure. 
Indonesia  850 4/29/2009 1 0 Indonesian soldiers 
mutinied against a 
commander in Indonesia's 
Papua Province. 100 
soldiers participated in the 
mutiny. The mutiny was 
specifically targeted at the 
battalion commander. Shots 
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were fired in the air, but no 
one was injured. The 
soldiers were upset because 
of the commander's decision 
over returning a body of a 
dead soldier as a function of 
the cost of this action. 
East Timor  860 2/8/2006 0 0 Troops mutiny because of 
poor living conditions and 
selective promotions. 
Troops are largely made up 
of what used to be rebel 
fighters (fighting for 
independence from 
Indonesia). 
East Timor  860 4/28/2006 1 0 Half of the East Timor 
military mutinied. This 
mutiny was largely led by 
officers that felt they had 
been passed over for 
promotion. A number of 
soldiers were killed during 
the unrest. Situation 
eventually brought under 
control by Australian 
troops. 
Australia  900 12/6/2012 0 0 Pilots refuse to fly new 
Tiger attack helicopters 
because of safety concerns 
surrounding fumes in the 
cockpit. Pilots were upset 
that there was not a decision 
to suspend flying until 
technical issues were 
resolved. 
Papua New 
Guinea  
910 1/3/1961 0 0 80 soldiers protested over 
pay. They clashed with 
local, civilian police forces. 
60 soldiers were arrested. 
Papua New 
Guinea  
910 3/17/1997 0 0 PNG government hired 
mercenaries to control and 
respond to a 9 year rebellion 
on the island of 
Bougainville. This 
infuriated the army that 
mutinied and rioted for 9 
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days. They were joined by 
civilian protesters that 
blockaded the parliament 
building and refused to let 
lawmakers leave. This 
spurred the PM to step 
down voluntarily. 
Papua New 
Guinea  
910 5/5/1997 0 0 Soldiers took up arms in 
support of brig-gen Jeery 
singirok who led the 
3/17/1997 mutiny. Soldiers 
loyal to Gen. Singirok 
armed themselves in 
expectation of a policy 
attempt to aren't the former 
commander. Mutiny appears 
to be peaceful. 
Papua New 
Guinea  
910 3/14/2001 0 0 Troops mutiny because the 
government planned to cut 
the military in half (to 1,900 
men). 100 soldiers seized 
weapons at Murray 
Barracks in Port Moresby. 
The government quickly 
scrapped these plans. The 
mutiny was peaceful even 
though weapons were 
seized. 
Papua New 
Guinea  
910 3/9/2002 0 0 PNG defense force troops 
mutiny for 10 days in 
response to a retrenchment 
scheme (reduction of 
forces). The renegade 
soldiers took control of 
Moem Barracks in Wewak. 
Mutiny seems peaceful. 
Papua New 
Guinea  
910 1/26/2012 1 0 This mutiny event happens 
in very close temporal 
proximity to a coup attempt. 
However, there is a mutiny 
event because soldiers were 
targeting military leadership 
and seeking to depose 
military leaders, not the 
executive. The mutineers 
placed Brigadier Agwi 
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under house arrest. The 
mutineers were led by 
Colonel Yaura Sasa. 
New 
Zealand  
920 9/16/1945 0 0 150 airmen of the New 
Zealand air force mutinied 
at a hangar in Whenuapai. 
They were upset because 
they were demanding an 
earlier release to civilian life 
and were protesting 
mustering out delays. 
New 
Zealand  
920 10/10/1945 0 0 This event is similar to the 
9/1945 New Zealand 
Mutiny. Airmen of the New 
Zealand air force mutinied 
at the Rapa Island Station. 
The men quit their duties for 
two hours in protest of 
demobilization delays and 
the conditions in which they 
were serving. The men 
eventually resumed their 
duties when they were told 
that their chief demand (a 5 
day work week) would be 
granted. 
Vanuatu  935 9/27/1996 0 0 Vanuatu paramilitary 
officers mutiny over low 
and delayed pay. A 
spokesmen of the 
paramilitary said over radio 
broadcast that the 
paramilitaries were "in 
command" but that it was 
not a military takeover. 
Fiji  950 11/2/2000 1 0 This event is confusing, 
because there are many 
stories only written at the 
point of the trial of the 
soldiers. This specific story 
indicates that 63 soldiers 
were tried for a mutiny that 
occurred in November of 
2000. There was a coup in 
May of 2000. This mutiny is 
largely in response to the 
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coup. A high ranking 
military official appears to 
have encouraged this event. 
Fiji  950 5/17/2011 0 0 A high level military 
official, Lieutenant- Colonel 
Ratu Tevita Mara, defected 
to Tonga after being falsely 
accused of trying to depose 
the president. The defector 
said that the military regime 
has been responsible for 
heavy amounts of repression 
and military style torture of 
civilians at the Queen 
Elizabeth barracks in Suva. 
Although this is only one 
actor, it counts as a mutiny 
because this is a high 
ranking official. 
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